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INTRODUCTION
"[Tihe broad interests of the Attorney General necessarily entail
protecting the public against any social and economic disadvantages
which may be occasioned by the activities and functioning of public
charities ...."'
"I'm there fighting for the people of Hershey and the people of central
Pennsylvania. This is the job that I have as the attorney general of
Pennsylvania. The fact that I'm running for governor in this great
commonwealth of ours has absolutely no role in the action that my
office and I are taking in this case."
2
"'It just wouldn't have been right to have Hershey Park called Wrigley
Field."'
3
Assets of nonprofit organizations are not governmental assets. Anglo-
American law recognizes the authority of private parties to create, fund, and
operate nonprofit organizations for public purposes. Importantly, the public served
by a particular charity is not necessarily--or even often--the general public.
Rather, a given nonprofit serves the indefinite class of beneficiaries chosen by its
creators, funders, governing board, and, in some cases, members-but not by the
state.
Regulation of the two legal forms of charity-trust and corporate-varies
somewhat from state to state both as a matter of formal law and in practice.
Basically, every state attorney general enjoys the role known as parens patriae-
inherited from the English view of the sovereign as father of the country-to
oversee the performance of charitable trusts and their fiduciaries. 4 A few state
constitutions commit jurisdiction over charitable trusts to the courts rather than to
1. Pennsylvania Attorney General, Petition for Citation for Rule to Show Cause Why a
Proposed Sale of Trust Assets Constituting the Controlling Interest in Hershey Foods
Corporation Should Not Be Conditioned Upon Court Approval at TI 16-18, In re Milton
Hershey School Trust (Orphans' Court Div., Ct. Common Pleas, Dauphin County, Aug. 12,
2002), available at http:llwww.attorneygeneral.gov/ppdlcharitylPDF/Hershey-Petition.pdf
(emphasis in original).
2. Business Center (CNBC television broadcast, Sept. 6, 2002), available at
http://www.lexis.con/research, Transcripts File. Subsequently, the voice-over in a Fisher
campaign broadcast intoned: 'TIhen he fought to block the sale of Hershey Foods, saving
6,000 more critical jobs." Peter L. DeCoursey, Pennsylvania Attorney General Will Use
Hershey Sale Halt in Campaign Ads, PATRIOT-NEws, Sept. 26, 2002 (quoting a new "30-
second 'Jobs' commercial for the campaign ad of Republican gubernatorial candidate Mike
Fisher").
3. Steven Pearlstein, For Hershey Trust, the Outcome Is Bittersweet, WASH. POST, Sept.
19, 2002, at El (quoting Attorney General Mike Fisher's explanation for why he sought a
restraining order on the Hershey Trust's sale of its stock in Hershey Foods, which
abandoned talks with Win. R. Wrigley, Jr. Co.).
4. See, e.g., Commonwealth of Kentucky ex rel. Ferguson v. Gardner, 327 S.W.2d 947,
948 (Ky. App. 1959) ("The asserted right of the Attorney General to intervene ...is
predicated on the ancient English doctrine that the King, as parens patriae, superintended the
administration of charities and acted by the attorney general, who was his proper officer in
that respect."); see generally MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATION: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 301 (2004).
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the legislature, and state laws on nonprofit corporations differ as to the authority
specifically granted to the attorney general. Moreover, as a practical matter, few
state attorneys general have the funding and inclination to engage in aggressive
charity enforcement. Indeed, the very lack of state involvement with the
organization and operation of nonprofit entities might explain how legislatures,
attorneys general, and even courts can misconstrue their proper roles in the
regulation of charities and other nonprofits.
Of course, nonprofit assets and activities exist within a social and political
structure.5 Nonprofit wealth and operations attract the most attention when the
public sector experiences particular financial stress. For example, it is not
surprising that the Connecticut attorney general recently charged Yale New Haven
Hospital with failing to make adequate distributions from donated "free bed funds"
to those who might otherwise draw on the state's overburdened Medicaid system.
6
More systematically, the ongoing shakeout in the hospital industry and the
consequent consolidation of some nonprofit hospitals-or even their "conversion"
to for-profit status-has driven many states to seek a more central role in the use of
charitable assets. Astonishingly, in New York and possibly elsewhere, the state
governor and legislature engineered the conversion of New York's nonprofit Blue
Cross entity in a manner that results in ninety-five percent of the conversion
proceeds being paid directly to public coffers.7
When faced with the flight or loss of significant nonprofit assets from a
locality, state regulators, courts, and the legislature sometimes mobilize to secure
the border. The manifestation of that uniquely state-level syndrome, parochialism,
follows a predictable path. Most generally, the rationale for charity-and, in
particular, for the tax exemption that charity has enjoyed-is often expressed as
"lessening the burdens of government," 8 and in this context charity very much
5. Beyond the scope of this Article are the nonprofit organizations created by, or for the
benefit of, governmental bodies. Notably, the now-common practice for public universities
to rely on fund-raising by private booster foundations raises troubling issues of governance
and disclosure. See, e.g., Julianne Basinger, Georgia Battle Pits Board Against Board,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 28, 2003, at Al:
[S]ome boards [of regents] have had to deal with legislative caps on
the amount of state money that can be used for presidents' pay. Other
boards have worried about the political repercussions of using
taxpayers' money to raise presidential compensation. The result has
been ever more reliance on private funds. A handful of presidents have
even signed two contracts, one for their foundation compensation and
another for their university pay.
6. See Press Release, Connecticut Attorney General's Office, Attorney General Sues
Yale New Haven Hospital (Feb. 20, 2003), available at http://www.cslib.org/attygenl/press/
2003/health/yale.htm; see generally Jane Gordon, At Hospitals, a Cushion for the Poor, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 2003, at 14CN.
7. See Part I.D & E.
8. See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax
Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585, 590 (1998) [hereinafter Brody, Sovereignty]. "[L]essening
the burdens of government" is only one route to federal income tax exemption as a charity
under regulations issued under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3). Id. To come within
that particular provision, the organization must demonstrate that the government considers
the organization's activities to be its burden. Generally, for property-tax exemption, states
have not adopted a narrow "'essential government function' test." Am. Museum of Fly
Fishing, Inc. v. Town of Manchester, 557 A.2d 900, 901 (Vt. 1989) (adopting instead a
2004]
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begins at home. But this is an incomplete view of the charitable sector. Granted, a
trust for governmental or municipal purposes is a charity. 9 But even the broader
conception that charities must further the "public interest" or "benefit the
community"' 0 oversimplifies the purposes for which the law permits charities to be
organized and operated. Notably, in concurring in the Bob Jones University v.
United States decision, Justice Powell observed that over 106,000 organizations
filed information returns as section 501(c)(3) organizations in 1981. He found "it
impossible to believe that all or even most of those organizations could prove that
they 'demonstrably serve and [are] in harmony with the public interest' or that they
are 'beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life.""'
More subtly, parochialism is built into our conception of private philanthropy.
Donor wishes must be honored, and donors often think locally. The attorney
general then becomes tempted to extrapolate the local nature of a charity's
founding and current operations to all of its assets, explicitly restricted or not, and
so seeks to confine the charity to its "community." Now we mix in paternalism.
Charity regulation appropriately concentrates on remedying fiduciary self-dealing
rather than second-guessing a board's business judgment, but it is not always easy
to separate the dual obligations of loyalty and care. An attorney general, court, or
even legislature might become convinced that a charity board acting contrary to the
wishes of "the community" is breaching the duty of loyalty to the charity.
This Article develops a legal framework for appropriate state enforcement
activity in charity matters that tend to invite public parochialism and paternalism.
Part I describes the legal structure for state oversight of nonprofits, focusing on
charities and the dual strands of charity trust law and nonprofit corporation law. 12
Because the attorney general as prosecutor is only a party in a dispute over charity
operations, we also examine the role of the courts. Third, we bring in the
legislatures' ambivalence about attorney general oversight of charities, as revealed
in budgetary and staffing decisions and jurisdictional impediments. This discussion
reminds us that it was ever thus-that regulation of charities' investment assets as
well as operating assets can provide a political cushion for the community or the
"public use" test). In whatever form, however, the subsidy theory places charities in a
position subordinate to the state, which can decide the parameters of its burdens. See, e.g.,
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 598-600 (1997)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28(e) & cmt. k (2003).
10. See id. at § 28(0; see also id. at § 29 & cmt. (Purposes and Provisions That Are
Unlawful or Against Public Policy); Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice, and Exit: The
Constitutional Bounds of the Right of Association, 35 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 821 (2002)
[hereinafter Brody, Right of Association].
11. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 608 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring). The Bob Jones "public policy" test has not been extended to other forms of
discriminatory activity, such as sex discrimination, or to racial discrimination beyond the
educational context. See generally Miriam Galston, Public Policy Constraints on Charitable
Organizations, 3 VA. TAX REv. 291 (1984); see also David A. Brennen, The Power of the
Treasury: Racial Discrimination, Public Policy, and "Charity" in Contemporary Society, 33
U.C. DAViS L. REv. 389 (2000) (describing some of the problems and dangers of extending
the Treasury's public policy power beyond racial discrimination).
12. In addition, federal tax law provides a uniform, minimum level of regulation. See
Evelyn Brody, A Taxing Time for the Bishop Estate: What Is the I.R.S. Role in Charity
Governance?, 21 U. HAw. L. REv. 537 (1999) (Bishop Estate Symposium Issue) [hereinafter
Brody, Bishop Estate].
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state. 3
In the last few years, the issues addressed in this Article have played out across
the country at an accelerating rate. The case studies in Part II illustrate in detail
three troubling levels of increasing state parochialism and paternalism over charity
assets:
1. Near-seizure of assets. The Fall 2002 Hershey Trust case
is a trifecta: eventually all three branches of Pennsylvania
government combined to pressure the Milton Hershey School
Trust to abandon plans for selling its controlling interest in
Hershey Foods as a diversification of an investment worth over
$5 billion, thereby preserving the local operations of the publicly
traded company. The attorney general, who was running for
governor, had won a preliminary injunction against the sale, and
participated in a shakeup of the board shortly after losing the
gubernatorial election. The outgoing governor signed a bill that
would require the Trust to obtain court approval, with attorney
general and community input, before any future sale.
The case study of the Illinois-based Terra Foundation for the
Arts illustrates similar issues with respect to operating assets,
rather than investment assets. As a result of attorney general
action, the board of the financially troubled charity abandoned
an exploration of moving to Washington, D.C.; instead, it will
close its museum and place its major pieces on long-term loan to
the Art Institute of Chicago.
These and other cases described in Part II illustrate the
efforts of attorneys general (if not the legislature) to influence
the make-up of the nonprofit board. Notably, in the case of
Minnesota-based HealthPartners, a court ruled that the attorney
general's desired appointee to the board would instead serve as a
special administrator, a compromise acceptable to the objecting
nonprofit.
2. Warring States. The for-profit hospital chain HCA, Inc.
submitted a winning bid of $1.125 billion to acquire the assets of
nonprofit Health Midwest, the largest health system in the
Kansas City area-and one that straddles two states. Then the
fight began over control of an expected $700-800 million that
would create one or more "conversion foundations." Health
Midwest brought suit to clarify the jurisdiction of the attorneys
general of Missouri and Kansas, both of whom responded by
suing to remove the Health Midwest board for abandoning their
charitable purpose. In the resulting spring 2003 settlements-
after all, no politician really wanted to stop the sale---the
proceeds will fund two separate conversion foundations, one in
each state and each operating under extraordinary attorney
general supervision. After expenses, the foundations will be
13. True to charity's trust law origins, to some degree we are really speaking of
property law, not corporate law.
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funded with about $520 million.
3. Noncharitable, Mutual-Benefit Nonprofits-Singing the
Blues. In 2003 Maryland adopted legislation barring CareFirst
from converting to for-profit status for five years, and giving
state officials extraordinary power over the board, to the
consternation of regulators in Delaware and District of
Columbia, whose residents may subscribe to affiliated plans.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina abruptly
abandoned its plan to convert in the face of continuing
regulatory deliberation, as did the plan in New Jersey
(Washington state's is faltering). Each of these transactions
would have resulted in the funding of charitable "conversion"
foundations whose income would have addressed health-care
needs of state residents. But the Empire Blue Cross case in New
York presents the starkest example of state control: Legislation
authorized the conversion on condition that 95 percent of the
conversion proceeds are payable directly to the state; proceeds
are escrowed pending court challenge.
In all of these cases-as well as several others--the state has blurred the line
between private and public by seeking to install local business and political leaders
(even political contributors) to the charity board. 14
It is fair to ask whether these situations represent a trend or general threat. As
any public-choice scholar would hypothesize, the state may be tempted by a well-
financed charity that occupies a unique position, and is politically isolated from its
natural allies, both nonprofit and for-profit. However, while not many charities may
identify with the fate of the charities in these cases, attorneys general might become
emboldened by short-term success, and seek further enlargements of their
authority. Moreover, it is the rare private party that has legal standing to complain
about attorney general overreaching, and, even when it could fight, the targeted
charity usually (if not almost always) prefers a quiet settlement to a court contest.
Thus we do not know whether these well-publicized cases are truly isolated or
rather represent the tip of an iceberg. Much (if not most) charity enforcement
activity occurs below the radar screen of court decisions.15 A case that does go to
court might result in no written or reported opinion, and published decisions occur
so sporadically in most jurisdictions that it is risky to read them as considered state
law and policy. More commonly, cases arise and settle without any public
attention. Even when one side or the other seeks publicity, news stories might serve
as the only source of information. Unfortunately, press accounts sometimes
oversimplify (if not contain factual and legal mistakes), and appear only if editors
and publishers deem them newsworthy. All of these factors combine to remind us
of the old warning that the plural of anecdote is not data.16 In defense, let me say
14. As described in Part II, appointment power can come through attorney general
action (e.g., HealthPartners, Red Sox, Terra, Hershey) or by legislation, particularly relating
to heath care conversions (e.g., Health Midwest, CareFirst, and Empire Blue Cross).
15. See Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REv. 1400,
1409-11 (1998) [hereinafter Brody, Fiduciary Law].
16. Professor David Hyman likes to add: "It's legislation." This prediction was borne
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that the recent proliferation of anecdotes in the area of charity enforcement
indicates, if not a trend, then certainly the outer limits of troubling state action.
These "big deals," which garner intense press coverage, might inure the public-if
not public officials themselves-to the notion that the states' successes reflect
appropriate law.
Inevitably, if the proper legal bounds of legitimate enforcement do not become
clearer, the role of charities in society could suffer. While our major charities do
not face direct seizure of assets-as occurred in England when Henry VIII
dissolved the monasteries-strict regulation can accomplish much the same thing.1
7
As I once wrote about the Internal Revenue Service in a charity administration
matter: "[Flew charities, small or large, can afford such a high-stakes gamble by
challenging the IRS over their very claims to exemption: Until the case is resolved
in court, donations could dry up, tax-exempt bond covenants could be breached,
and local governments might challenge property-tax exemption." 18 Charities facing
state attorney general inquiry similarly worry about loss of donations, loss of
contracts and patronage, and retention of staff and volunteers. Nevertheless, should
charities too quickly accede to state demands over matters of discretionary
governance, the sector as a whole can see a degradation in charities' willingness to
take risks, and in volunteer board members' willingness to serve.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CHARITY LAW REGULATION
State charity oversight and enforcement, operating within the confines of the
federal and state constitutions, involve all three branches of state government. In
historic order, the attorneys general (as parens patriae) and courts have long
overseen charitable trusts. More recently, legislatures have enacted statutes that
enable the creation of nonprofit corporations, codify the law of charitable trusts,
regulate industries in which nonprofits engage, provide general structures for
attorney general and court jurisdiction, and provide specific legal regimes for such
transactions as nonprofit hospital "conversions." As we will see, for a variety of
institutional reasons, the most important state player is the attorney general, but the
attorney general could not enjoy the power he or she does in the absence of an
accommodating legal landscape.
A. Constitutional Protections
The powers of the state are not unbounded. Private philanthropy and the
nonprofit sector rest on the fundamental constitutional guarantees of private
property, liberty of contract, and freedom of worship and expression. These rights
are not absolute, however. The government retains the power to regulate the use of
property short of a "taking" before having to pay just compensation under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. However, the government can infringe on the First
Amendment right of expression only if it has a compelling state interest and
neutrally applies the least restrictive means.' 9 In 1819, the Supreme Court applied
out in several of the cases discussed in Part II (Hershey, Health Midwest, CareFirst, and
Empire Blue Cross).
17. See Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of Dynasty, 39
ARiz. L. REv. 873 (1997) [hereinafter Brody, Charitable Endowments].
18. Brody, Bishop Estate, supra note 12, at 545.
19. Brody, Right of Association, supra note 10, at 848 (discussing, among other cases,
2004]
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the Contracts Clause to decide that a corporate charter is a contract that cannot be
unilaterally amended by a state legislature. 20 The state does not have the authority
to terminate a charitable trust, although the court may apply the cy pres doctrine,
described below, when it becomes necessary to alter the charitable purpose.2'
For certain charities, the spillover effect of their tax exemption can extend
beyond the state borders, to the consternation of the host state.22 For example, the
Vermont Supreme Court recognized the exemption of a building used for the
administration of a charity operating out-of-state group homes, foster homes, and
other assisted living programs for those with developmental and other disabilities.
The court rejected the town's argument "that implicit in the definition of public use
is a requirement that the people served must be primarily citizens of Vermont and
the Town because the Legislature would have no reason to make property exempt
to benefit residents of other states." 
23
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution guards against certain forms of
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)).
20. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). As described
nearly a century later by the high court of New York:
As soon as it was realized that the principle of the decision applied to
the charters of all corporations and placed them forever beyond the
power of legislation, the situation caused great anxiety throughout the
nation. It was felt that danger threatened the public welfare when a
thing created by law was placed beyond control of law.
Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 87 N.E. 443, 446 (N.Y. 1909). As a result, state
corporation statutes began to include reserved powers to enact legislation that would have
the effect of amending corporate charters; moreover, the legislature in New York, for
example, rejected a proposed exception for "religious, literary and charitable societies." Id.
The New York Court of Appeals ruled that "the legislature under its reserved power may
amend any charter in any respect that is not fundamental when the object of the corporation
and property acquired by it are considered... [;] it can regulate investments, methods of
administration and details of procedure in the interest of the public and of all concerned." Id.
21. See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 131 N.E. 31, 32 (Mass. 1921) (footnotes
omitted):
Gifts to trustees or to eleemosynary corporations, accepted by them to
be held upon trusts expressed in writing or necessarily implied from the
nature of the transaction, constitute obligations which ought to be
enforced and held sacred under the Constitution. It is not within the
power of the Legislature to terminate a charitable trust, to change its
administration on grounds of expediency, or to seek to control its
disposition under the doctrine of cy pres.... Determination of the uses
to which shall be devoted trusts no longer susceptible of execution
according to their foundation is a well-recognized branch of chancery
jurisdiction.
See also Bd. of Regents v. Trs. of the Endowment Fund, 112 A.2d 678 (Md. 1955) (holding
unconstitutional a statute that effected the complete transfer of management and control over
a nonprofit corporate endowment fund to the University of Maryland Board of Regents).
22. See generally Evelyn Brody, Legal Theories of Tax Exemption: A Sovereignty
Perspective, in PROPERTY-TAx EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATrLEFIELD 145
(Evelyn Brody ed., 2002). See, e.g., Yale Club of Chi. v. Dep't of Revenue, 574 N.E.2d 31,
37 (l. App. Ct. 1991) ("An organization designed to benefit Yale exclusively does not
appear to dispense its benefits to an indefinite number of people, or all those who need and
apply for it. The State of Illinois and its taxpayers receive no apparent relief from any
economic burden by the [Yale Club of Chicago]'s activities.").
23. Inst. of Prof'l Practice, Inc. v. Town of Berlin, 811 A.2d 1238, 1241 (Vt. 2002).
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state parochialism. In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Maine statute
that exenpted nonprofit summer camps only if they primarily served Maine
residents. The Court accepted the argument that charitable activity is entitled to
protection of the Commerce Clause, which prohibits states from discriminating in
interstate commerce. Distinguishing direct governmental grants from tax
exemption, though, the Court suggested that it would likely uphold an outright
subsidy targeted either to Maine residents or to camps serving residents.
25
However, four justices, who could not conceive of charities as businesses,
strenuously objected to the application of the Commerce Clause. Moreover,
adopting a subsidy approach but rejecting a constitutional distinction between tax
exemption and direct grants, the dissenters would also have permitted Maine to
target tax exemption to charities whose services lessen the burdens of state
government. Scholars are currently debating whether a constitutional distinction
between tax subsidies and direct subsidies can be sustained.26
Camps Newfound applies to parochial income tax legislation as well as in the
property tax context. The Minnesota Supreme Court cited the case to strike down a
state alternative minimum tax deduction that was allowed only for contributions
made to charities that serve Minnesota residents.27
Ironically, because the Commerce Clause does not bind Congress itself, the
property tax exemption law Congress wrote for the District of Columbia could
properly limit exemption to those charities that benefit District residents. 21 On this
basis, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals confined its role to statutory
interpretation in upholding the District's denial of exemption to the Cato Institute.
29
Interestingly, the trial court had found that the Cato Institute does provide benefits
in the District by focusing its charitable activities on educating Congress. 30 The
24. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
25. The analysis in this paragraph is drawn from Evelyn Brody, Hocking the Halo:
Implications of the Charities' Winning Briefs in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 27
STETSON L. REv. 433, 446-50 (1997).
26. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits" Constitutionally Equivalent to
Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. REv. 379 (1998).
27. Chapman v. Comm'r of Revenue, 651 N.W.2d 825, 833-35 (Minn. 2002). The
taxpayer had made a lump-sum contribution to a donor-advised fund established by the
Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund in Boston, and had argued that future distributions would be
made only to Minnesota charities. The supreme court remanded for a determination of
remedy: expanding or eliminating the Minnesota AMT deduction so that it applied equally
to all charitable donations. In the meantime, the legislature chose the former remedy. MINN.
STATS. § 290.091(2) (2002), amended by 2003 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1st sp. sess., ch. 21,
art. 1, § 9 (West).
28. See Dist. of Columbia v. Helen Dwight Reid Educ. Found., 766 A.2d 28, 37 (D.C.
2001) ("While the dormant commerce clause may prohibit state legislatures and other non-
federal legislative bodies from enacting burdens on interstate commerce, that clause imposes
no limitations on Congress, even when Congress acts 'like a state legislature' in exercising
its plenary power to legislate for the District of Columbia under art. I, § 8, cl. 17 of the
Constitution."). However, the court added: "Cf Milton S. Kronheim & Co., Inc. v. District of
Columbia, 319 U.S. App. D.C. 389, 394-97, 91 F.3d 193, 198-201 (1996) (although
restrictions of dormant commerce clause do not apply to laws enacted by Congress, they do
apply to laws promulgated by the District of Columbia Council)." Id.
29. Dist. of Columbia v. Cato Inst., 829 A.2d 237, 238 (D.C. 2003).
30. Cato Inst. v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 7792-98, 2002 LEXIS STr 148-8 (D.C. Super.
Ct. Tax Div., Aug. 1, 2002).
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Appeals Court disagreed:
The sharing and dissemination of information to people in or of the
District of Columbia does not by itself demonstrate an impact within the
District of Columbia; it is simply an activity that occurs within the
District. There must be some evidence that through the use of Cato's
building and the dissemination of such information there is a benefit,
which inures principally to the public in the District. 31
B. Roles of Branches of State Government
We consider here the role of the three branches of state government in the
enforcement of charity law.
1. The Attorney General as Parens Patriae
Political cynics believe that "A.G." stands not for "attorney general" but for
"aspiring governor. ' 32 In recent years, state attorneys general have dramatically
expanded their role in areas ranging from public health33 to antitrust 34 to Wall
Street.35 Critics have complained that these types of prosecutions, while lucrative
for the states and politically rewarding for the attorneys general, should be left to
the appropriate federal agencies or state legislatures.36
31. Cato Inst., 829 A.2d at 245-46.
32. See, e.g., N.C. Regulators Deny They Would Have Put Blues at a Disadvantage,
BESTWIRE, July 9, 2003 ("[F]ormer Kansas insurance commissioner Kathleen Sebelius
blocked the conversion of the Kansas Blues plan and then used it as part of her campaign to
run successfully for governor.").
33. November 1998 brought a $246 billion settlement agreement signed by forty-six
state attorneys general and major tobacco companies. Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys General,
Master Settlement Agreement, at http://www.naag.org/issues/tobacco/index.php?sdpid=919.
34. In the Microsoft litigation, a few of the states refused to go along with the federal
antitrust settlement reached by the Justice Department. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of
New York State Attorney General, Statement by New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer
and California Attorney General Bill Lockyer Regarding a Remedy in the Microsoft Case
(Sept. 10, 2001), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/200l/sep/seplOa_0l.html
(last visited Feb. 24, 2004). On November 1, 2002, a federal district court judge rejected
most of the remedies sought by the hold-out state attorneys general.
35. See, for example, Merrill Lynch's $100 million fine and agreement to separate
research from investment banking. See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney
General, Spitzer, Merrill Lynch Reach Unprecedented Agreement to Reform Investment
Practices (May 21, 2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/may/may2la
_02.html. But see Matt Fleischer-Black, Independent Means: Eliot Spitzer Can Act Like a
Real Lone Wolf That Could Be a Problem If He Ever Wants to Be the Leader of the Pack,
AM. LAW., Sept. 2002, at 92 (describing Merrill's insistence that the deal be contingent on
the assent of all fifty states, and acceptance, as of August 2002, of only thirty-one). See also
Shawn Young, MCI Restates Away $74.5 Billion, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2004, at B2
(reporting that "the state of Oklahoma dropped its criminal case against [MCI for accounting
fraud] after MCI agreed to cooperate in prosecutions against former executives and to add
1,600 jobs in Oklahoma over 10 years"; the attorney general's office defended the jobs
demand on the ground that because the fraud had victimized the state's pension fund, the
state treasury should benefit).
36. See, e.g., Jaret Seiberg, Spitzer Again Outpoints SEC, THE DEAL, Feb. 26, 2004
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By contrast, only a few state attorneys general have been active in a realm
firmly committed to state regulation and enforcement: the monitoring and oversight
of charities. According to a survey, top state charity officials conceive of
themselves primarily as consumer protectors: their "biggest problem" relates to
charitable solicitations, and whether charities spend their money as represented to
donors.37 And, as described below, those attorneys general who do maintain an
active charities bureau-and the ones housing the most charities and the most
charitable assets-suffer from chronic under-funding and under-staffing. 38 Despite
these handicaps, the state attorneys general have achieved important successes in
educating the public about fraudulent fund raising and challenging wrongdoing,
educating fiduciaries and staffs in meeting their legal obligations and improving
charity governance, rectifying self-dealing and other breaches of fiduciary duty by
charity insiders, and assisting charities that have lost their way to restructure or
dissolve.
Even with regard to nonprofit organizations, though, the state attorney general
remains an inherently political creature. 39 The incentives of this nearly universally
(describing action on February 25, 2004, by the House Committee on Financial Services to
strip from H.R. 2179, the Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003,
a provision that would have pre-empted state securities laws that contradicted federal policy,
and reserved enforcement power to the SEC to the exclusion of state regulators); New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Whose Side Are They On? The Federal Government's Effort
to Curtail State Enforcement of Predatory Lending and Other Consumer Protection Laws,
Lecture at Georgetown University (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
press/statements/georgetown_university.html; see also Martin Morse Wooster, How State
Attorneys General Police Nonprofits: Court Actions Sometimes Distort Charity, Restrict
Free-Market Activity, CAPITAL RESEARCH CTR'S ORG. TRENDS (Aug. 2000), available at
http://www.heartland.org/pdf/64751b.pdf (while generally praising attorney general role,
criticizing the use of "forced donations" to charities in settlements with businesses charged
with wrongdoing); see also, infra note 149 (discussing Dardinger).
37. Thirty-eight states responded. Connecticut mentioned the improper use of charitable
assets and management self-dealing; Massachusetts mentioned "board stewardship"; Oregon
found "that a lot of small and medium-sized charities are being run... by one or two people
rather than a board, or the board is not involved, or there is self-dealing in terms of benefits";
Pennsylvania offers "training sessions for charities"; Texas reported that "[m]oney is
misspent or even outright stolen." Many complained of a lack of resources. Dean Mehegan
et al., Charity Regulation Today: How the States See It, NONPROFIT TiMEs, Mar. 1994, at 1.
38. But see Tamar Lewin, Alumni Fight for "Soul" of Richest Orphanage, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2000, at A18 ("Nationally, with mushrooming philanthropic assets providing an
increasingly important pool of money for the public good, attorneys general have become
more active in monitoring how the money is used: the number of lawyers in the
Pennsylvania attorney general's charitable trust section has doubled in the last three years.").
39. Notably, New York attorney general Eliot Spitzer has claimed oversight over a
range of actors from securities analysts to mutual funds to charities to, most recently, the
New York Stock Exchange. In January 2004, the board of the nonprofit (but not tax exempt)
NYSE asked the attorney general to investigate the $187 million compensation package
granted to ousted chief executive Dick Grasso by the previous board. See Susanne Craig et
al., Spitzer and SEC Open Probes Into Grasso's Pay, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2004, at C1. It is
hard to see, however, where the attorney general's jurisdiction lies against what is essentially
a for-profit cooperative. Perhaps the NYSE is reluctant to sue former board members for
breach of fiduciary duty. Indeed, the NYSE's letter to the attorney general stated, in part:
"While we believe that you are more capable of pursuing the matter than the Exchange itself,
we assure you that we will participate or cooperate in any way that is appropriate." Press
Release, New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Board Asks SEC and NYS Attorney General to
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elective office 40 impel the incumbent to ignore cases that are politically dangerous
and to jump into matters that are politically irresistible but implicate only
"business" decisions of charity managers. 4 1 Of course, as described below, it is
unfair to single out the attorney general for blame-after all, in the absence of
powers granted in the state constitution, what the attorney general does is a
function of what the legislature and courts grant or permit.
42
In carrying out its supervisory role, the attorney general (or other designated
state official), can investigate charges of improper charitable activities, view books
and records, and subpoena witnesses. Unfortunately, we are unable to judge the
level of charity oversight because few cases involving nonprofit fiduciary issues
have reached the courts--often as much because of the concerns of charity
fiduciaries as those of the attorney general. Reform rather than punishment is
generally the goal of the charity regulator, and board members as well prefer a
chance to improve their behavior while avoiding embarrassment and personal
liability. Settlements have traditionally been kept confidential,43  although
regulators are increasingly requiring disclosure where the transgression reflects
more than a minor infraction by a single bad actor." Thus it is impossible to
Pursue Webb Report Findings of Unreasonable Compensation of Grasso (Jan. 8, 2004),
available at http://www.nyse.com/press/p1020656068695.html?displayPage=%2Fpress%2F
1073561404497.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
40. According to the website of the National Association of Attorneys General: "The
Attorney General is popularly elected in forty-three states, and is appointed by the governor
in five states (Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Wyoming) and in the five
jurisdictions of American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands. In Maine, the Attorney General is selected by secret ballot of the legislature
and in Tennessee, by the state Supreme Court. In the District of Columbia, the Mayor
appoints the Corporation Counsel whose powers and duties are similar to those of the
Attorneys General of the states and jurisdictions." See http://www.naag.org/naag/abo
ut-naag.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
41. Over forty years ago, Kenneth Karst observed, "and this is by no means an
indictment of our attorneys general, any high political official may be expected to approach
rather cautiously the investigation of charges that respectable trustees are guilty of
wrongdoing or even mismanagement." Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable
Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARv. L. REV. 433, 478-79 (1960).
42. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL:
POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 27-39 (Lynne M. Ross ed., 1990) [hereinafter NAAG, STATE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL] (reviewing common law powers as bounded by state constitution,
legislation, and judge-made law).
43. Even where reports of complaints are kept, Swords and Bograd found that "[o]ften,
investigations of specific abuses are disposed of by settlement, in which the charity does not
admit to having committed any abuse; thus the files do not show whether or not the
allegations were found to be true." PETER SWORDS & HARRIET BOGRAD, ACCOUNTABILITY IN
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: WHAT PROBLEMS ARE ADDRESSED BY STATE REGULATORS?
(Nonprofit Coordinating Comm. of N.Y. ed., 1996) [hereinafter SWORDS & BOGRAD,
ACCOUNTABILITY], available at http://www.charitychannel.com/forums/cyb-acc/resources/
agprob.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
44. Notably, in recent years, regulators conditioned settlement on disclosure by Boston
University (Massachusetts), Adelphi University (New York), and the Kamehameha
Schools/Bishop Estate (Internal Revenue Service). See, too, the numerous press releases on
the New York attorney general's website, at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/press.
Moreover, prosecutions for embezzlement and other crimes are very public affairs. See
infra note 46 (discussing the Hale House). In a startling case, the Pennsylvania attorney
general criminally prosecuted the former chief executive, chief financial officer, and general
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determine how well government is doing to address malfeasance and misfeasance
by charity fiduciaries.
Separately, attorney general action might reflect a rivalry between a state's
regulatory agencies, because, depending on the industry in which it operates, a
given nonprofit organization might also be regulated by such other agencies as the
insurance commissioner, the department of health, education, or commerce, or the
corporations commission. The case studies of the Blue Cross conversions in Part II,
below, illustrate how the insurance commissioner might play a more central role
than the attorney general-who might be conflicted between representing the
public as to the charitable assets and representing the insurance commissioner or
defending the conversion legislation itself.
Finally, regulators might simply be uninformed about their responsibilities in
overseeing the charitable sector-or, as described above, reluctant to carry them
out. Several recent cases illustrate this problem. For example, an investigation by
the staff of the Pennsylvania Assembly into the spectacular collapse of the
Foundation for New Era Philanthropy found that the failings of the attorney
general's office were not so much the fault of inadequate staffing as deference to a
well-connected, charismatic founder. 45 Despite his claims of inadequate resources,
counsel of the Allegheny Health, Education and Research Foundation, the largest nonprofit
bankruptcy in history. The unprecedented indictment charged that the officers invaded the
endowments and restricted charitable gifts in order to maintain general charitable operations,
and by so doing they committed thefts by failure to make required disposition of funds
received (a felony), misapplications of entrusted funds (a misdemeanor), and conspiracy to
do the same. In May 2002, after a preliminary hearing that lasted for months, the judge
narrowed the charges against the chief executive, Sherif Abdelhak, to several hundred
allegedly misapplied restricted gifts (apparently some $50 million), and dismissed all
charges against the other former officers (the judge also threw out the conspiracy charges,
since Abdelhak could not conspire with himself). See Cinda Becker, Settling Down; AHERF
to Pay $93.7 Million to Creditors, Trusts, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jan. 21, 2002, at 14. An
attorney general press release acknowledged that the court "dismissed felony theft charges
against Abdelhak, saying he did not use the endowment money for his own personal gain."
Press Release, Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, Former AHERF Official Pleads to
Raiding Endowments; CEO Sentenced to 11 to 23 Months (Aug. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.attomeygeneral.gov/press/release.cfm?p=00D4FI06-2A92-42CF-BB86DIA6C7
268849. On August 29, 2002, Abdelhak pleaded no contest to a single misdemeanor of
misapplication of entrusted funds; of his sentence for eleven to twenty-three months, he
served three. See Cinda Becker, Early Release: Abdelhak Wins Parole After Serving Three
Months, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb. 3, 2003, at 18.
45. PENN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, JOINT STATE GOv'T COMM'N, THE COLLAPSE OF THE
FOUNDATION FOR NEW ERA PHILANTHROPY 49-50 (1995):
Of course, more quality employees can do more quality work; however,
with this section enforcement was not a question of staffing.
The Commonwealth's Office of Attorney General and Department
of State learned of the foundation's existence and novel scheme
approximately 23 months prior to the foundation's collapse.... Given
the foundation's initial refusal and subsequent reluctance to comply
with the Solicitation of Funds for Charitable Purposes Act along with a
novel demand that potential grantees surrender funds to the foundation
in order to receive a grant that could double these funds in six months,
both should have been more vigilant. . . . [New Era founder John]
Bennett became acquainted with and pursued multimillionaires; some
people representing the traditional establishment fell into his
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the same charge could be made of the New York attorney general's failure to act
sooner in the Hale House case.
46
Indeed, it is not always possible to reach consensus over whether the proper
response to a particular charity governance dilemma is government enforcement
action. The question of the "accountability" of charities is a hotly debated one in
the philanthropic world today.47 Equally important is the accountability of the
regulator: Invisibility at the informal end of the regulatory spectrum makes it hard
to judge the level and the effectiveness of regulators in influencing charity
behavior-and whether regulators are motivated by their own or the public's
interest. Perhaps state (and federal) regulators should be encouraged to issue
reports of their own, describing their regulatory efforts, settlements, and judicial
outcomes.
48
2. Adding in the Legislature
Schizophrenia sometimes better characterizes the states' approach to the
regulation of charities: if under the common law, the attorney general seems
untethered, under recent statutes and current practice, the attorney general seems
alternately omnipotent and impotent. At the same time, as we read press reports of
aggressive attorneys general, we might be surprised to learn that legislatures
typically have granted them few tools to provide effective oversight and
confidence. A man with these references might have been too
intimidating for regulators who should have been more aggressively
curious.
Id.
46. In defending New York State's delay in discovering and exposing the looting of
Hale House (a children's shelter that attracted millions in donations) by its long-time
executive director, "[attorney general] Mr. Spitzer said the charities bureau in his office was
charged with helping charities comply with state requirements, rather than aggressively
policing them. The bureau has only six accountants to oversee 40,000 charities, he said, and
it still must rely on information kept on 3-by-5 index cards to track the organizations.
Requests for the money to computerize the operation have been repeatedly rejected." Nina
Bernstein, Officials Overlooked Dire Signs at Charity, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 2002, at B 1.
Moreover, Hale House's founder was the executive director's mother, who "was elevated to
sainthood" by Ronald Reagan and popular with other politicians. Id. (quoting the senior vice
president for agency services at United Way).
47. See generally Evelyn Brody, Accountability and Public Trust, in THE STATE OF
NONPROFIT AMERICA (Lester Salamon ed., 2002).
48. See, for example, the yearly reports by the attorney general of Pennsylvania for
1997, 1998, and 1999-2000, at http://www.attorneygeneral.gov/pei/years.cfmL The website
of the Massachusetts Attorney General has made an impressive start in public reporting. For
example, the attorney general sets forth statutorily-mandated procedures for nonprofit
hospital conversions, see generally infra notes 108-20 and accompanying text, as well as
information and documents relating to specific transactions. See, for example, the attorney
general's report on the Waltham Deaconess transaction, at http://www.ago.state.ma.us
/healthcare/hcdwstatement.pdf. On the other hand, the attorney general's "Public Charities
Database of Final Legal Actions Against Fundraisers and Charities," sounds promising but
amounts only to an alphabetical listing of the names of organizations investigated over the
last twenty years, and the date and type of resolution (assurance of discontinuance, final
judgment by consent, final judgment by default or final judgment) without any identification
or discussion of the issues in the case. See http:/www.ago.state.ma.us/charity/judgment.asp
(last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
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enforcement. State budgets allocate insufficient resources, and most attorneys
general concentrate their charitable firepower on fraudulent and misleading
fundraising.49 Peter Swords and Harriet Bograd found that, as of 1996, only
thirteen states had charities sections within the attorney general's offices, of which
eleven employed two or more full-time attorneys.50 However, a simple head-count
is misleading: 'These thirteen states are home to about 55% of U.S. charities, with
62% of national charitable revenues.'
Variations occur across states in both statutes and court decisions as to the
situations-such as will contests involving charitable trusts, cy pres, and sale of all
or substantially all assets, merger, or liquidation-in which the attorney general
must be notified, give approval, or is a necessary or proper party.52 While most
states require filings from those who solicit for charitable contributions, only
twelve states have some form of charity registration. 53 New York state has one of
49. See generally Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not
Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAvis L. REv. (forthcoming
2004).
50. PETER SWORDS & HARRIET BOGRAD, NONPROFIT ACCOUNTABILITY: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Nonprofit Coordinating Comm. of N.Y. ed., 1996) [hereinafter
SWORDS & BOGRAD, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://www.charity
channel.com/forums/cyb-acc/resources/accrept.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2004). For a
performance audit of the Charitable Trust Section of the Michigan Attorney General's
Office, the Section provided the following 2002 data comparing Michigan with six other
states having similar charitable oversight obligations: Michigan had one attorney (for 4125
registered charities); California had ten (8200 each); New York had eighteen (2222 each);
Ohio had eight (375 each); Massachusetts had seven (5857 each); Minnesota had three (1834
each); and New Hampshire (which requires only a one-time, not annual, registration) had
one (6000 registered charities). MICHIGAN DEP'T OF AFr'Y GEN. AND DEP'T OF CONSUMER
AND INDUS. SERvS., AUDIT OF STATE AcTIvmEs RELATED TO NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 30
(May 2002), available at http://audgen.michigan.gov/comprpt/docs/rll20001.pdf (last
visited Feb. 22, 2004). California's website states: "[T]he Attorney General has a small staff
and limited financial resources to carry out charitable investigations." Office of Attorney
General, State of California, Dept. Of Justice, Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://caag.state.ca.us/charities/faq.htn#8 (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
51. SWORDS & BOGRAD, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50. Swords and
Bograd found the following:
The "integrated" state offices generally provide: registration and
reporting systems for charities and for professional fundraisers; an
enforcement program that includes inquiries, investigations,
negotiations, and litigation to protect charitable assets and prevent
fundraising abuse; educational programs to promote more responsible
board governance and/or to prevent fundraising fraud; and oversight of
charitable trusts or bequests. Some but not all of these offices also
oversee certain structural changes such as mergers, dissolutions, or
major transfers of assets. Many of these offices have self-sustaining
budgets, supported by fairly modest registration and reporting fees.
Id. at 4.
52. For a summary of these statutes, see FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 4, app., tbl. 1, at
476-511. Note that where business corporation statutes require shareholder approval of such
extraordinary events as merger or dissolution, nonprofit statutes often require the approval of
members. Such a mechanism offers no check on the fundamental decisions of the fiduciaries
of a charity lacking members--that is, most charities.
53. Fewer than ten states have adopted legislation requiring both registration and
reporting from both charitable trusts and charitable nonprofit corporations: California,
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the most comprehensive notice and oversight schemes. 4 Significantly, "in the vast
majority of states there is no monitoring of dissolutions-and thus no oversight b75
a state official interested in preserving the assets of the terminating charity."
Parochialism can be found in the legislation of some of the states with merger
statutes: "In some states the merger provisions require that the surviving
corporation remain under the jurisdiction of the state in which the charity was
originally organized. If the statutes of two states contain this requirement, merger is
effectively prohibited.,
56
Not all of the lack of enforcement activity of charity officials can be blamed on
poor resources. First, it might simply reflect a sector with relatively few problems.
Alternatively, legislation granting few powers or resources to the executive branch
might reflect the belief that no good can come from having an attorney general
involved in the "business" decisions of a charity, including structural decisions like
change in purpose or sale of assets.57 As the Assistant Attorney General of Ohio
Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, and
Oregon. See id. at 313-16. These states, however, cover the majority of American charities
and charitable assets. The offices in these states maintain charity registries, review financial
reports, investigate and prosecute breaches of trust, participate in court proceedings where
the attorney general is a named party (such as cy pres and dissolution), and regulate
charitable solicitations. See id. at 351-61. In addition, similar legislation in Rhode Island and
South Carolina reaches charitable trusts, but not charities operating in corporate form. Id. at
314.
54. New York's Not-for-Profit Corporation Law ("N-PCL") requires a not-for-profit
corporation to obtain State Supreme Court approval, upon notice to the Attorney General,
before it may (1) amend its purposes or powers (N-PCL Article 8), (2) sell, transfer or
otherwise dispose of all or substantially all of its assets (N-PCL Article 5), (3) merge or
consolidate (N-PCL Article 9) or (4) dissolve (N-PCL Article 10). See CHARITIES BUREAU,
NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE REGULATORY ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S CHARITIES BUREAU 22 (July 15, 2003), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us
charities/role.pdf [hereinafter NYAG Outline]. The New York attorney general's website
suggests:
It is a common and better practice for organizations to provide the
Attorney General with the terms and conditions of their proposed
transaction in advance of the actual court filing. Such a procedure
enables the Attorney General to review the transaction and raise
concerns before the court application is filed. When the court
application is filed, the Attorney General may either give a "no
objection" endorsement or file objections. The Attorney General
ensures that charitable assets are being protected and preserved for
appropriate charitable purposes.
NYAG Outline, supra at 23.
55. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 4, at 318.
56. Id. at 319.
57. Where the desire of attorneys general to protect the public from charity wrongdoing
clashes with another social value, the legislature could favor the other policy. In a 1990
study entitled State Attorneys General: Powers and Responsibilities, the National
Association of Attorneys General notes with unease "the movement to enact legislation
designed to reduce the potential liability of directors and trustees." NAAG, STATE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 42, at 193. Acknowledging the relationship of this topic to
broader tort reform issues, NAAG cites with disapproval statutes that grant immunity from
civil liability to uncompensated directors, trustees, and officers of nonprofit organizations
for injury caused by their actions or omissions if undertaken in good faith, within the scope
of his or her functions, and not willful or wanton misconduct. Id. (citing to Connecticut's
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recently wrote: "When charitable enforcement issues arise, many private sector
practitioners seem to regard the state attorney general as an unwelcome and
meddlesome interloper.",5s Finally, the oversight that does occur might be of the
"wrong" kind, overemphasizing filings, which provide obective and measurable
signs of agency activity, while scrimping on investigating. 5 Even granting the lack
of resources for this function, at some point we must concede that the public might
not want to pay for more (or different) oversight than is occurring. The media play
an important role: When the matter becomes politically pressing or irresistible, the
regulator seems to find the resources.6°
statute). Congress passed a federal Volunteer Protection Act (1997), which preempts any
state statute that offers less protection. These statutes are triggered when harm befalls a third
party, and do not, by contrast, protect volunteer trustees or directors from suits by or on
behalf of the charity, or by the attorney general, for breaches of fiduciary duty. NAAG
commented, "This is a departure from existing law governing trustees, who have always
been held to a higher standard of care." Id.
58. David Villar Patton, The Queen, the Attorney General, and the Modern Charitable
Fiduciary: A Historical Perspective on Charitable Enforcement Reform, 11 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 131, 133 n.2 (2000). Patton continues: "Much of this resistance results, no
doubt, from an excusable ignorance on the part of many corporate practitioners regarding the
history, tradition, and implications of charitable trust law." Id.
59. See Renee A. Irvin, Nonprofit Accountability and State Attorneys General: Trading
a Little Fraud for a Lot of Forms, Paper Presented at the Annual Conference of the
Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (Nov. 16, 2002)
(on file with author). According to a study by Peter Swords and Harriet Bograd, "no one has
a precise picture of what abuses take place and the extent of the abuses," and state charity
officials learn of abuses in one of three episodic ways:
First, they may review the annual reports filed by nonprofits (rules vary
from state to state as to exactly which groups, if any, must file). States
vary widely in how intensely they review the filed reports, but clearly
some review is done and from time to time these reports reveal
problems. Second, in some states under various statutes charity officials
must oversee certain transactions. These might include incorporation,
mergers, dissolution, transfers of substantially all assets, and charitable
bequests; these reviews occasionally reveal problems. Finally,
informants such as disgruntled employees, disaffected board members
or employees, the general public, other government agencies, and the
media are a major source of identifying problems. Indeed, a hard news
story about some nonprofit abuse in the papers or on a T.V. almost
forces state officials to investigate and become involved. Interestingly,
our interviews with officials from the IRS also suggested informants
and the media as a major source of leads to abuses.
SWORDS & BOGRAD, ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 43.
60. For example, a year-long Chicago Tribune investigation found that Save the
Children Federation, which pioneered the heart-tugging child-sponsorship appeal, took
money for children who were dead, and falsified correspondence to sponsors from children.
The charity immediately appointed a former Watergate prosecutor and U.S. inspector
general to monitor the promised benefits. Several states also investigated; in a settlement
with Connecticut, Save the Children agreed to change its advertising to clarify that donations
and government grants are pooled to fund worldwide development. Lisa Anderson,
Relentless Campaigns of Hollow Promises; Charity's Probe Finds Sponsors Funded at
Least 24 Dead Children, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 15, 1998, at 1; Lisa Anderson, The Road to
Reform; Save the Children Redirects Staffers to Closely Monitor Individual Cases, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 31, 1998, at 1. InterAction, a group of 162 nonprofits, adopted tougher standards
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Marion Fremont-Smith finds that state legislatures have been spurred to action
in the charitable arena "only after the attorney general exerted strong support," and,
once legislation is in place, "if the attorney general initiates changes, they will be
adopted if he has a strong voice in the legislature, but not otherwise." 61 Indeed, as
discussed below, the state attorneys general achieved significant success in
obtaining statutes that provide an expanded role for attorneys general (and the
public) in nonprofit hospital and HMO conversions.
3. And the Last Word: The Courts
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court described the role of the Commonwealth
with respect to charitable trusts:
A charitable trust is initially and continuously subject to the parens
patriae power of the Commonwealth and the supervisory jurisdiction of
its courts .... Moreover, the orphans' court has plenary power to ensure
the competency and performance of trustees. Trustees of a charitable
trust are fiduciaries, and as such are officers of the orphans' court,
subject to its exclusive supervision and control.62
Because attorneys general lack the authority to unilaterally impose or grant
legal remedies, 63 the courts can offer relief if the charity wants to challenge a
position taken by the attorney general in an enforcement action, or, more
commonly, when the charity seeks approval for modification of a restriction or for
instruction.64 Courts usually defer to the charity fiduciaries when the attorney
for child sponsorship agencies, see http://www.interaction.orglpvostandards/index.html, and
announced plans to hire outside evaluators to monitor compliance through checks of agency
financial accounts and regular visits to their international field operations.
More recently, a relentless Boston Globe series examining excessive compensation and
self-dealing by private foundations has prompted regulators in Massachusetts, New York,
California, and Connecticut to announce investigations. See Sacha Pfeiffer & Michael
Rezendes, Mass., 2 Other States to Probe Foundations, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 10, 2003, at
Al; Francie Latour & Beth Healy, AG in Conn. Begins Probe, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 11,
2003, at B 1.
61. FREMONT-SMrrH, supra note 4, at 363.
62. In re Coleman Estate, 317 A.2d 631, 634 (Pa. 1974) (citations omitted).
63. See, e.g., Midkiff v. Kobayashi, 507 P.2d 724, 745 (Haw. 1973) ("The function of
the attorney general, as parens patriae of charitable trusts, is to oversee the activities of the
trustees to the end that the trust is performed and maintained in accordance with the
provisions of the trust document, and to bring any abuse or deviation on the part of the
trustees to the attention of the court for correction. The authority of the attorney general over
charitable trusts does not extend beyond the performance of that function. M. R. Fremont
Smith, Foundations and Government, 198 (1965). If a deviation from any trust provision is
necessary in the interest of the trust, the power to authorize the deviation rests solely with
the court.") (citations omitted). See generally FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 4, at 309.
64. The court, on motion of the attorney general or on its own, can "enjoin[] wrongful
conduct, rescind[] or cancel[] a transfer of property, appointment of a receiver, replacement
of a fiduciary, compel[] an accounting, redress of a breach or performance of fiduciary
duties." EDITH L. FISCH ET AL., CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS § 711 (1974)
(citations omitted). In addition, the court can dissolve a corporation, enforce restrictions on
gifts, supervise indemnification awards, and surcharge fiduciaries for improperly received
benefits. See JAMES J. FIsHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES
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general has no objection to the requested relief,65 although the court is not bound
by a settlement entered into by the attorney general.66
The court, too, has its proper realm. The authority of the courts is bound by the
Constitution-including the right of due process, pursuant to which a nonprofit
corporation "has a property interest sufficient to require that it be given notice and
a hearing before it could be deprived of the right to determine disposition of its
assets. ' '67 While most charity regulation occurs in the lower courts, whose findings
of fact are rarely reversed, courts "may adjudicate only disputes brought to their
attention by opposing parties and they are confined to the issues raised by these
parties. 68 As a separate matter, courts in some states enjoy statutory authority, at
the behest of proper parties, to dissolve nonprofit corporations that exceed their
powers. 69 Finally, we have "the well-settled rule that absent 'the greatest
emergency,' courts are not warranted in interfering with the internal operation of a
AND MATERIALS 255-56 (2d ed. 2000).
65. For example, in In re Barnes Foundation, 684 A.2d 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), the
court considered the petition of a supporting and supported foundation to sever their
relationship. The court explained why it was reversing the decision of the lower court:
In his opinion in support of his decision, Judge Ott stated that he
would not permit the requested deviation from the terms of the de
Mazia trust because in his view "the sanctity of the donors' written
intent [was] more compelling than the immediate but short-sighted
benefits of approving the agreements sub judice." Although we agree in
principle with Judge Ott that the sanctity of the donor's intent should be
honored and upheld whenever possible, we are convinced that the
benefits of approving the present settlement will go further to advance
Ms. de Mazia's intent than forcing the parties to continue in what has
obviously become a bad marriage: a marriage which threatens to
damage or destroy one or both parties' respective abilities to benefit the
citizens of this Commonwealth. This latter concern was obviously at the
heart of the position taken by the Attorney General, the statutorily
designated guardian of the interest of the general public, who stated:
"[T]he public interest would best be served by allowing each [party] to
pursue its own program independently rather than be tied to the other
with the resultant disharmony, disagreement, and litigation that has
ensued." We are compelled to agree.
Id. at 136 (citation omitted).
66. See, e.g., In re Barnes Found., 683 A.2d 894, 899 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)
("[A]lthough the law requires the participation of the Attorney General's Office in any
proceeding to modify the terms of a charitable trust .... appellant cites no support for the
proposition that the Court is bound by the position espoused by the Office of the Attorney
General, and a reviewing judge must exercise his or her independent power of review."); In
re Will of Fuller, 636 N.E.2d 1333, 1343 (Mass. 1994).
67. Kansas E. Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc. v. Bethany Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 969 P.2d 859, 868 (Kan. 1998) (reversing the trial court which sua sponte had
permanently enjoined Bethany Medical Center from amending its articles of incorporation to
remove the designation of the Kansas East Conference as recipient of its assets on
dissolution).
68. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 4, at 304. Fremont-Smith identifies only two
exceptions: one, "universally available," where the charity fiduciaries seek "instructions as
to the extent and interpretations of their duties," and two, exercised rarely in some
jurisdictions, where the court may exercise equity power to act on its own motion. 1d.
69. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT § 14.30(a)(1) (1987)
(proceeding brought by attorney general).
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corporation." 70 Similarly, "[t]he powers of trustees and the discharge of trusteeship
responsibilities regularly involve the exercise of discretion, or fiduciary judgment,
with which courts do not interfere except to prevent abuse." 71
Availability of court review can curb inappropriate regulator zeal--or
willingness to compromise-but even a process of court review still risks error by
both the enforcer and the tribunal.72 Moreover, attorneys general could not achieve
the success they do in negotiating settlements unless the charity litigates before
courts with views of state power similar to that of the attorney general's. As an
institutional matter, the judges before whom the charity would appear are often
elected.73
C. The Complication of Organizational Form: The Charitable Trust
and the Nonprofit Corporation
1. Historical Roots and Contemporary Challenges
74
To understand the current state of charity regulation, one has to appreciate the
effects of history. The American common law powers of the attorney general and
the equity courts trace back to English property rules respecting trusts and survived
the American Revolution.75 A charitable trust, like a private trust, is valid only
because someone has the power of enforcement. The power "implies the duty to
oversee the activities of the fiduciary who is charged with management of the trust
funds, as well as the right to bring to the attention of the courts any abuses that may
appear to need correction." 76 In the charity context, however, this is not as easy to
accomplish as it sounds because a charitable trust may not have ascertainable
beneficiaries who can sue to enforce their rights;77 after all, "the human beings who
are favorably affected by the execution of the trust are merely the media through
whom the social advantages flow to the public."
78
70. Kansas E. Conference, 969 P.2d at 870. The court cited its earlier decision in Cron
v. Tanner, 229 P.2d 1008 (Kan. 1951), involving a banking corporation, in which the Kansas
Supreme Court had declared:
It is not the function of the court to manage a corporation nor
substitute its own judgment for that of the officers thereof. It is only
when the officers are guilty of willful abuse of their discretionary power
or of bad faith, neglect of duty, perversion of the corporate purpose, or
when fraud or breach of trust are involved, that the courts will interfere.
Id.
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. a (2003).
72. A particularly vivid example of this occurred with regard to the Art Institute of
Chicago. See infra Part II.B.
73. See generally Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe:
Judicial Elections, the First Amendment, and Judges As Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 301 (2003).
74. This section draws from Brody, Fiduciary Law, supra note 15, and Evelyn Brody,
The Legal Framework for Nonprofit Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH
HANDBOOK (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. forthcoming 2004).
75. But this lineage was not without controversy. See, e.g., FREMONT-SMrrH, supra note
4, at 43-47; Brody, Charitable Endowments, supra note 17.
76. FREMONT-SMrrH, supra note 4, at 301.
77. AUSTIN W. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 364 (2d ed. 1956).
78. George G. Bogert, Proposed Legislation Regarding State Supervision of Charities,
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It is this absence of parties with a property interest that explains why the law
grants standing to the attorney general to enforce the trust's terms (including its
charitable purpose) and the fiduciaries' duties. However, such a structure puts
pressure on the "inclination and budget of a public official to vindicate [the
beneficiaries'] rights. 79
Finally, unless the trust instrument so provides, a trustee has no legal authority
to amend the terms of the trust. This leads to problems where the purposes
established by the settlor have become impossible to carry out (or other restriction
imposed by the settlor becomes difficult to adhere to), and the trust instrument
provides no discretion to the trustee to adapt the purpose to the changed
circumstances. Once again, property law comes to the rescue. The most famous
rule of charitable trust law-the cy pres doctrine-gives the courts power to reform
charitable trusts whose purposes have become impossible or impracticable to carry
out.80
Most American charities take the legal form of a nonprofit corporation, as
opposed to a charitable trust. What does this mean for the powers of the attorneys
general and courts?
A corporation, even a charitable corporation, owns its assets outright: unlike a
trust, legal title and beneficial title reside in the same person.8' Thus if we view the
charity itself as the beneficiary, the corporation does not need the help of the
attorney general to enforce the proper use of the charitable assets. Such an
approach, however, would leave boards of corporate charities unsupervised. If
instead we consider the corporate charity as the means by which the public is
benefited, a supervisory role for the attorney general and courts continues. 2 Some
commentators find-and criticize-a recent trend in attempts by attorneys general
to enlarge their jurisdiction over nonprofit corporations.8 3 They cite to "increasing
52 MICH. L. REv. 633, 633 (1954); see generally Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue
in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 37 (1993).
79. Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 468 (Del. 1991) (quoting the attorney general's
brief).
80. "In applying cy pres we must be mindful that courts have no more power to make
wills for the dead than contracts for the living. Therefore basic to that determination is the
intention of the testator." In re Estate of Edward B. Goehringer, 329 N.Y.S.2d 516, 520
(Surr. Ct. 1972). This philosophical judge also observed: "But all institutions must
ultimately fail, if not soon after vesting then decades later.... Those which are in charitable
trust and not consumed will invariably be subjected to cy pres." Id. at 521. The modern
formulation of this rule expands relief where adherence to the designated purpose, while
possible, would be "wasteful." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUsTs § 67 (2003).
81. See St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Bennett, 22 N.E.2d 305, 307 (N.Y. 1939) ("The
corporation uses the property, in accordance with the law of its creation, for its own
purposes; and the dictation of the manner of its use, within the law by the donor, does not
affect its ownership or make it a trustee. A person... cannot be a trustee for himself.").
82. See generally FREMONT-SMrrH, supra note 4, at 301 ("Both the enforcement power,
exercised by the attorney general, and the regulatory power, exercised by the courts, extend
to all assets dedicated to charitable purpose, regardless of the legal form-corporation, trust,
or voluntary association-in which they are held."); see also NAAG, STATES ATrORNEYS
GENERAL, supra note 42, at 186 ("[A] brief statutory reference to the Attorney General's
authority may, if liberally construed, enable the Attorney General to exercise some control
over the management and disposition of charitable funds.") (footnote omitted).
83. The National Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG") anticipated this issue in
a 1990 study on attorneys general's powers and responsibilities. The section on charity
regulation describes the emerging issue of nonprofit hospital and HMO conversions, which
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use of charitable trust laws to effect remedies that are unavailable under nonprofit
law," resistance to applying the business judgment rule in the nonprofit context,
and even asserting "waste" of corporate assets.
Consider the case where the corporation's assets were donated and the donor
specifically restricts the gift. Courts agree that the corporate charity must honor the
restriction, even where it is not technically a trustee. 5 As with a charitable trust,
though, only the attorney general may bring suit to enforce the restriction, 86 and the
NAAG accurately predicted would likely continue to be important. See infra Part I.C.2. The
study notes the distinction between the law of charitable trusts and corporate law, and
comments: "The propriety of hospital directors' actions may well depend on which set of
principles is applied. If... pure corporate law applies.... [i]t would represent an erosion of
the fundamental authority of the Attorney General to represent the public's interest in the
preservation and proper application of charitable funds." NAAG, STATE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL, supra note 42, at 193.
84. Michael W. Peregrine & James R. Schwartz, Key Nonprofit Corporate Law
Developments in 2001, 11 HEALTH L. REP. 272 (2002). The authors discuss three 2001
settlements: in Florida (with Intracoastal Health Systems), in Illinois (Terra Museum), and in
Minnesota (Allina Health Systems). See infra Part U.
Note the definition of "waste" in the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate
Governance:
A transaction constitutes a "waste of corporate assets" if it involves an
expenditure of corporate funds or a disposition of corporate assets for
which no consideration is received in exchange and for which there is
no rational business purpose, or, if consideration is received in
exchange, the consideration the corporation receives is so inadequate in
value that no person of ordinary sound business judgment would deem
it worth that which the corporation has paid.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 1.42 (1992).
85. See, e.g., St. Joseph's Hosp., 22 N.E.2d at 308. "No authority has been brought to
our attention that a gift to a charitable corporation with the express direction that it be
applied to a specific corporate purpose in a specific manner may be accepted by the
corporation, and then used for a different corporate purpose in a different manner. No trust
arises, it is true, in a technical sense, . . . for the trustee and beneficiary are one.... [The
charitable corporation] may not, however, receive a gift made for one purpose and use it for
another, unless the court applying the cy pres doctrine so commands." Id. Cf RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS (2003):
An outright devise[] or donation to a nonproprietary hospital or
university or other charitable institution, expressly or impliedly to be
used for its general charitable purposes, is charitable but does not create
a trust as that term is used in this Restatement. A disposition to such an
institution for a specific purpose, however, such as to support medical
research, perhaps on a particular disease, or to establish a scholarship
fund in a certain field of study, creates a charitable trust of which the
institution is the trustee for purposes of the terminology and rules of this
Restatement.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003).
86. See St. Joseph's Hosp., 22 N.E.2d at 306-07. Cf Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v.
Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 1002 (Conn. 1997) (holding that an objecting donor has
no standing under the Connecticut Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act).
English charity law still embraces a founder's right of "visitation" over gifts made to
charitable corporations. American law generally rejects this doctrine. That the English right
is hereditary makes it less appealing here. For example, Professor Bogert writes:
In a country such as the United States, where primogeniture is obsolete,
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final word rests with the court.
More generally, unless the state constitution provides otherwise,8 7 the
legislature can alter, remove or confirm distinctions between charitable trusts and
88corporations. Indeed, statutory authority is needed to form a corporation in the
first place,8 9 and some nonprofit corporation laws grant broad authority to the
attorney general. 90 At the extreme, some legislatures have declared that a charitable
the vesting of a power of visitation in the heirs of the donor is not desirable..
•. [I]n many cases they would be either wholly uninterested in exercising the
right of visitation, or would be openly hostile to the institution which had
deprived them of a part or all of the fortune of their relative.
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 416 (2d ed. 1977) (footnote omitted), quoted in Wier v. Howard Hughes Med. Inst., 407
A.2d 1051 (Del. Ch. 1979). But cf. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.3(a), (d), & (e)
(2002) (allowing anyone "founding, endowing and maintaining" a public library, museum or
educational institution in trust to exercise complete control over administration of the trust
during his or her lifetime, and, if granted, to pass on these rights to the surviving spouse,
without any obligation to account).
87. See, e.g., Opinion of the Attorney General of Connecticut, 1987 Conn. Op. Att'y
Gen. 42 ("The Connecticut Supreme Court has consistently held that the administration of a
charitable trust is solely a judicial function in which the legislature may not interfere because
of the doctrine of distribution of powers as set forth in Article II of the Constitution of the
State of Connecticut .... ).
88. See NAAG, STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 42, at 31 ("Today, Attorneys
General derive their power from constitutional and statutory mandates, as well as the
common law. No clear lines separate the three sources of authority, for each often
supplements the others. In fact, many constitutional provisions and state statutes are merely
declaratory of common law.") (footnote omitted).
89. In some states the secretary of state or the courts once played a gate-keeper role, by
having discretionary authority to approve certificates of incorporation. Today, however,
incorporation is viewed as an entitlement, not a privilege. See NORMAN I. SILBER, A
CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM: THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN NONPROFIT SECTOR 15-25
(2001).
90. Most notably, see the American Bar Association's Revised Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act (1987), which has been adopted in a minority of jurisdictions. The
introduction by the reporter, Professor Michael Hone, summarizes the wide powers and
rights of the attorney general under this model act:
The Revised Act seeks to fill this void by statutorily clarifying existing
common law and statutory authority of the attorney general ...by
authorizing the attorney general to monitor and exercise oversight
powers over public benefit corporations. The attorney general has
authority to bring, must receive notice of, and may join in, derivative
actions on behalf of public benefit corporations. The attorney general
may approve conflict of interest transactions and must be made a party
to proceedings in which a court is asked to approve conflict of interest
transactions. The attorney general may sue former or incumbent
directors and officers for ultra vires acts, and may bring an action for
breach of their duty of care or loyalty. The attorney general may
commence proceedings to hold an annual, regular or special meeting of
members.
The attorney general must be given notice of important corporate
actions . . .(1) indemnifying directors; (2) merging; (3) selling all or
substantially all corporate assets; (4) delivering articles of dissolution to
the secretary of state; and (5) transferring or conveying assets as part of
the dissolution process.
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nonprofit corporation is deemed to be a trust and its directors to be trustees. 91 In
some other states it is the courts that treat the charitable class served by the
corporate charity as the beneficiaries of a trust.
92
The situation where the charity seeks to change its charitable purpose raises
additional issues. The charity fiduciaries' twin duties of loyalty and care combine
to require charity trustees and directors to keep the funds productive for the benefit
of a charitable class.93 Some commentators find a third duty of charity fiduciaries:
the "duty of obedience" to the organization's original mission. 94 Such a duty would
have particular application to nonprofit corporations, because of the power
typically enjoyed by the directors to amend the articles of incorporation, including
the purposes clause. Blind obedience to mission, though, can impede the rational
use of nonprofit corporate assets. Consider the case of a college suffering declining
applications, but whose alumni and students do not want it to close.95 Henry
Hansmann describes how regulatory structures-and the combination of history
and culture that he calls "institutional inertia"-already lock assets into the
nonprofit sector. 96 Mandating the application of the cy pres doctrine to a re-
evaluation of corporate mission furthers the expectation that charity managers must
honor the original purposes of the charity through thick and thin.
The duty of obedience has been recognized (at least at the trial court level) in
New York. Upholding the attorney general's objection to the sale of assets by one
nonprofit hospital to another, the court invoked such a duty of obedience,
98
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION AcT, at xxvii (footnotes omitted).
91. Separate from the question of the corporate charity's obligation to honor a
restriction is the potential liability of the corporation's directors. The Revised Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act explicitly rejects the view that directors of corporate charities are
trustees. Section 8.30(e) provides: "A director shall not be deemed to be a trustee with
respect to the corporation or with respect to any property held or administered by the
corporation, including without limit, property that may be subject to restrictions imposed by
the donor or transferor of such property." The comments explain that "the corporation, as
distinguished from its director, may hold or be deemed to hold property in trust or subject to
restrictions." Id. § 8.30(e) cmt. 1.
92. See, e.g., Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932 (Cal.
1964) (ruling that a minority director could sue to enforce a charitable trust). See generally
Committee on Charitable Trusts, Duties of Charitable Trust Trustees and Charitable
Corporation Directors, 2 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 545 (1967). A trust approach makes
monetary judgments for breach meaningless--the corporation would have to sue itself;
however, equitable remedies would still be available. Id. at 547.
93. An attorney general can bring a court action to force cy pres. In England, "the assets
of charitable corporations are subject to the doctrine of cy pres and deviation, regardless of
their source .. " FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 4, at 440.
94. See DANIEL L. KuRTz, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 84-90
(1988).
95. Harriet M. King, The Voluntary Closing of a Private College: A Decision for the
Board of Trustees?, 32 S.C. L. REv. 547 (1981); Hazel G. Beh, Downsizing Higher
Education and Derailing Student Educational Objectives: When Should Student Claims for
Program Closures Succeed?, 33 GA. L. REv. 155 (1998).
96. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 46, 241, 295-96 (1996).
97. In re Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 593-96
(Sup. Ct. 1999).
98. Id. at 593. The court stated:
It is axiomatic that the Board of Directors is charged with the duty
to ensure that the mission of the charitable corporation is carried out.
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commenting:
Embarkation upon a course of conduct which turns it away from the
charity's central and well-understood mission should be a carefully
chosen option of last resort. Otherwise, a Board facing difficult
financial straits might find sale of its assets, and "reprioritization" of its
mission, to be an attractive option, rather than taking all reasonable
efforts to preserve the mission which has been the object of its
stewardship. 99
By contrast, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized the right
of the board of a nonprofit corporate hospital to amend its articles of incorporation
to allow it to sell its assets. The court rejected the attorney general's argument that
the board of a nonprofit corporation could not amend its articles to adopt new
purposes for future activities and gifts.1'° However, some courts have held that
unrestricted gifts previously donated to a corporation that later amends its
charitable purpose are impliedly restricted to the original purpose, and so may be
used only for those pre-amendment purpose. 10 The classic statement of this
position appears in the Massachusetts attorney general's brief in Attorney General
v. Hahnemann Hospital: "[T]hose who give to a home for abandoned animals do
not anticipate a future board amending the charity's purpose to become research
vivisectionists."'
10 2
This duty has been referred to as the "duty of obedience." It requires the
director of a not-for-profit corporation to "be faithful to the purposes
and goals of the organization," since "[u]nlike business corporations,
whose ultimate objective is to make money, nonprofit corporations are
defined by their specific objectives: perpetuation of particular activities
are central to the raison d'etre of the organization." (Bjorklund, op. cit.,
§ 1 l-4[a], at p. 414). Analysis of the duties of charitable directors more
commonly arises in an action brought by the AG alleging breach of the
duties owed to the corporation under §§ N-PCL 112 and 720, and does
not appear to have been discussed in any reported decision under
section 511. But the duty of obedience, perforce, must inform the
question of whether a proposed transaction to sell all or substantially all
of a charity's assets promotes the purposes of the charitable corporation
when analyzed under section 511.
Id.
99. Id. at 595.
100. Att'y Gen. v. Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1020-21 (Mass. 1986); see
also Kansas E. Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc. v. Bethany Med. Ctr., Inc.,
969 P.2d 859, 863-65 (Kan. 1998).
101. See, e.g., Pac. Home v. County of Los Angeles, 264 P.2d 539, 542-43 (Cal. 1953);
Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 41-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (ruling
that a charitable corporation may not "abandon" its purpose). This approach was confirmed
by Section 5820 of the California Nonprofit Corporation Law: "Amendment of the articles
of a corporation ... does not, of itself, abrogate any requirement or limitation imposed upon
the corporation, or any property held by it, by virtue of the trust under which such property
is held by the corporation." Subsection (b) provides: "The Attorney General may, at the
corporation's request, and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may issue,
give rulings as to whether the Attorney General will or may oppose a proposed action, or
article amendment, as inconsistent with or proscribed by the requirements of a charitable
trust." CAL. CORP. CODE § 5820(b) (2004).
102. 494 N.E.2d at 1021 n.18. See, too, the description of New York law in the outline
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Generally stated, where state law permits a charity to sell its assets and alter its
purpose (the "front-end cy pres issue"), the next question is whether resulting funds
must be used for the original purpose (the '"back-end cy pres issue")103 -and who
decides. Despite the examples in the cases discussed in Part II, it is illegitimate for
the state legislature to dictate where the assets are to go.1 4 Moreover, because of
the language of the state statute providing for a more lenient standard, New York
courts apply a "quasi-cy pres" standard to distributions by liquidating corporate
charities. 05 The New York Court of Appeals found that under the N-PCL, "it is the
board of directors which adopts the plan of distribution" and that the legislature
"intended also that not-for-profit corporations have 'a strong board of
directors. ' ' 1" 6 Pragmatic practitioners will, prior to the cy pres filing, negotiate
proposed changes with the attorney general's office, which has a similar interest in
arriving at a useful restructuring in order to avoid multiple trips to court. °7
2. Nonprofit Hospital and HMO Conversion Legislation
As suggested by the examples given above, a nonprofit hospital can be one of
the largest charities in a community. Communities have been worrying about
behind-closed-doors sales of nonprofit hospital assets: the community might be
short-changed either in the amount paid for the assets (and hence the funds
available for future charity) or in the quality and price of future for-profit hospital
services. Some also suspect conflicts of interest on the part of the nonprofit's
trustees and officers, who might receive positions either in the new hospital
by attorney general office's of its obligation to "[aissure that where the charity's new
purposes do not overlap with its original purposes, the charitable assets obtained by a charity
for its original corporate purpose continue to be used for that restricted purpose, pursuant to
the doctrine of cy pres (the subject of the 1985 Court of Appeals decision in Alco Gravure,
Inc. v. Knapp Foundation, 479 N.E.2d 752 (N.Y. 1985))." NYAG Outline, supra note 54.
103. These phrases are Richard Allen's, former top charity official in Massachusetts.
104. The term parens patriae is often used uncritically to refer to the regulatory
authority of the state over charitable assets, but in England the term embodies two distinct
powers-one legislative and the other oversight--and only the second survives in the
democratic United States. Because the monarchical power of "prerogative cy pres" did not
survive the Revolution, courts rather than the legislatures have the power, when necessary,
to direct the disposition of charitable funds. See generally MARION FREmONT-SMITH & JILL
R. HoRwrrz, THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE: INSURER CONVERSIONS AND CHARITABLE
FUNDS (Hauser Center on Nonprofit Organizations, Working Paper, 2003) (analyzing the
Empire Blue Cross transaction in the legal framework of American cy pres). Fremont-Smith
and Horwitz reject as aberrational a series of nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions
involving the Mormon Church's forfeiture of property on account of its practitioners'
adherence to the illegal practice of polygamy, back when Utah was a federal territory. Id. at
16; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. a (2003) ('The prerogative power
(or its legislative counterpart) has not been recognized in the United States, although
legislation may reasonably regulate the extent and exercise of the cy pres power of the
courts.").
105. In re Multiple Sclerosis Serv. Org. of N.Y., Inc., 496 N.E.2d 861 (N.Y. 1986).
106. Id. at 868. Some commentators urge an elevated standard of review for organic
changes. See, e.g., Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and
Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631 (1998); James J.
Fishman, Checkpoints on the Conversion Highway: Some Trouble Spots in the Conversion
of Nonprofit Health Care Organizations to For-Profit Status, 23 J. CORP. L. 701 (1998).
107. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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management or the resulting foundation. In response, states began to adopt versions
of a "Nonprofit Hospital Sale Act."'' 08 The National Association of Attorneys
General ("NAAG") produced a model nonprofit health-care conversion statute in
July 1998.09 Today, almost half the states have enacted legislation addressing these
transactions. 11
0
Typically, these conversion statutes require that the nonprofit hospital inform
the attorney general of the terms of the proposed deal, and, after a public hearing,
give the attorney general the right to disapprove it as against the public interest
(disappointed parties may appeal to court)."' As NAAG comments on the
108. See generally Evelyn Brody, Introduction to Nonprofit Symposium Issue, 23 J.
CORP. L. 581 (1998); John D. Colombo, A Proposal for an Exit Tax on Nonprofit
Conversion Transactions, 23 J. CORP. L 779 (1998); James J. Fishman, Checkpoints on the
Conversion Highway: Some Trouble Spots in the Conversion of Nonprofit Health Care
Organizations to For-Profit Status, 23 J. CORP. L. 701 (1998); Harvey J. Goldschmid, The
Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed
Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631 (1998); David A. Hyman, Hospital Conversions: Fact, Fantasy,
and Regulatory Follies, 23 J. CORP. L. 741 (1998).
109. Model Act for Nonprofit Healthcare Conversion Transactions, reprinted in
National Association of Attorneys General, Resolution Adopting Legislation on Conversion
of Nonprofit Health Care Entities to For-Profit Status (Summer 1998), available at
http://www.naag.org/naag/resolutions/es-sum98-healthcareconv.pdf (last visited Feb. 24,
2004) [hereinafter NAAG MODEL ACT]. Section 9.02 of NAAG's model statute provides:
"Nothing in this Section shall be construed to limit the common law authority of the
Attorney General and the [director of charitable trusts] to protect charitable trusts and
charitable assets in this state." Id. § 9.02. Section 9.01 provides that a conversion transaction
entered into in violation of the statute
shall be null and void and each member of the governing boards and the
chief financial officers of the parties to the nonprofit healthcare
conversion transaction may be subject to a civil penalty of up to
$1,000,000, the amount to be determined by the [court of competent
jurisdiction] in the county in which the nonprofit healthcare entity's
assets to be transferred are located.
Id. § 9.01. The penalties and remedies provided in the statute, section 9.02,
are in addition to, and not a replacement for, any other civil or criminal
actions which the Attorney General may take under either the common
law or statutory law, including rescinding the nonprofit healthcare
conversion transaction, granting injunctive relief or any combination of
these and other remedies available under common law or statutory law.
Id. § 9.02.
110. Marion R. Fremont-Smith & Jonathan A. Lever, State Regulation of Health Care
Conversions and Conversion Foundations, 9 HEALTH L. REP. 714 (2000).
111. Section 2.01 of NAAG's model statute requires:
At the time of providing notice to the Attorney General [Court], the
nonprofit healthcare entity shall provide the Attorney General [Court]
with written certification that a copy of this statute has been given in its
entirety to each member of the board of trustees of the nonprofit
healthcare entity.
NAAG MODEL AcT, supra note 109, at § 2.01. Section 4.01 requires the attorney general to
publish notice of the public meeting not only in the newspaper of the "affected community"
and provided to the county board of supervisors, but also, "if applicable, to the city council
of the city where the nonprofit healthcare entity's assets to be transferred are located." Id. §
4.01.
NAAG's model statute does not provide for an appeal of an adverse decision by the
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desirability of community input:
An open process maximizes the public's confidence in the review
process and reduces any concerns that these charitable assets are not
being adequately protected. The role of the Attorney General's Office is
to enforce the provisions of the charitable trust laws so as to fully
protect the charitable assets for the benefit of the public. The charitable
trust laws are built upon the principle that charitable trusts are not
private business entities, like fast food franchises and indoor plumbing
supply companies.112
The parties must usually pay for the attorney general's costs of investigating the
fairness of the deal, including expert appraisers. Legal problems remain because
statutes define "hospital" and "conversion" differently, and political problems can
arise if different state officials have overlapping jurisdictions." 3 NAAG
emphasizes the importance of educating the legal and healthcare community on the
attorney general's interpretation and procedures, adding: "The Attorney General
should seek to reassure directors, not intimidate them or cause good individuals to
avoid serving on governing boards." ' 14 In general, though, the process set forth in
these statutes can make it even harder for a struggling nonprofit hospital to
liquidate its assets and redeploy the proceeds to a more socially useful purpose.
Should the deal be allowed to proceed, under the typical nonprofit hospital sale
statute the resulting funds must be used for "health care purposes" in the
community that the hospital served."15 Moreover, some states are considering
attorney general; however, its drafters commented, "With respect to judicial review, under
most state Administrative Procedure Acts, arbitrary and capricious acts can be challenged. In
addition, mandamus actions are available to parties aggrieved in this way." Christine
Milliken, Comments to the Proposed Health Care Conversion Model Act, reprinted in
National Association of Attorneys General, Resolution Adopting Legislation on Conversion
of Nonprofit Health Care Entities to For-Profit Status (Summer 1998), available at
http://www.naag.org/naag/resolutions/res-sum98-healthcare-conv.pdf (last visited Feb. 24,
2004).
112. Commentary to the Proposed Model Act for Nonprofit Healthcare Conversion
Transactions, reprinted in National Association of Attorneys General, Resolution Adopting
Legislation on Conversion of Nonprofit Health Care Entities to For-Profit Status (Summer
1998), available at http://www.naag.org/naag/resolutions/res-sum98-healthcare-conv.pdf
(last visited Feb. 24, 2004). NAAG also observes: "Adoption of this statute will place
significant demands upon the resources and staff of an Attorney General's office and
consideration should be given to these additional demands." Id.; see also SWORDS &
BOGRAD, ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 43 ("These cases are complex and can require
significant commitment of state officials' resources, and are complicated by the problem that
too often the charity has not kept adequate records of restricted funds and restricted assets.").
113. NAAG's model statute contains an "optional" section 5.02 "for Attorneys General
who deem it appropriate to also consider issues of health impact in their review." NAAG
MODEL ACT, supra note 109, at § 5.02 note. NAAG notes that "[i]f adoption of this optional
section is deemed to be inappropriate [because exceeding the scope of the attorney general's
abilities and resources], it is strongly recommended that oversight for these issues be placed
within an existing public health authority for review by that agency." Id.
114. Id. § 6.01 note.
115. Not all states have such a "back-end" cy pres requirement. NAAG notes that "if
your state has.., a cy pres statute [which requires court approval for such conversions], you
must consider the options available: substituting the Attorney General for the court
procedure and approval; requiring both court and Attorney General approval; or retaining
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barring the old hospital trustees from controlling the board of the resulting
foundation; in any event, foundation leaders recommend that new members be
brought in to provide grant-making expertise and avoid potential conflicts of
interest. NAAG recommends that "the Attorneys General should consider taking an
active role in the drafting of the articles and bylaws [of the conversion foundation],
the identification of the disadvantaged groups to be served, the defining of the
charitable mission, and the critical selection of the members of the first governing
board."' 16
The recent experience in Virginia illustrates the confusion that remains in this
area. A few years ago, the Virginia legislature adopted a targeted statute granting
the attorney general and the courts detailed powers over health care conversions.
This prompted the state supreme court-in a 4-to-3 decision-to declare, based on
the wording of the statute, that only the state corporations commission (and not its
attorney general and circuit courts) has jurisdiction over nonprofit corporations (as
opposed to charitable trusts)." 17 The majority opinion reasoned that the legislature
must have meant at the same time to constrict attorney general authority involving
other types of nonprofit corporations."18 The dissenting opinion highlighted the
attorney general's common law jurisdiction over charitable assets, whether held by
trusts or nonprofit corporations. Within months, the Virginia legislature overturned
this decision and explicitly applied charitable trust doctrine to nonprofit
corporations." 9 Michael Peregrine and James Schwartz commented: 'Thus,
only court approval." Id. § 2.01 note. NAAG also notes that its standard is more flexible than
that of the cy pres statutes, "and how to proceed is a policy question for each state to
decide." Id.
116. Id. § 5.01(9) note. Section 5.01(9) lists as a factor for the Attorney General to
consider in approving or disapproving the proposed conversion: "Whether any foundation
established to hold the proceeds of the sale will be broadly based in the community and be
representative of the affected community, taking into consideration the structure and
governance of the foundation." Id.
117. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. Beales v. JOCO Found., 558 S.E.2d 280, 284,
287 (Va. 2002); see also Rex Bowman, Judge's Power to Remove Foundation Chief at
Issue, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 15, 2000, at B2; Jay Conley, Philanthropist's Case Near
End, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Jan. 25, 2002, at Al; cf Van de Kamp v. Gumbiner,
270 Cal. Rptr. 907, 925-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (no attorney general jurisdiction over health
care plan, even if settlement with plan predated statute).
118. JOCO Found., 558 S.E.2d at 285.
119. Section 2.2-507.1 sets forth the authority of the attorney general:
The assets of a charitable corporation incorporated in or doing any
business in Virginia shall be deemed to be held in trust for the publicfor
such purposes as are established by the donor's intent as expressed in
governing documents or by other applicable law. The attorney general
shall have the same authority to act on behalf of the public with respect
to such assets as he has with respect to assets held by unincorporated
charitable trusts and other charitable entities, including the authority to
seek such judicial relief as may be necessary to protect the pubic
interest in such assets.
S. 676, 2002 Leg. Sess. (Va. 2002) (emphasis added). Section 17.1-513.01 sets forth the
jurisdiction of circuit courts: "The circuit courts shall have the same subject matter
jurisdiction over matters pertaining to assets of charitable corporations, incorporated in or
doing any business in Virginia, as the circuit courts have with respect to assets held by
unincorporated charitable trusts and other charitable entities, including the power to require
accountings, appoint receivers, award damages and enter injunctive relief against such
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Virginia nonprofit corporations experienced both extremes of charitable trust law
interpretation in a mere six month period."'
' 20
Separately, tailored conversion legislation has been prompted by specific
events, as illustrated by the cases of HealthPartners (Kansas), CareFirst Blue Cross
(Maryland), and Empire Blue Cross (New York), discussed in Part II below.
3. Multi-Entity Structures
Attorneys general, courts, and legislatures can impede the ability of multi-state
hospital systems to rationalize their structure and operations. For the fiduciary of a
system affiliate, the corporate law does not appear to recognize duties to the
system, as opposed to a duty to the affiliate on whose board the fiduciary sits.121
(But see the case study in Part II of CareFirst. 122) As explained by practitioner
Douglas Mancino:
If there is a difference between the desires of the parent corporation and
that of the subsidiary, the parent corporation must take the step of
removing the board if it is legally empowered to do so and replace that
board with new directors, before it can take full control over the assets
[of the subsidiary]. 123
Practitioners Michael Peregrine and James Schwartz warn that the possibility
of legal challenge to multi-entity structures "has the potential of creating a
significant conflict of interest when the best interests of the local hospital may be
perceived to be different from those of the system, e.g., closure of local hospitals,
reductions in services at such hospitals, assessments to pay for system-wide
initiatives, etc."' 124 In particular, Peregrine and Schwartz focus on the concern that
charitable corporations, their officers, directors, agents, employees and others may be
necessary to protect the public interest in such assets." Id. The language in italics did not
appear in the bill as introduced on January 18, 2002, but was apparently added out of a
concern that the attorney general's discretion would otherwise be too broad. I thank Michael
Peregrine for this interpretation. Email from Michael W. Peregrine, to Evelyn Brody (June 7,
2002) (on file with author).
120. Michael W. Peregrine & James R. Schwartz, Key Nonprofit Corporate Law
Developments in 2002, 12 HEALTH L. REP. 324, 327 (2003).
121. Because nonprofit corporations cannot issue stock, a parent-subsidiary type
relationship is often replicated through the device of naming the "parent" nonprofit as the
sole member with the power to appoint the board of the "subsidiary" nonprofit, perhaps with
overlapping board membership. As to the duties of a sole corporate member of a nonprofit,
see Dana Brakman Reiser, Decision-Makers Without Duties: Defining the Duties of Parent
Corporations Acting as Sole Corporate Members in Nonprofit Health Care Systems, 53
RUTGERS L. REv. 979 (2001).
122. In May 2003, the Maryland legislature passed a bill aimed at CareFirst, the
Maryland nonprofit holding company of Blue Cross plans in Maryland, Delaware, and the
District of Columbia. The legislation, in part, requires the board of directors of a nonprofit
health service plan to act "in a manner that is reasonably believed to be in the best interests
of the corporation AND ITS CONTROLLED AFFILIATES OR SUBSIDIARIES THAT
OFFER HEALTH BENEFIT PLANS." S.B. 772, 417th. Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md.
2003) (emphasis in original).
123. Douglas M. Mancino, Following the Money, HEALTH Svs. REv., May/June 1997,
at 10, 12.
124. Peregrine & Schwartz, supra note 120, at 328.
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"the Board of Directors of the independent affiliate has a legal obligation to protect
the interest of its corporation to the potential detriment of the system and state
attorneys general have been very active in demanding that affiliate directors meet
this obligation."' 125 Such a view of fiduciary duty leaves the board of the affiliate
vulnerable "to suit by state attorneys general for a failure to challenge actions that
they believe run counter to local interests."' 26 Accordingly, these authors
recommend:
[l]t is imperative that corporate counsel to health care systems take
substantial care in drafting and updating both parent and affiliate
governance documents (Articles and Bylaws) in order to insure that all
the relevant corporate documents accurately reflect the nature of the
relationships between the system parent and the individual affiliates.
Dealing with this effectively in advance can mitigate, although likely
not wholly srevent, such issues from reaching a crisis point
downstream.
Whether a particular organic change opens the door to attorney general
involvement depends on the statute. In Nathan Littauer Hospital Ass'n v. Spitzer,
128
a hospital wanted to restructure to create a sole member that, in turn, would adhere
to Catholic directives for health care. Abortion rights groups protested and the
attorney general asserted the right to intervene based on his approval powers over
the disposition of nonprofit corporate assets. The court ruled that the attorney
general "has failed to offer any persuasive authority in support of the proposition
that a change in the composition of Littauer's membership is the functional
equivalent of a sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of corporate assets."'
129
The New York Court of Appeals denied the attorney general's appeal. 130 The
attorney general's website states: "Administratively, the Attorney General
continues to insist that not-for-profit corporations that affiliate through a change of
membership are disposing of control over the corporation, a substantial asset itself
of the corporation, as well as control over the corporation's assets.''
4. Transporting Trust Doctrine to Nonprofit Corporation Law
In sum, due to the lack of judicial precedents-and on the theory that
charitable activities should be governed by the same legal standards regardless of
organizational form-trust law doctrine often finds its way into the administration
and adjudication of the law of nonprofit corporations. In practice, the differences
between the organizational forms often diminish, because corporate donees must
still obey any restrictions in a gift, and trust settlors typically waive strict trust
standards. More broadly, particularly in states with a strict interpretation of the cy
pres doctrine, the conservative desire to hew to the wishes of donors exerts its pull
on regulators and courts throughout the life of all charities, trust and corporate.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 734 N.Y.S.2d 671 (N.Y. App. 2001).
129. Id. at 676.
130. Nathan Littauer Hosp. Ass'n v. Spitzer, 771 N.E.2d 835 (N.Y. 2002).
131. NYAG Outline, supra note 54, at IV.D.3.c.
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D. Sources of Parochialism in Charity Enforcement
The charitable sector fits oddly into traditional public/private distinctions.
While charities represent privately held and managed assets, they perform public
services. Furthermore, like other enterprises, they face government regulation. In
tying these concepts together, the question becomes: Which public can the state
appropriately regulate a charity to serve, and who decides this question? These
issues apply to both operating assets and investment assets.
1. Operating Assets: Geography Is Destiny
Attorneys general and courts commonly administer the law by assuming that
donors to an existing charity mean those funds to "stick" to the community in
which the charity operates. However, a community in which charity operations
occur is not necessarily congruent with the donor's conception of the beneficiary
class. State-level rivalry steals from other states, and interstate moves usually
provoke protests from the incumbent community.132 What is the proper role of the
attorney general in these matters? Most worrisome, when attorneys general act
parochially, no state regulator exists whose interest it is to look out for the
beneficiaries of a national or international charity. In terms of the national public
interest, however, relocation could be a positive-sum game: The governing board
of a charity might determine that the overall social benefit can be increased by
moving its activities from a state with a low utility to a state with a higher one.
Notably, for example, the fate of hospital sale proceeds includes where they
will be expended. Consider one recent case from the courts of both North Dakota
and South Dakota. Banner Health System, an Arizona nonprofit that operates an
eight-state system of hospitals and nursing homes, has been seeking consolidation
through sales of facilities in these states and refocusing "on the higher-growth
132. Compare state business development efforts, where one state's loss is another's
gain. See Part II for a discussion of the Terra Foundation, the Hershey Trust, and Health
Midwest. See also the case involving the Museum of the American Indian, most of whose
collection moved from New York to Maryland and Washington, D.C. when the Smithsonian
rescued the financially troubled charity. Museum of the Am. Indian v. Huntington Free
Library, 610 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Sup. Ct. 1994), discussed in FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note
64, at 130-34.
In an earlier case, the New York attorney general opposed the move by the Sailor's
Snug Harbor, a centuries-old retirement home for seamen, from Staten Island to North
Carolina, where it would be operated in cooperation with Duke University. In re Estate of
Robert R. Randall, 338 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sur. Ct. 1972). The surrogate court granted the
charity's cy pres petition over the objection of the New York attorney general that the new
site "is remote, that Sea Level is a very small community, that the town of Morehead City
some 30 miles distant does not afford the opportunities available in New York City." Id. at
272-73. The court countered by observing:
The average age of the residents is 77 years. Approximately 85% of
these residents suffer from some sort of respiratory disease; 25% of
them require intensive infirmary care, some are confined to wheel
chairs. 75% of these residents were born in foreign countries and of the
remaining 25%, most were born in states other than New York. In
recent years less than 15% of the residents of the Harbor lived in New
York City at any one time before they entered the Harbor.
Id. at 272-73.
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markets of Arizona and Colorado.', 133 Banner seeks to use the sale proceeds to
support its operations in other states, but the North and South Dakota attorneys
general object. 34
Moving first in North Dakota, Banner responded by suing in federal district
court for "declaratory or injunctive relief from what it claims to be unconstitutional
threats from the AG. The AG later filed a parallel case in state court, which is
stayed pending a decision from this Court." 35 The federal court, however, ruled
that it lacked jurisdiction over a suit against a state in these circumstances:
Banner asserts that the AG intends to use the state court system to
prevent it from selling its property and moving the proceeds out of the
state, in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and the dormant Commerce Clause of Article I, Section
8. However, the state court provides an adequate forum to vindicate
federal constitutional interests. 1
36
Banner appealed that decision to the Eighth Circuit.
Meanwhile, in South Dakota, "[wihile the sale was in progress, the Attorney
General informed Banner that he believed the facilities were restricted by
constructive charitable trusts and therefore the proceeds could not be removed from
the communities in which the facilities were located.' ', 37 A week after the North
Dakota decision, Banner filed a complaint in federal district court in South Dakota
for a ruling that it is governed solely by the state's nonprofit corporation law with
respect to the sale of its facilities in South Dakota, and that charitable trust doctrine
does not apply. The district court certified the following question to the South
Dakota Supreme Court: "Whether the laws of South Dakota recognize any legal
theory that would subject any of the assets of a nonprofit corporation or proceeds
from the sale of those assets to an implied or constructive charitable trust in the
absence of an express trust agreement."' 138 On certification, the South Dakota high
court rejected the attorney general's argument "that the common law allowed
imposition of an implied charitable trust when the purpose of the gift is narrower
than the purpose of the receiving corporation."' 9 However, the court declared that,
on remand,
should the court find that Banner was unjustly enriched by the sale of
the assets and removal of the proceeds from the local communities at
the expense of those communities, the court would retain power to
impose a constructive trust on those proceeds....
Furthermore, should the court find that an implied trust is
133. Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against Banner Health, PHOENIX BUSINESS JOURNAL,
Aug. 14, 2003, available at http://phoenix.bizjoumals.comphoenix/stories/2003/08/1 1/daily
49.html.
134. Id. Banner also faces similar legal challenges in New Mexico. Id.
135. Banner Health Sys. v. Stenehjem, No. A3-02-121, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2702
(D.N.D. Feb. 25, 2003).
136. Id.
137. Banner Health Sys. v. Long, 663 N.W.2d 242, 246 (S.D. 2003) (on certification of
question of law from the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota).
138. Id. at 243.
139. Id. at 248.
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warranted under SDCL 55-1-11, Banner and its corporate predecessors
may be held accountable for breach of fiduciary duties to the
communities. 
140
Back to the North Dakota attorney general's suit in state court. In August
2003, the trial judge granted Banner's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
facts alleged in the complaint failed to establish the two elements of a constructive
trust: a confidential relationship and unjust enrichment. As to the latter claim, the
court rejected Banner's claim "that it had not been enriched because the proceeds
from the sales of the nursing homes are used in furtherance of other charitable
purposes": 141
Plaintiff claims that the local communities surrounding the nursing
homes helped create and enhance the value of the nursing homes by the
tax-exempt status and the contributions from community members....
It could be further argued that the reputation of Defendant has been
enriched in other states by its use of the proceeds from the sale of the
nursin homes to benefit other charitable programs in those other
states. 142
However, the court found that the attorney general did not show that the
enrichment lacked a justification 143 and that the attorney general lacked a remedy at
law.'44 The state appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.
The North Dakota disputes (both federal and state) ended in December 2003,
when Banner agreed to pay $1 million, settlement being desired by the parties in
recognition of "the expense, time, and risk associated with litigation, particularly
where, as here, the claims at issue involve novel and untested legal theories and
corresponding legal uncertainty."'' 45 The attorney general's press release declared:
"'This $1 million payment by Banner will now be available as charitable assets in
the state of North Dakota. I anticipate the North Dakota communities at issue will
receive a substantial benefit from the settlement as the proceeds will be dedicated
to healthcare or healthcare-related purposes in North Dakota'...."146
2. The Temptation of Charitable Investment Assets
Some of the cases of state enforcement relate to investment, rather than
140. Id. at 248-49.
141. Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 5, North Dakota v. Banner
Health Sys., Civil No. 09-02-C-4093 (Cass County, N.D., Aug. 12, 2003) (order granting
defendant's motion to dismiss) (on file with author) (footnote omitted).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 6 ("Plaintiff argues simply that '[t]he diversion of funds would be
inequitable, and there would be no justification for allowing [Defendant] to betray the trust
and confidence placed in it by the Local Communities ... .
144. Id.
145. Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release of All Claims between Banner Health
and Wayne Stenehjem, Attorney General of North Dakota, at 3 (Dec. 12, 2003) (copy on file
with author).
146. Press Release, North Dakota Attorney General, Stenehjem Announces Settlement
of Banner Health Lawsuit (Dec. 15, 2003), available at http://www.ag.state.nd.us/News
Releases/2003/12-15-03.pdf.
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operating, assets of charities. Of course, investment assets are in a very real sense
charitable assets, and not just for private foundations, whose only assets might be
investments that produce grant income.1
47
The wealth held in charitable endowments, like private wealth, must be
invested somewhere, and by someone. A serious imbalance of resources towards
the nonprofit sector inevitably attracts attention.' 49 A revenue-hungry sovereign
cannot ignore the wealth held in the tax-exempt sector. 150 In the twentieth century,
American would-be dynasties used private foundations to control family business
enterprises. Moreover, foundations "provided a framework in which beneficiaries
of family trusts could themselves become private fiduciaries, not of family
fortunes, but of the public order in general."' 5 Required to divest control of family
businesses by the Tax Reform Act of 1969,152 the private foundations, along with
other charities, now hold a fair-sized proportion of the equity and debt issues of
publicly traded corporations. 153 As of March 2004, Congress was considering a
proposal that would prohibit private foundations from counting some of their
administrative expenses in the percentage of assets they must distribute to charities
each year 154_motivated in part by the desire to free up more current private funds
147. See, for example, the fascinating case of the multi-billion Bishop Estate in Brody,
Bishop Estate, supra note 12.
148. The discussion in this section draws substantially from Brody, Charitable
Endowments, supra note 17.
149. Of course, adding to charity resources is often regarded as superior to private
wealth enhancement in the case of wrongdoing. For an unusual and extreme case of judicial
activism, consider the 4-3 decision by the Ohio Supreme Court in Dardinger v. Anthem Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121 (Ohio 2002). A widower had won a $49 million
punitive damage award (and $2.5 million in compensatory damages) against an insurance
company that had refused to pay for treatment for his dying wife (it claimed the treatment
was experimental). The court gave Dardinger the choice of a new trial or the remittitur of the
punitive damages down to $30 million-with $20 million going to the Ohio State University
for cancer research (after funding all the attorneys fees), into a fund named for the deceased
wife. At no stage in the proceedings was this approach raised or considered, and the plaintiff
had no say in the choice of charity or the charitable purpose. Nor does Ohio have a statute
(as a few states do) that permits or requires some of the punitive damages to be paid into a
fund to benefit others. Dardinger is quoted as saying that he had already made charitable
arrangements (and is now unsure of their effect), but that, rather than funding research, he
would prefer to pay for patients whose insurance companies are denying treatment. The
Early Show (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 30, 2002) (on file with author); Adam Liptak,
Court Dictates How to Spend Award, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2002, at A12. As of January 1,
2003, the composition of the Ohio Supreme Court changed slightly, perhaps enough to have
made a difference. Lee Leonard, Ruling Highlights Court's Split, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan.
3, 2003, at 1C.
150. See generally Brody, Sovereignty, supra note 8; Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax
Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 TENN. L. REv. 687 (1999).
151. GEORGE E. MARCUS wrm PETER DOBKIN HALL, LIVES IN TRUST: THE FORTUNES OF
DYNASTIC FAMILIES IN LATE TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 69 (1992).
152. I.R.C. § 4943 (Taxes on Excess Business Holdings).
153. The influence of any particular institutional investor on any particular company is
no doubt much less, on average, than in the 19th century. For example, as of the mid-1990s,
Harvard owned nearly 5000 different securities, including U.S. stocks and bonds, foreign
stocks and bonds, real estate, and private placements. Martin Baker, Universities Are Often
Smart Investors, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 13, 1996, at 20.
154. See H.R. 7, 108th Cong. (2003). A conference has not yet been appointed to
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and reduce the load on overburdened governments.
Charity trust law being partly property law, the cy pres doctrine can be
variously applied to preserve or alter current beneficiaries' expectations. Perhaps
the poster child for a movement to liberalize the American cy pres doctrine would
be the Buck Trust. In 1975 Beryl Buck bequeathed $10 million worth of oil
company stock to a trust for the benefit of the needy of Main County, one of the
richest in the country. 155 Ten years later, when the stock had ballooned in value to
$400 million, the trustee possessing distribution powers-the San Francisco
Foundation-sought court approval to spend some of the income to benefit the
greater San Francisco Bay area. The attorney general opposed on the ground that
the original restriction was not impossible to carry out. The court agreed, and
denied cy pres relief; the trustee resigned and was replaced. 56
While a trustee's duty of care includes the duty to make trust assets productive,
most states took many years to accept the "prudent investor" rule (for private as
well as charitable trustees), which originated in the 1830 decision of Justice
Putnam in Massachusetts.1 57 The legislative and judicial quest to distinguish
permissible "investing" from impermissible "speculating" led to extreme
conservatism. Some courts and legislatures relied instead on "legal lists"-
generally consisting of government bonds, and excluding both equities and debt
issued by corporations as too risky-until, by the turn of the 19th century, trust
companies had developed to provide "a rational, institutional base for legal and
business experience in drafting, forming, managing and perpetuating long-term
trusts."15 8 In 1990, the American'Law Institute adopted and promulgated volume I
of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, which is devoted exclusively to revisions in
the Prudent Investor Rule.1
59
resolve differences with the Senate's CARE bill, which does not contain such a provision.
155. There is some skepticism about how seriously to take this low valuation; because
the stock was left to charity, no estate tax applied to the bequest, and so the precise value
was not an issue. See Harvey P. Dale, The Buck Trust, 4d & n.14 (Mar. 18, 1987)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
156. In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986), reprinted in 21 U.S.F. L.
REv. 691 (1987); see also Estate of Buck v. Marin Cmty. Found., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 442, 443-
44 (Cal. App. 1994):
The petition for modification and the petition for removal of
trustee were tried before the court beginning in February of 1986. After
a six-month trial, the probate court issued a one hundred thirteen-page
statement of decision. In its written decision, the probate court refused
to apply the cy pres doctrine to modify the Marin-only restriction. The
court reasoned that all of the Buck Trust income could be spent
effectively and efficiently in Main County. Moreover, the court found
that the geographic restriction in the Buck Trust was "unequivocal."
Id.; see generally John G. Simon, American Philanthropy and the Buck Trust, 21 U.S.F. L.
REv. 641 (1987). Compare United States v. Cerio, 831 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Va. 1993). In that
case, the district court granted the cy pres petition of the Coast Guard Academy for a
donated fund whose income was to be awarded each year to the graduating cadet with the
highest grade in physics and chemistry. The income was so high that the Academy declared
that it would refuse the gift unless the court permitted most of the income to be used for
science fellowships and visitorships.
157. See Harvard Coll. v. Armory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
158. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547, 561, 563 (1964).
159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 (1992). The
Restatement embodies modem portfolio theory in its amended Section 227. The general
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Not coincidentally, though, legal lists that restrict investments to government
bonds (among other approved securities) conveniently provided a source of funds
for the public sector. Describing the hazards of relying on the legislature to
authorize particular investments, Professor Friedman observed, "It must have been
clear to all where the impetus for these laws arose. This was not a plain and narrow
path but an invitation to corruption. The power to prescribe 'legals' was a power to
control or at least to influence the flow of investment money."' 61 Professor
Friedman concluded that the Depression provided the spur to final repeal of legal
lists: "One might seriously question... the social utility of rules which kept funds
out of channels which might conceivably restore business confidence, enhance
stock prices, and help get the country back on its feet."1 2 As Mark Sidel comments
on the Hershey saga:
The Pennsylvania statute adopted in the environment of revenge and
victory after the collapse of the Hershey sale returns us, at least in
Pennsylvania, to an era that trusts and trustees might have long assumed
gone, when charitable trust investments were subject to more severe
restrictions than in the modem era. The Pennsylvania statute may even
be seen as a modem, sophisticated version of the old "legal list," when
states limited the permissible investments trustees were allowed to
make, publishing allowable investments on statutory lists. 163
Can a charitable trust, consistent with the duty of care, accept a lower return if
to do so would benefit the community? The Third Restatement of Trusts permits a
charity to take "social considerations" into account only "to the extent the
charitable purposes would justify an expenditure of trust funds for the social issue
or cause in question or to the extent the investment decision can be justified on
grounds of advancing, financially or operationally, a charitable activity conducted
by the trust."'164 "Program-related investments" are made to advance a charitable
purpose rather than to earn a financial return.165 At the other extreme, a charity
standard of prudent investment "requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution,
and is to be applied to investments not in isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio
and as a part of an overall investment strategy, which should incorporate risk and return
objectives reasonably suited to the trust." Ie. § 227(a).
160. See John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment
Law, 1 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 5 n.18 (1976). See generally Roberta Romano, Public
Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795
(1993).
161. Friedman, supra note 158, at 562.
162. Id. at 570-71. See generally WILIAM L. CARY & CRAIG B. BRIGHT, THE LAW AND
THE LORE OF ENDOWMENT FUNDS 6-8 (1969) (In 1939, Stanford University sought court
approval to buy equities for an endowment that had been invested exclusively in fixed-
income securities for 51 years.).
163. Mark Sidel, The Struggle for Hershey: Community Accountability and the Law in
Modern American Philanthropy, 65 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 45 (2003) (footnote omitted).
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTRUSTS § 227 cmt. c.
165. Compare the debate over the Department of Labor's rules for "economically
targeted investments" by pension funds. See Dep't of Labor Interpretive Bulletin 94-1, 29
C.F.R. 2509.94-1 (2003) (this would have been nullified by H.R. 1594, which passed the
House on Sept. 12, 1995, but died with the 104th Congress). See generally Alvin D. Lurie,
ETIs: A Scheme for the Rescue of City and Country With Pension Funds, 5 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL. 315 (1996); Edward A. Zelinsky, ETI, Phone the Department of Labor:
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might divest or shun holdings in corporations whose activities clash with the
charitable purpose. In the 1980s, institutions divested stock in companies doing
business in South Africa;166 some campus groups today call for divestiture from
businesses in Israel.167 More broadly, some institutions apply screens or invest in
"conscience funds" to avoid investments in stocks of companies producing
tobacco, alcohol, and munitions.168
Prudent investment generally includes a requirement to diversify. 169 Donors to
charitable trusts and to corporate charities may direct the entity to retain an
investment in particular assets, such as stock in the donor's business. Legislatures
and courts have not yet unequivocally interpreted "charitable purpose" to exclude
any right of a donor to require investment of charity assets in the donor's
business---except for the narrow rules passed by Congress for "private
foundations." 170
D. Ascertaining the Proper Role of Charity Enforcers
Finally, we seek to set forth principles to guide the exercise of state authority
over charities, and to highlight open issues. The seemingly unconstrained powers
of the attorney general, and the hazards of litigation for targeted charities, can
induce attorneys general and courts to step over the line between oversight and
management. The flip side of meddling--reticence to monitor and investigate-
Economically Targeted Investment, 1B 94-1 and the Reincarnation of Industrial Policy, 16
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 333 (1995).
166. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 reporter's note c (discussing
social investing cases and commentaries); Daniel R. Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's
Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1105 (1988).
See also Basich v. Bd. of Pensions, Evangelical Lutheran Church, 540 N.W.2d 82 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995) (noting the courts could not constitutionally interfere with the church's and
pension board's policy, based on social and doctrinal grounds, to divest stock in companies
doing business in South Africa).
167. See, e.g., Rachel P. Kovner, Anti-Israel Drive Seeks To Revive Financial Tactic,
N.Y. SUN, May 13, 2002, at I (reporting that "Students for Justice in Palestine has collected
250 to 300 signatures of Columbia affiliates calling on the university to divest from
companies that do business with Israel.... A chapter of the group has also been formed at
New York University, and petition drives are in progress at Princeton, Harvard, Yale, MIT
and the University of California."). This story adds: "The divestment campaign appears to be
the largest since a campaign targeted at South Africa during apartheid in the 1980s, from
which organizers draw their inspiration, and a similar campaign apposing the Burmese
military regime. But unlike those campaigns-where the government had few defenders-
this one is drawing heated opposition from Jewish student groups, including some who argue
the protests are motivated by anti-Semitism." Id.
168. One wonders how far charities will take this "tainted money" concern-recall
Shaw's Salvation Army Major Barbara, and her repugnance at accepting a donation
proffered by a wealthy distiller and arms merchant. GEORGE B. SHAW, MAJOR BARBARA
(Dodd, Mead & Co. 1941).
169. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TRUSTS § 227(b) ("In making and implementing
investment decisions, the trustee has a duty to diversify the investments of the trust unless,
under the circumstances, it is prudent not to do so."); see also id. § 229 cmt. d.
170. See the prohibition against excess business holdings in section 4943 of the Internal
Revenue Code, and the prohibition on jeopardizing investments in section 4645. Congress
intentionally crafted these rules to ensure that the Hershey Trust would not be classified as a
private foundation. See infra notes 222 and 230.
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might reflect a different kind of paternalism, the desire not to discourage charity
managers from serving, but political considerations operate at this end of the
spectrum as well. The terms in the title of this Article are, of course, pejorative, but
they mean to suggest that one can objectively distinguish between appropriate and
misguided prosecutorial, judicial, and legislative behavior.
The typical state legal regime and political pressures produce the twin
weaknesses of the charitable sector: the lack of energy and initiative on the part of
many nonprofit managers, and the lack of resources and zeal in enforcing the
public's interest on the part of many charity regulators. Occasionally, though, we
find the reverse problem: a board trying to do the right thing, but thwarted by an
overreaching regulator. Sometimes, too, cooperation between a board and an
attorney general can produce unwarranted results. Or the charity and the attorney
general might reach the right result, but the court misapplies the law. Finally, the
legislature can enact "bad" law, raising issues of the appropriateness of attorney
general and court enforcement action. Even assuming the law is clear and proper,
we thus variously find cases where the attorney general and courts:
A. Know the law, and enforce that law.
B. Know the law, and do not enforce the law (either by doing nothing or by
misapplying the law):
1. For neutral reasons appropriate to prosecutorial discretion (e.g., budget
allocation, or hazards of litigation on the merits).
2. For paternalistic reasons:
a. Leniency, to avoid discouraging board service.
b. Meddling (i.e., acting as a "super director").
3. For parochial or other "political" reasons.
C. Do not know the law, and do not enforce the law (either by doing nothing or
by misapplying the law, as described above in B).
Of course, "the law" is often unclear. Moreover, just because an attorney general
does nothing does not mean nothing happened. The governing boards' own
advisers play a large role in crafting the legal environment for charity behavior.
More significantly, donors and other stakeholders upon whom the charity depends
bring far more pressure upon charity fiduciaries than can the law.
171
171. See the news accounts of the management scandal involving the United Way of
the National Capital Area, and the response by area corporations to withdraw from
workplace fundraising for the charity. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Directors Say Records
Hidden At United Way, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2002, at A19; David Cay Johnston, Former
Head of United Way in the Washington Area Pleads Guilty to Theft, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5,
2004, at A17. Despite having made drastic leadership changes, at the end of January 2003
the organization reported that major corporations and their employees have pledged only
about $4.5 million since fall of 2003, a fraction of the approximately $20 million pledged in
2001. Jacqueline L. Salmon, United Way's Donations Plummet; Charity Will Cut 40% of
Workforce, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2003, at Al. A month later, the organization announced
that, for the first time in 25 years, it would not participate in the federal workplace
solicitation program, the Combined Federal Campaign, which in recent years has brought in
more than half of its annual collections. Jacqueline L. Salmon, United Way To Suspend
Federal Role; DC Charity Wants Md. Group to Fill In, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2003, at Al.
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1. Focus on Fiduciary Duties, Not Ends
Public oversight of charity activity could more properly be termed oversight of
the activities of the charity fiduciaries. The other primary focus of state interest
relates to consumer-protection statutes that govern charitable solicitations, to
prevent fraud and the diversion or waste of donated funds. 172 Researchers Peter
Swords and Harriet Bograd find a disconnection between those who focus on one
or the other of these two realms of state oversight.
73
The role of the attorney general and courts is to guard against charity
fiduciaries' wrongdoing, and to enforce charitable obligations without interfering in
discretionary decisionmaking carried out in good faith. An attorney general is
vested with the authority to seek to correct breaches of charity responsibilities and
of fiduciary duty that have not otherwise been remedied by the board, but the
attorney general is not a "super" member of the board. 174 The courts are needed to
guard against possible opportunism by the charity's fiduciaries, but have no
particular familiarity, much less expertise, with the charity's operating needs.
Consistent with these principles, the attorneys general and courts should endeavor
to reach settlements with charities, in order to preserve charitable assets and to
support good-faith fiduciary decisionmaking.175 If the court has concerns about
possible conflicts of interest or lack of independence, the court can appoint master
or special-purpose trustees (or special-purpose directors) to make a
recommendation with respect to the matter.
76
As Marion Fremont-Smith explains, the right of parens patriae enjoyed by the
attorney general "does not, however, include a right to regulate, or a right to direct
172. The Internet revolution highlights the longstanding problems of state charity
regulators faced with the interstate activities of both look-alike and legitimate charities.
Where is Internet charitable solicitation taking place for legal purposes, and who can
regulate it? In September 2000, the National Association of Attorneys General/National
Association of State Charities Officials (NAAG/NASCO) released a proposal on this topic-
called the "Charleston Principles" after the conference at which it was developed. See
http://www.nasconet.org.
173. "Many law professors and practitioners who specialize in nonprofit law focus on
the themes listed here under 'protecting charitable assets.' On the other hand, professional
fund-raisers, their attorneys and clients, and many journalists focus attention mainly on fund-
raising issues. There seems to be little communication between the two camps." SwoRDs &
BOGRAD, ACCOUNTABiLrrY, supra note 43. One official, commenting on a draft version of
their paper, suggested that "you might want to point out that our offices spend considerable
time on fund-raising problems because the public is outraged by misconduct in this area and
demands that its public officials take enforcement action." Id.
174. See, e.g., In re Estate of Horton, 90 Cal. Rptr. 66, 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) ("We
are cited no statutory or case law authority placing the Attorney General in the position of a
super administrator of charities with control over, or right to participate in, the contractual
undertakings of the charities. He has undoubted standing to seek redress in the courts of
contracts entered into by charities which are collusive, tainted by fraud or which demonstrate
any abuse of trust management.").
175. See, e.g., id. ("No doubt it may become 'necessary or desirable' for a charity to
compromise litigation when it becomes involved in a good faith dispute which may affect its
assets, or, in this case, its expectancies.").
176. For example, the probate court overseeing the Bishop Estate appointed special-
purpose trustees to handle the tax dispute with the Internal Revenue Service. See Brody,
Bishop Estate, supra note 12, at 538 & n.5.
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either the day-to-day affairs of the charity or the action of the court."' 77 After all,
state attorneys general have no necessary expertise, much less the resources, to
address the myriad concerns of the hundreds of thousands of charities that function
in the United States today. A posting of frequently asked questions on the website
of the attorney general of California nicely delineates between proper oversight and
inappropriate interference:
The Attorney General investigates and audits charities to detect cases in
which directors and trustees have mismanaged, diverted, or defrauded
the charity.... The Attorney General does not review matters involving
internal labor disputes, contested elections, disagreements between
directors and members over policy and procedures, and most legal
actions between charities and third parties regarding contracts or
torts. 1
78
A New York case illustrates the differences between an attorney general acting
as the fiduciary and proceeding against the fiduciaries. New York has a statute
providing: 'The attorney general shall represent the beneficiaries of .
dispositions [of property] for religious, charitable, educational or benevolent
purposes and it shall be his duty to enforce the rights of such beneficiaries by
appropriate proceedings in the courts."'179 In Leflowitz v. Lebensfeld,180 the New
York attorney general invoked this statute to sue corporations whose preferred
stock was owned by certain charities, and sought to compel the payment to the
charities of dividend arrearages. The courts held that the attorney general has no
authority to bring direct suit against third parties on behalf of charities. Declared
the trial court: "[N]ot-for-profit corporations . . . have the right to prosecute an
action in their own names for the protection of their ultimate beneficiaries... and
thus no need exists for the Attorney General to act in their behalf."'' The appellate
division distinguished the situation in which a restricted gift made to a charitable
corporation may be enforced at the instance of the attorney general. By contrast, "a
donor who has attached no conditions has no such expectation. He is, in effect,
relying on the good will and judgment of the donee charity to utilize his gift in
what the donee perceives to be the most appropriate manner."' 8 2 Instead, the
attorney general may, if warranted, proceed against the fiduciaries. "Standing to
sue and supervisory powers are entirely separate legal principles."18 3 The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed: "[The statute] does not authorize a large scale
incursion into the everyday affairs of charitable corporations. Indeed, in these
circumstances, to confer standing upon the Attorney-General... would be to grant
all but unlimited and uncontrolled power to act as the alter ego of the charitable
organization."
1
177. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 4, at 301.
178. State of California Office of the Attorney General, Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://caag.state.ca.us/charities/faq.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2004).
179. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.1(f) (McKinney 2002).
180. 415 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1980).
181. Lefkowitz v. Lebensfeld, 408 N.Y.S.2d 216, 219 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
182. Lefkowitz v. Lebensfeld, 417 N.Y.S.2d 715, 720 (App. Div. 1979).
183. Id. at 721.
184. Leflcowitz, 415 N.E.2d at 922. Compare Estate of Janes, 681 N.E.2d 332 (N.Y.
1997) (permitting attorney general suit for breach of fiduciary duty by the trustee of a private
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At the same time, more enforcement against wayward fiduciaries-even, or
perhaps especially, politically well-connected fiduciaries-might be salutary, with
the sanction perhaps being reputational rather than monetary. For example, in
recent years, all investors, including nonprofits, became more conscious of asset
allocation. In the mid-1990s, the bull market attracted the smallest charity;
foundations, due to their payout requirement, were particularly conscious of their
portfolio values. Now, posting the first losses after years of positive investment
returns, charities seem to be struggling to maintain their endowments-perhaps
overly struggling. As of June 30, 2001, the Art Institute of Chicago had invested
nearly $400 million of its $667 million endowment in lightly regulated "hedge
funds," only to discover in the fall that a $23 million investment had nearly
vanished, and another $20 million was at similar risk. 185 In a lawsuit, the museum
complained that the hedge fund in which the loss occurred had promised that the
museum "could not lose any of [its] investment, even in a declining market, unless
the particular stocks in which the fund assets were invested fell in value by more
than 30 percent," but that the investment involved a "highly proprietary trading
strategy" that could not be disclosed. 186 The museum's finance committee included,
among others, department-store heir Marshall Field V, the chief executive of the
Chicago Board of Trade, and a former chairman of Sears, Roebuck & Company. A
former chairman of Sara Lee Corporation and the current chairman of Hyatt Hotels
Corporation also sit on the board.187 Commented trustee Field: "This is the risk of
the game. And we lost. And so what?"'' 88 We have no information as to whether the
Illinois attorney general is investigating the actions (or inactions) of the museum's
board.
The question remains whether a change in purpose is or should be a special
case. 189 This subject is being examined by the ongoing American Law Institute's
trust with charitable remaindermen; holding it imprudent to retain a high concentration of
Kodak stock in the estate--seventy-one percent-for seven years given the needs of the
beneficiaries; and assessing damages for the value of the lost capital but not lost profits),
with Commonwealth ex rel. Ferguson v. Gardner, 327 S.W.2d 947, 948 (Ky. 1959) ("It is
significant that no record has been produced of any attempt by an attorney general, during
the entire 167 years of the Commonwealth, to intervene in the many contests about the
validity and establishment of wills involving charities."). Surprisingly, in this latter case, the
court also commented:
If the present will is declared valid, bequests thereunder for the ultimate
benefit of charity will be nontaxable, and the state will be deprived of a
substantial amount in inheritance tax revenue and in future taxes.
Certainly, it was not the intention of the Legislature to place the
Attorney General in the inconsistent position of being under the duty of
seeking to establish the validity of a will when the state will benefit
from its invalidity.
Id. at 949.
185. Barbara Rose, Museum Defends Investing Strategy, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 2001, at
3:1.
186. Id.
187. Ianthe Jeanne Dugan et al., Chicago Art Institute Learns Tough Lesson About
Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2002, at Al.
188. Id.
189. See NAAG Model Act, supra note 109 (citing proposals by Professors
Goldschmid and Fishman).
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project on Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations.1 90
2. Parochialism by Charities: What Is the Effect of Foreign Incorporation?
A charity operating across state lines becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the
state in which it maintains assets and solicits contributions. Similar problems can
arise for an affiliated group of separately incorporated charities formed in more
than one state, as already described with respect to Banner Health System and as
illustrated in Part II by the Heath Midwest case. But the lines of jurisdiction are not
clear, particularly over decisions by the board to make organic changes in purpose
and governance.
A matter may be heard in one jurisdiction while applying the law of another.
The law is generally settled for charitable trusts: Unless the trust designates a
jurisdiction, issues of interpretation are governed by the law of the state of
organization and issues of administration are governed by the law where the trust is
administered (where the trust has the most contacts). Matters appear more complex
for nonprofit corporations.
Even for charities intending to operate in a single state, the desire to operate
free of unreasonable governmental oversight has led savvy advisers to choose the
state of incorporation carefully. While their laws tend to resemble each other, states
sometimes have different policy goals, or even compete with each other by
providing more hospitable legal environments for certain activities. 91 Nonprofits
might then shop for a favorable state of incorporation.
For example, New York practitioners, seeking to avoid the delays and
involvement of the attorney general and the courts, routinely incorporate their
nonprofit clients in Delaware (which does not have a separate nonprofit corporation
statute). 192 Those starting a charity in California might be reluctant to submit to
California's requirement that "not more than 49 percent of the persons serving on
the board of any [nonprofit public benefit] corporation may be interested
persons."' 193 Finally, many states offer limitations on the "monetary damages that
could be recovered from directors of [nonprofit] business corporations who breach
their duty of care."'
194
190. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations §§ 240, 245 (Council Draft
No. 1, 2003). Note that this draft has not been adopted by either the AL council or the
membership. See supra note * (stating that I am the Reporter of this project).
191. While the powerful institutional force of isomorphism (conformity) operates on
legislation, there is sometimes a "race to the bottom" to attract desired enterprises. See
Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOzO L. REv. 709
(1987).
192. See FIns:1MAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 64 (explaining that incorporators of charities
intending to operate in New York, which has a strict regulatory regime, prefer to incorporate
in Delaware).
193. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5227(a) (West 1996). Subsection (b) defines "interested
persons" as either "[any person currently being compensated by the corporation for services
rendered to it within the previous 12 months . . . excluding any reasonable compensation
paid to a director as director," or any specified family member of such a compensated
person. Id.; see also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-B, § 713A(2) (West 2003.)
194. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT at xxxv (1987); see also FREMONT-SMiTH,
supra note 4, app. at 514-17 (identifying 21 states allowing for optional elimination of
liability).
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At the federal level, in 2002 Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley
legislation,195 generally affecting only publicly traded companies, in response to the
corporate governance scandals of Enron, WorldCom, and others. Proposals have
followed for similar reform at the state level. Similar changes are being adopted by
self-regulating bodies.196 The desirability of extending some of these reforms to the
nonprofit sector is a subject of much debate, and could influence the choice of form
(as trust or corporation), as well as the choice of state of organization. 197 However,
the broadly-applicable standards adopted by the BBB Wise Giving Alliance
recommend that no more than one person who directly or indirectly receives
compensation from the charity should serve as a voting member of the board-and
should not serve as chairman or treasurer.
198
Typically, a foreign corporation (for-profit or nonprofit) must register to obtain
a certificate of authority in states in which it operates. 199 It is not always clear,
however, what requirements a state may impose on a charity formed elsewhere, and
the degree of state oversight over foreign charities remains largely untested in the
courts. The state of operations should not be able to impose requirements on
foreign charities more onerous than those imposed on its domestic charities. The
issue remains about which requirements imposed on domestic charities can also be
imposed on a foreign charity formed in a state with less strict requirements, such as
the number of directors or their independence.
A charity operating across state lines becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the
state in which it maintains assets or solicits contributions. If a charity formed in one
state operates exclusively in another, ordinarily the attorney general of the state of
organization does not oversee operations, and the attorney general in the state of
operations does not oversee internal affairs. But the boundaries of jurisdiction can
195. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
196. See New York Stock Exchange, Final NYSE Corporate Governance Rules
(approved by the SEC in Nov. 2003), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs-
finalcorpgovrules.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2004).
197. For example, the New York legislature is considering a proposal to apply certain
of the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley to nonprofit organizations receiving over $1 million in
annual revenues or having over $3 million in assets. See Press Release, Office of New York
State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General Spitzer's Proposed Reforms to State
Corporate Accountability Laws: Proposals Would Protect Public Against Abuses by For-
Profit and Non-Profit Corporations (Mar. 12, 2003), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/mar/marl2a_03.html; Nonprofit Coordinating
Committee of New York, Sarbanes-Oxley for Nonprofits (Aug. 2003), available at
http://www.npccny.org/info/gtilO.htm. Note that Drexel University made headlines by
voluntarily adopting many of the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley. See Memorandum from
Tobey Oxholm of the Drexel University Office of the General Counsel, to NACUA
Colleagues (March 10, 2003), available at http://www.nacua.org/documents/Drexel-
Sarbanes-OxleyMemo.doc.
198. See BBB Wise Giving Alliance, Standards for Charity Accountability (effective
Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://www.give.org/standards/spring03standards.pdf; BBB Wise
Giving Alliance, Implementation Guide to the BBB Wise Giving Alliance Standards for
Charity Accountability (effective Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://www.give.org/standards/
impguide03.pdf.
199. See generally People v. Jewish Consumptives' Relief Soc'y, 92 N.Y.S.2d 157, 158
(N.Y. Spec. 1949) ("[M]ost of the norms prescribed for doing business by commercial
corporations appear to apply with equal validity to non-profit corporations.").
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be indistinct, particularly regarding decisions by the board to make organic changes
in purpose and governance. Problems can be acute for an affiliated group of
incorporated charities formed in separate states-notably multi-state health care
systems. The attorney general of the state of operations can be expected to argue, at
the very least, that contributors to the domestic charity intended not only to further
the purposes of the organization, but also to benefit the community in which the
charity has been operating. Assuming that an attorney general could successfully
assert oversight over donated assets (including intangible assets), the next question
is whether that oversight is severable. Consider, for example, a nonprofit theater
incorporated in Delaware and operating in Trenton, whose assets have resulted
from a mix of contributions, government grants, and ticket sales. If the organization
decides to move to Philadelphia, what authority does the New Jersey attorney
general wield over (1) the decision to sell the assets, (2) the decision to move the
resulting funds to another state, and (3) the decision to devote those funds to a use
other than as a theater? Apparently, while data are sparse, attorneys general seek to
keep operations in the state, but would settle for keeping the entire net asset value
in the hands of other state charities. °°
Under long-standing (although sometimes criticized) conflict-of-laws
principles, the "internal affairs doctrine" holds that the law of the state of
incorporation applies to regulate the intra-corporate matters of a foreign
corporation authorized to transact business in the state of operation.20 1 Enshrined in
200. See, e.g., Press Release, New Mexico Office of the Attorney General, Attorney
General Will Not Oppose the Sale of St. Joseph's Hospital (July 19, 2002), available at
http://www.ago.state.nm.us/PIO/Archived-PressReleases/2002/AGwillnotOpposeSaleofSt.J
osephHospital.htm (announcing the issuance of a "no objection" letter in the sale of St.
Joseph Healthcare Systems by its member organization, Catholic Health Initiatives of
Denver, to Ardent Health Services of Nashville, Tennessee). The press release stated:
"St. Joseph's Hospital has had a 100 year tradition of service to unmet
health needs in the Albuquerque area. That tradition will continue
because Catholic Health Initiatives has agreed to use an estimated $21
million, the net proceeds of the sale, and an additional estimated $7
million from St. Joseph Foundation assets to serve the health needs of
the people of Albuquerque and New Mexico. I appreciate the fact that
Catholic Health Initiatives worked with my office and as a result New
Mexico's charitable assets will remain in New Mexico," Madrid said.
Id. (emphasis added). The press release added that "[tihe exact mission and structure of the
new [nonprofit] health ministry will be determined through a planning process that will
include public input"; the "New Mexico Charitable Registrar of the Attorney General's
office will have oversight of the new health ministry's planning process"; and the
"governance board of the new health ministry will reflect the geographic, cultural and
linguistic diversity of New Mexico." Id.
201. The Restatement looks to the "local law of the state of incorporation .... except in
the unusual case where . . . some other state has a more significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302(2) (1969).
Comment a states:
Many of the matters that fall within the scope of the rule of this Section
involve the "internal affairs" of a corporation ....
Matters falling within the scope of the rule of this Section and
which involve primarily a corporation's relationship to its shareholders
include steps taken in the course of the original incorporation, the
election or appointment of directors and officers, the adoption of by-
laws .... the holding of directors and shareholders' meetings, methods
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the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the doctrine has been adopted in the
corporations code of over half the states. 2°2 However, a few states are particularly
concerned about the "pseudo-foreign corporation"-the entity whose only tie to the
state of incorporation is incorporation itself. California and New York, in
particular, have adopted statutes applying much of their domestic corporate law to
foreign corporations operating in-state that meet a threshold test.
20 3
But the Restatement and these statutes explicitly do not apply to nonprofit
corporations.2 °4 What, then, can we say about the level of authority that a state
attorney general and courts wield over a foreign nonprofit corporation?20 5 Case law
is sparse. A California appeals court ruled: "The election and removal of officers
are matters involving the internal affairs of a corporation, and California courts
generally apply the laws of the place of incorporation in such instances.
' 2°6
of voting .... shareholders' rights to examine corporate records, charter
and by-law amendments, mergers, consolidations and reorganizations.
Id. §302 cmt. a. See generally Note, The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical Justifications
and Tentative Explanations for Its Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1480 (2002).
202. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 15.05 (2002) (identifying 29 state codes that
contain an exception for the internal affairs of a foreign corporation doing business in the
state).
203. I am grateful to Tom Silk for a helpful discussion of the California approach to the
internal affairs doctrine.
204. The Introductory Note to Chapter 13 of the Restatement (Second) begins:
This Chapter deals with business corporations. It is concerned with the
choice-of-law problems that arise when a business corporation extends
its activities beyond the borders of the incorporating state. On the other
hand, this Chapter does not deal with municipal or other public
corporations or with nonprofit corporations, charitable or otherwise.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 13 introductory note (1969).
205. Space does not permit a full explanation of worthy enforcement action by the
Hawaii attorney general against the self-dealing trustees of the Bishop Estate. See generally
Brody, Bishop Estate, supra note 12; Evelyn Brody, Administrative Troubles for the
Intermediate Sanctions Regime, 92 TAx NOTES 423, 423 (2001). Relevant to our inquiry is
the report that the Bishop Estate considered moving out of Hawaii in order to escape the
oversight of the Hawaii attorney general-indeed, it contemplated reforming in the
Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation in South Dakota to get out from under IRS jurisdiction as
well-but, as a trust, hesitated because of the necessity of obtaining court approval. See
Interim Trs.' Trial Mem. at II.B.1, In re Estate of Bishop (Haw. Prob. Ct. Dec. 13, 1999)
(Equity No. 2048) ("The Incumbent Trustee Investigated Moving KSBE's Domicile to
Escape Oversight of their Activities By the Hawai'i State Courts, Legislature, and Executive
Branch."); Interim Trs.' Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 55-
63, In re Estate of Bishop, Equity No. 2048 (Haw. Prob. Ct. Dec. 13, 1999) ("Possible
Changes in Domicile and Tax Status"); see also Rick Daysog, Bishop Eyed Move to Dakota,
HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Oct. 12, 1999, at Al.
206. Am. Ctr. for Educ., Inc. v. Cavnar, 145 Cal. Rptr. 736, 742 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). If
the charity takes the trust form, the court continued, it would usually be governed by the
laws of the state in which the trust is administered. Id. at 743. "Factors to be considered in
determining the place of administration are the domiciles of the trustees, the physical
location of the assets constituting the res of the trust, and the place in which the business of
the trust is carried on." Id. (internal citation omitted). However, administration is not
necessarily the same thing as governance.
As for corporations formed in another country, compare a decision by the U.S. Supreme
Court involving a Cuban bank, which argued that under the law of Cuba it would be viewed
as a government instrumentality entitled to sovereign immunity. In First National City Bank
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Nevertheless, the court went on to rule:
Where a charity has been organized by California residents, is located in
this state and has all of its assets and most of its activity here, we
believe that actions taken in California concerning the administration of
that charity should not escape the scrutiny of California law merely
because the founders chose to incorporate elsewhere. Consequently, we
hold that the law of California, to the extent it exists, is controlling.
207
The court noted:
This holding, however, is not of great consequence because the
differences between California and the District of Columbia law in the
relevant areas are not so significant as to dictate opposite results in this
case. Moreover, because the case presents issues which have not been
definitively settled by the courts of California or of the District of
Columbia, we shall have to seek guidance from the decisions of other
jurisdictions as well. 208
The high court of Maryland declined to become involved in a membership
issue involving the NAACP, a foreign corporation, citing the internal affairs
doctrine. Referring to the business corporation context, the court cited a definition
by the United States Supreme Court:
[T]he internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which
recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate a
corporation's internal affairs-matters peculiar to the relationships
among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and
shareholders-because otherwise a corporation could be faced with
conflicting demands.
209
v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983), the Supreme Court
declined to apply Cuban law, explaining:
As a general matter, the law of the state of incorporation normally
determines issues relating to the internal affairs of a corporation.
Application of that body of law achieves the need for certainty and
predictability of result while generally protecting the justified
expectations of parties with interests in the corporation. See
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 302, Comments a & e,
(1971). Cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2090, 45
L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). Different conflicts principles apply, however, where
the rights of third parties external to the corporation are at issue. See
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, supra, § 301. To give
conclusive effect to the law of the chartering state in determining
whether the separate juridical status of its instrumentality should be
respected would permit the state to violate with impunity the rights of
third parties under international law while effectively insulating itself
from liability in foreign courts. We decline to permit such a result.
Id. at 621-22 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
207. Cavnar, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
208. Id. (footnote omitted).
209. NAACP v. Golding, 679 A.2d 554, 559 (Md. 1996) (quoting Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982)). The Maryland court continued:
We further explained the rationale for the doctrine in Condon v. Mutual
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In conclusion, the court held:
Applying these principles to the facts of the instant case, we first
observe that the national NAACP is a foreign corporation. As such,
applying the internal affairs doctrine, we decline to interfere with its
internal management decisions. Moreover, even under Maryland
corporations law, applying the business judgment rule, we would not
interfere with the organization's decision because the NAACP did not
engage in any fraud, arbitrariness, or bad faith.
210
3. Inappropriate Involvement in Charity Governance
One final area of vulnerability in the proper relationship between the state and
charity has been highlighted by recent events: the insistence by attorneys general
on having appointment or veto power over the members of a charity board. This is
further discussed in the following case studies.
II. CASE STUDIES
This Part applies the principles discussed above to several recent enforcement
or regulatory actions that resulted in at least preliminary court review-and, in
nearly all the cases, targeted legislative activity.21 These cases present a continuum
of issues, beginning with public control over charity investment activities (the
Hershey Trust) and control over charitable operating assets (the Terra Foundation).
The remaining cases deal with health care institutions-hospitals, which are
charitable trusts or charitable nonprofit corporations, and Blue Cross entities, which
are usually mutual-benefit nonprofits rather than charitable entities. Health
Midwest illustrates what happens when warring attorneys general address a single
multi-state health care system. Finally, events in several states illustrate very
different-and troubling--outcomes in desired conversions of Blue Cross plans to
for-profit status: One state legislature mandated nonprofit status for five years;
another state conditioned permission to convert on the plan's agreeing to pay the
Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 89 Md. 99, 42 A. 944 (1899), stating that:
Our courts ... can enforce no forfeiture of charter
for violation of law, or removal of officers for
misconduct; nor can they exercise authority over the
corporate functions, the by-laws, nor the relations
between the corporation and its members, arising
out of, and depending upon, the law of its creation.
These powers belong only to the State which
created the corporation.
Id. at 116-17, 42 A. at 948. Accord Moore v. NAACP, 425 Pa. 204, 229
A.2d 477, 478-79 (1967) (upholding trial court's decision that it did not
have jurisdiction over internal affairs of the NAACP, a New York
corporation, and thus could not enjoin the NAACP from establishing
additional chapters in Philadelphia).
Golding, 679 A.2d at 559.
210. Id. at 562-63.
211. In addition to citing to attorney general press releases and available court decisions
and legislation, the case studies draw heavily from the extensive press coverage these events
received.
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sale proceeds directly to the state coffers; and in three states, the Blue Cross plan
abandoned the attempt.
21 2
A. Hershey Trust's Aborted Sale of Control in Hershey Foods Corp.
Hershey, Pennsylvania is a company town with a vengeance, 21 3 perfumed with
the aroma of roasting chocolate and festooned with Kiss-shaped hoods on the street
lamps. The vision of Milton S. Hershey lives on in Hershey Foods Corporation, the
Hershey Trust Company, Hershey Entertainment and Resorts Company, and the
Milton Hershey School, which owns most of the foregoing. The school's decision
to sell its multi-billion dollar investment in the New York Stock Exchange-listed
food company provided a summer's worth of delight to headline writers, from
"Blood and Chocolate" to "Judge Issues Hershey Bar" to eventual "Meltdown,"
"Kiss Off," and "Sweet Victory" when the board retreated. All this from the
utopian community that Milton Hershey dreamed of having "no poverty, no
nuisances, and no evil.,
21 4
In 1909, Milton and his wife Catherine created a trust for the founding of the
Hershey Industrial School "for the residence and accommodation of poor white
male orhans";21 5 the deed of trust required that the orphans be indentured to the
school.2 16 Over time, Milton Hershey's vision yielded to changing social and
economic conditions, as reflected in a series of cy pres decisions. No longer only a
vocational school, the now-named Milton Hershey School is open to any "poor"
child, regardless of race and sex, so long as at least one parent is unable to provide
212. As described below, it is not always clear whether, in a particular state, the pre-
conversion Blue Cross is a charity or some other form of nonprofit, and thus it is not always
clear what law applies.
213. Steven Pearlstein, A Bitter Feud Erupts Over Hershey Plant: Plan to Sell Candy
Empire Divides a Company Town, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2002, at Al [hereinafter Pearlstein,
Bitter Feud].
Milton S. Hershey and his famous candy company not only provided
residents with steady jobs and free medical care but also a swimming
pool, theater, dance hall, zoo, parks, hockey arena and a junior college.
He personally financed the school buildings and paid off the mortgages
of every church. And Hershey-owned entities provided residents with
subsidized electricity, water, phone and trolley service, and operated the
town's newspaper, drug store, hotel and department store.
Id.
214. JOIL GLENN BRENNER, THE EMPERORS OF CHOCOLATE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD
OF HERSHEY AND MARS 89 (1999) (quoting Milton Hershey).
215. Trust Indenture, Milton S. Hershey et ux. to Hershey Trust Company, Hershey
Industrial School, pmbl. (Nov. 15, 1909), available at http://www.miltonhersheyschool.com
/mhsaaALib/The%20Hershey%20Industrial%2OSchool%2ODeed%20-%2ONov%2015%2019
09.pdf.
216. Id. at § 15.
No orphans shall be admitted until the surviving parent, guardian, or
other competent authority shall have given by indenture, release,
relinquishment, or other lawful acquittance. ... adequate power to the
Managers ...to enforce, in relation to each orphan, every proper
restraint, and to prevent relatives, friends, or others from interfering
with, or withdrawing such orphans from the institution.
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adequate care, and does not require the surrender of parental rights.2" 7 The 1990s
produced a radical restructuring from a farm-based residential education to a
centralized academic campus. 2 1 The school still offers free tuition, room and
board, clothing, and medical care. However, some dismayed alumni feel that even
poverty is no longer required of applicants.
219
Catherine Hershey died in 1915, and Milton Hershey died in 1945; they had no
children. Shortly after his wife's death, Milton had transferred thousands of acres
of land and all of his stock in the then-Hershey Chocolate Company (then valued at
over $60 million) in trust for the school.220 The trustees are limited to spending
217. See Milton Hershey School Second Restated Deed of Trust, at 7 (Nov. 15, 1976)
[hereinafter Trust Indenture], available at http://www.mhs-pa.org/docs/webdocs/Deedof
_Trust.pdf. Section 13 now provides, in part:
Consistent with the purposes of this deed, only a child deemed poor and
healthy by the Managers, and who, in the opinion of the Managers, is
not receiving adequate care from one of his or her natural parents, is of
good character and behavior, has potential for scholastic achievement,
and is likely to benefit from the program then offered by the school, in
addition to meeting the other qualifications set forth herein, shall be
admitted to the School.
Id. § 13.
218. In 2000, former Pennsylvania Governor and U.S. Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh, retained by the boards of the trust and the school, exonerated the boards from
complaints brought by the Milton Hershey School Alumni Association that the boards failed
to carry out the intent of Milton Hershey and otherwise breached their fiduciary duties.
Richard Thornburgh et al., Independent Evaluation of Fiduciary Compliance: Findings and
Conclusions of Special Counsel (Sept. 1, 2000) [hereinafter Independent Evaluation] (on file
with author); Richard Thornburgh et al., Independent Evaluation of Fiduciary Compliance:
Summary of Findings and Conclusions of Special Counsel (Sept. 1, 2000) [hereinafter
Independent Evaluation Summary] (on file with author).
219. See, e.g., David Olive, Bittersweet: The Failed Sale of Hershey Foods Suits its
Spiritual Shareholders-The Townsfolk, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 21, 2002, at Cl (quoting one
Hershey worker: "They've turned it into a damn prep school. Every time the trust does
something controversial, like trying to sell the company, they say it's for the orphans. But
it's not an orphanage any more. It's a very rich Ivy League school where the kids don't get
dirt under their fingernails."). The Thornburgh report explains that "the Deed of Trust does
not define 'poor,' so the Managers have approved a policy of limiting admission to students
from families with incomes below 150 percent of the federal poverty index." Independent
Evaluation Summary, supra note 218, at 84. On July 31, 2002, the Hershey School and Trust
entered into a closing agreement with the attorney general, calling for, among other things,
the school to adhere to this 150 percent cap. This agreement was modified on June 27, 2003.
See Press Release, Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, AG Fisher Announces New
Agreement with Milton Hershey School and Hershey Trust; Prohbiting Conflicts of Interest
and Ensuring that Poor Children Are Served (June 27, 2003), available at http://www.mhsaa
.org/docmanager/applications/DocumentLibraryManager/upload/OAG -pressrelease-july2
12002 -agreement 062703.pdf; see also infra note 297 and accompanying text.
220. BRENNER, supra note 214, at 134-35. Brenner continues:
[I]t was five years before the press got wind of the donation. On
November 9, 1923, The New York Times ran a front-page story detailing
Hershey's philanthropy, creating a sensation throughout the business
community.... At sixty-one, Milton Hershey was still very much alive,
and yet he had given away virtually everything he owned.
Id. at 135.
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221only the income, but are not directed to hold specific investments. Stock in
222Hershey enterprises today makes up almost sixty percent of the Trust's assets.
From the beginning, accumulation of income beyond the needs of the school
concerned the boards. Meanwhile, "[i]n the years after Hershey's death ... the
company and town slowly started to move apart., 223 "It was subtle at first, like
when the company stopped providing the town's garbage pickup, snow removal
and electricity. ' 224 In 1963, the Trust-with the attorney general consenting-
obtained court approval to transfer $50 million from accumulated income to Penn
State University to build a medical school in Hershey. Funding the medical center
"completely changed the nature of the town. Suddenly, there were thousands of
new residents who had nothing to do with the chocolate company and had little in
common with the town's established citizenry." 225 "Many believed that if Milton
Hershey were still in charge, that money would have been used to improve the two-
year Hershey Junior College, which provided a free education to town residents
and company employees"; instead, the junior college closed down. 226 The 1970
razing of the Cocoa Inn--the historic landmark that once served as the town's
"drugstore, department store, bank, post office, restaurant and hotel"---confirmed
"feelings that the Hershey enterprises no longer cared for the town as Milton
Hershey had.",227 In subsequent years, the free park closed (to be replaced by a
commercial theme park); factory tours were replaced with a simulation ride; and, in
228the community center, only the theater remained open to the public.
In 1969, Congress adopted significant legislation that could have jeopardized
the Hershey Trust holdings. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 prohibits a private
foundation from owning more than 20 percent of any single business (35 percent if
no party related to the donor or the trust owns any stock).229 Congress worried that
if a donor could use his foundation to control the stock, the foundation would focus
more on providing support for the company than on maximizing its charitable
program. The statutory scheme that Congress wrote, however, deems certain types
of section 501(c)(3) organizations-including schools-as automatically public
charities. But the Hershey Trust is not itself a school; it is simply an endowment
that supports a school. So in the same legislation Congress created a class of non-
private foundations called "supporting organizations, and had the Hershey Trust in
221. The deed of trust gives the trustee and the school's managers "full power and
authority to invest all or any part" of the principal and unexpended income of the trust estate
"in any securities which the Trustee and the Managers together may consider safe... and
neither the Trustee nor the Managers shall be held accountable for the exercise of its and
their discretion, exercised in good faith ..." Trust Indenture, supra note 217, at § 5.
222. Congress had the Hershey Trust in mind when it wrote the rules in Internal
Revenue Code § 509(a)(3) on "supporting organizations," and thus the Trust is not subject to
the prohibition in § 4943 on "excess business holdings." See infra notes 229-31 and
accompanying text.
223. BRENNER, supra note 214, at 264.
224. id.
225. Id. at 265.
226. Id. at 264-65.
227. Id. at 265.
228. Id. at 266-67. "In one stroke the town lost its bowling alley, indoor swimming
pool, gymnasium, pool hall and party room." Id at 267.
229. I.R.C. § 4943 (2002).
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mind when it did So.",230 As a result, unlike the large foundations that had to divest
their majority holdings of business corporations, the Hershey Trust has been under
no federal pressure to diversify.
231
Despite the Hershey Trust's wealth, in 1999 the Orphan's Court denied a
detailed cy pres application to spend $25 million a year out of accumulated and
current income on an institute to train teachers in educating at-risk children, to be
known as the Catherine Hershey Institute for Learning Development (CHILD). 232
The attorney general, who had initially supported the petition, took the position in
court that there had been no failure of the trust. The court found that: "Except for a
few years in the late 1970s, the income of the fund has always exceeded the
expenses of operating the School and at the close of the 1998 fiscal year, the
230. The legislative history is recited in a case of the U.S. Tax Court:
[T]he House and Senate reports further indicate that the purpose of
section 509(a)(3) was limited, namely, to exclude from private
foundation status, organizations which were theoretically separate from
publicly supported organizations but were not thought of as private
foundations because they were operated in close association with
publicly supported organizations. The reports give, as examples of
section 509(a)(3) organizations, religious organizations other than
churches, the Hershey Trust (which is organized and operated for and in
connection with a specific school), and university presses.
Quarrie Charitable Fund v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 182, 190 (1978) (citing 115 Cong. Rec.
37,514-15 (1969)).
231. An undiversified portfolio might constitute a "jeopardy investment" subject to
another private foundation tax, but the regulations ignore investments gratuitously received.
One group of supporting organizations recently made news when the attorney general
of New York persuaded them to dissolve and distribute their assets to their supported public
charities. In this unusual case, seven supporting organizations were established by Reader's
Digest founders DeWitt and Lila Wallace and funded with nonvoting stock of the company
for the benefit of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, Lincoln Center, Colonial Williamsburg,
and ten other charities. See generally Mark Rambler, Note, Best Supporting Actor: Refining
the 509(A)(3) Type 3 Charitable Organization, 51 DuKE L.J. 1367, 1368-69 (2002). In the
1990s, Reader's Digest stock plummeted and slashed its dividends; meanwhile, company
executives dominated the supporting organizations' boards. The New York attorney general
succeeded in obtaining the dissolution of the organizations; the beneficiary charities are now
free to reinvest these holdings, worth a combined $1.7 billion. Ralph Blumenthal, 13
Institutions Obtain Control of Vast Bequest, N.Y. TIMEs, May 4, 2001, at Al; see also Press
Release, Office of New York State Attorney General, Spitzer Announces Resolution
Involving $3.2 Billion Legacy Left by Founders of Reader's Digest (May 4, 2001), available
at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2001/may/mayO4a. 01.html.
Mark Sidel notes the uncomfortable position occupied by these supported charities
during the process: "Comments by the recipient groups-some of which had complained
earlier of investment and Reader's Digest stock sale restrictions-were considerably more
muted, as the recipients tried to antagonize neither the Wallace Funds nor the Attorney
General." Mark Sidel, The Nonprofit Sector and the New State Activism, 100 MICH. L. REv.
1312, 1323 n.35 (2002) (reviewing SILBER, supra note 89).
232. See Reply Brief for Petitioner, Milton Hershey School et al., No. 712 (Orphans'
Ct. Div., Ct. C.P., Dauphin County 1999), available at http://www.miltonhersheyschool.com
/mhsaalLib/Reply%20Brief%20-%200ct%2021%201999.pdf; Milton Hershey School et al.,
No. 712, slip op. (Orphans' Ct. Div., Ct. C.P., Dauphin County 1999) [hereinafter 1999
Adjudication], available at http://www.miltonhersheyschool.com/mhsaa/Lib/Adjudication
%20and%20Decree%20-%2ODec%207%201999.pdf.
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amount of available accumulated income was 608 million dollars. 233 However, the
court ruled that "[a]ny discretion of the Board of Managers is servient to the
dominant intent of the Hersheys to care for as many children at the School as the
income will permit.,'234 The court distinguished the 1963 cy pres proceeding by
noting the attorney general's support of that earlier petition, and the absence of
public notice, hearing and opinion in that matter.235 In conclusion, "our [cy pres]
discretion is not unfettered and, if exercised, must be within the limits of
approximating the dominant intent of the Hersheys. The proposed Institute does not
come close." Today, "even after spending $93,000 a year to educate, house,
clothe, feed and nurture each of its 1200 students, the school still has a reserve fund
of more than $850 million from all the money it could not spend over the years. 237
Diversification was another concern of the Trust's. In 1980, eighty percent of
the Trust's portfolio was in Hershey Foods stock.238 A restructuring of the
company that year created "A" shares (with one vote) and "B" shares (with ten
votes). Following four company buybacks in the 1990s, the Trust has whittled its
Hershey Foods holdings down to fifty-two percent of its assets, representing thirty-
one percent of the total stock and seventy-seven percent of the voting shares.
However, should the Trust's ownership drop below fifteen percent of the company,
the "B" shares would convert to "A" shares and the Trust would lose control of the
company. The IRS Form 990 filed by the Milton Hershey School and School Trust,
for the year ending July 31, 2001, valued its Hershey Foods ownership at $2.6billion.23
The attorney general's office, too, had concerns about lack of
diversification. 24° At a December 2001 meeting with the Hershey Trust, as part of
233. 1999 Adjudication, supra note 232, at 5.
234. Id. at 7.
235. Id. at 8-9.
236. Id. at 15. It was to this same judge, Warren G. Morgan, before whom the Trust and
the attorney general were to return in the summer of 2002.
237. Pearlstein, Bitter Feud, supra note 213.
In addition to three classroom buildings and modem library, the school
boasts several theaters, a lavish gymnasium, a visual arts building and
120 group homes where 10 to 12 children live with full-time house
parents. For vocational training there is an up-to-date television studio,
a computerized printing and design shop, a mock hospital ward, and
working dairy and vegetable farms. The school also operates its own in-
patient infirmary, an extensive network of psychological services and a
dental clinic with eight stations. And every student gets a laptop
computer.
Id.
238. Information in this paragraph comes from an interview of Robert Vowler,
president and chief executive officer of the Hershey Trust Company, and A. John Gabig,
chairman of the Milton Hershey School Trust board of directors, by the editorial board of the
Harrisburg Patriot-News. See Why the Decision Was Made, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg),
July 27, 2002, at A4.
239. Form 990, available at http://www.guidestar.com, also reported one hundred
percent ownership of Hershey Trust Company (valued at $46 million), and a one hundred
percent common stock ownership of Hershey Entertainment & Resorts Company (valued at
$6.6 million), in addition to other securities and real estate investments. Total investments
assets were valued at nearly $4.7 billion.
240. In 1999, the Pennsylvania legislature had adopted a version of the Uniform
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discussions on a range of governance issues, an official in the attorney general's
office suggested diversification. The trustees understood this to mean that in order
to avoid exposure for breach of fiduciary duty, they should consider selling their
controlling interest in Hershey Foods.
Several months later, in May 2002, the Hershey Trust rejected a proposal by
Hershey Foods to buy back the Trust's remaining shares.24' In July 2002, the Trust
announced that it would explore selling its ownership in the company. "[T]he
choice to us was either (go below) 15 percent and lose control, or to just sell it
outright.,
242
Back in the early '70's, the price of Hershey Foods stock dropped
considerably back when you had price wage controls from President
Johnson. Hershey Foods, at that point, was more than 80 percent of the
portfolio. They cut their dividends and the trustees at the time had to
sell real estate off to pay the bills of the Milton Hershey School. When
you saw a precipitous drop in the population of the school from the
early '70's in to the '80's, that was the reason.243
Evidently, the Trust's board reached its decision to sell reluctantly: "Members of
the board are graduates of this community. My heart is not in it, but my head is."
244
Prudent Investor Act, 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7201-14 (Supp. 2003), which provides in
relevant part:
§ 7204 Diversification
(a) Requirement-Except as provided in section 7205 (relating to
retention of inception assets), a fiduciary shall reasonably diversify
investments, unless the fiduciary reasonably determines that it is in the
interests of the beneficiaries not to diversify, taking into account the
purposes, terms and other circumstances of the trust and the
requirements of this chapter.
§ 7205 Retention of Inception Assets
A fiduciary, in the exercise of reasonable care, skill and caution, may
retain any asset received in kind, even though the asset constitutes a
disproportionally large share of the portfolio.
Id.
241. According to the president of Hershey Trust, "The company's offer, which was to
take us out of the entire holding completely, involved a long period of time-3-5 years to
take us out. And that involved to us, market risk, price risk.... In other words, the stock
could have dropped down, and we would have been subject to the same market conditions
we were trying to solve in the first place." Why the Decision Was Made, supra note 238, at
A4. Another reported reason was the fear that such a transaction would "require Hershey
Foods to borrow money, putting the company at risk of a hostile takeover." Bill Sulon,
Kellogg to Hershey: Ownership is Grrrrreat!, PATRIOT-NEws, Sept. 15, 2002, at Al.
available at http:llwww.pennlive.com/news/patriotnews/index.ssf?./news/hersheystories/her
shey_73.htm
242. Why the Decision Was Made, supra note 238, at A4.
243. Id.
244. Id. (comment of the chairman of the board of the School Trust). He elaborated:
When I came on board in 1996 and saw 52-55 percent of the assets
in one security, the bells went off. I said, what happens if that falls on
my shift. I don't carry that kind of liability insurance.
This was discussed over a period of time where we had to evaluate
what the alternatives were-stock swap, sell on the open market.... [It
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The possibly naive board (only seven out of fourteen lived in the Hershey area)
was shocked by the explosive opposition. 245 Workers fearful for their jobs
produced "Derail the Sale" lawn signs and internet petitions sprang up. The Alumni
Association remobilized. Members of the public were invited to affix their
signatures to a petition to remove the trustees. The board of supervisors of Derry
Township voted to change the official name of the town to "Hershey." One resident
complained: "I don't see why a town should be ruined so underprivileged kids can
be privileged." 246
The legislature and the attorney general began drafting legislation that would
require, among other things, a charitable trust considering a sale of a controlling
business interest to consider the welfare of affected communities, as well as require
attorney general and judicial approval.247 Invoking the proposed legislation, the
attorney general-the Republican candidate for governor-filed suit to halt any
sale without court approval. 248 When reminded that in the last year his office had
pressed the trust to diversify its holdings and remove conflicts of interest between
the board of the school and other Hershey enterprises, he responded that he had not
meant that they should sell the company. 24 9 Some trustees felt "betrayed at Fisher's
was very, very hard for, particularly, the alumni to make that decision.
I don't think the kids that will come in here in the future, 25 years
from now, should be subject to a decision that I made to keep a stock,
when I don't know how that stock is going to do. And the only way I
know how to handle that is to fully diversify.
id.
245. See, e.g., Pearlstein, Bittersweet, supra note 3; Amy Barrett, How Hershey Made a
Big Chocolate Mess, Bus. WK., Sept. 9, 2002, at 54.
246. Pearlstein, Bitter Fued, supra note 213, at Al.
247. See, e.g., Suggested Law Change Could Hinder Hershey Sale; Welfare of
Community Might Have to Be Weighed, PATRIOT-NEwS, Aug. 9, 2002, at Al; Brett
Lieberman & Jan Murphy, Stopping Hershey Sale Becomes Legal Challenge, PATRIOT-
NEWS, Aug. 18, 2002, at Al.
248. Attorney General's Petition for Citation for Rule to Show Cause Why a Proposed
Sale of Trust Assets Constituting the Controlling Interest in Hershey Foods Corporation
Should Not Be Conditioned Upon Court Approval, In re Milton Hershey School Trust, No.
712, slip. op. (Orphans' Ct. Div., Ct. C.P., Dauphin County, Aug. 12, 2002), available at
http://news.findlaw.comhdocs/docs/hershey/pavhersheyO8l2O2pet.pdf [hereinafter Petition].
The petition reads, in part:
20. Existing trust law requires a fiduciary to make decisions that are in
the best interests of the charitable trust.
21. The Attorney General is currently engaged in an expedited
legislative effort to require that fiduciaries administering charitable
trusts consider the impact of their investment decisions on the
community.
Id.
249. See, e.g., Pearlstein, Bitter Feud, supra note 213 ("In the past few years, in
response to complaints by the alumni association, Fisher's office forced the changes in the
makeup of the board. His office also pushed the trust to cut its traditional ties to other
Hershey-related businesses and entities. As a result, only a handful of the 17 board members
now live in town or have any connection to its major institutions."); see also Press Release,
supra note 219; Press Release, Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General, AG Fisher
Reaches Agreement with Milton Hershey School to Restructure Its Operations and
Admittance Policies (July 31, 2002), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.gov/press/
release.cfm?p=3EAC5F90-ABAE-4ECC-BCE36F7225659B3F.
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emergence as the prime impediment to the sale, after his office privately
encouraged it."
250
The attorney general's petition asserted:
Any public sale of the controlling interest in Hershey Foods
Corporation by the School Trust, while likely to increase the value of
the trust, could also result in profound negative consequences for the
Hershey community and surrounding areas, including, but not limited
to, the closing and/or withdrawal of Hershey Foods Corporation from
the local community together with a dramatic loss of the region's
employment opportunities, related businesses and tax base. 2
51
Invoking case law granting the attorney general authority "to inquire into the status,
activities and functioning of public charities" and the view that "the ultimate
beneficiary and real party in interest of all charitable trusts is the general public to
whom the social and economic advantages of the trusts accrue," the petition
declared:
Accordingly, the broad interests of the Attorney General necessarily
entail protecting the public against any social and economic
disadvantages which may be occasioned by the activities and
functioning of public charities .... 252
In the attorney general's view, this transaction "does not equate with the typical
investment decisions that trustees make on a daily basis."253 The petition invokes
the court's equity power "to protect and promote to the fullest extent possible as
many of the competing interests as can be equitably achieved."
2 4
The Orphans' Court granted the attorney general's motion for a preliminary
injunction on September 4, 2002.255 Using such language as "pray tell" 256 and
250. Brett Marcy & Jan Murphy, State Urged Hershey Sale; Fisher Deputy Was a
Force Behind Move to Put Company on Block, Sources Say; He Disputes It, PATRIOT-NEws,
at Al, Aug. 23, 2002. The news story quotes Fisher: "They should have called me to check
my position. They never hesitated to call before and come and meet with me... I'm at a loss
as to how they got to where they are." Id.
251. Petition, supra note 248,. 14 (emphasis added).
252. Id. 1 16-18 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
253. Id. 1 19.
254. Id. 25-26. In later oral argument on appeal, a news story reported the following
exchange between President Judge James Garner Colins and Deputy Attorney General Jerry
Pappert:
"What makes the attorney general's office better financial
managers than the board of the Hershey Trust, and literally the
worldwide experts they have hired as well?" Colins asked.
Pappert replied: "Because we're managing different clients. We're
managing the interests of the public, and we have an opportunity and a
duty under the law to make sure that the ultimate beneficiary of the
trust, the public, is not harmed."
Bill Sulon, Attorneys Debate Role of Hershey Trust Co., PATRIOT-NEws, Sept. 12, 2002, at
D1. Pappert "added that the attorney general's office would 'absolutely' try to intervene
even if an acquiring company chose to move Hershey operations elsewhere in the state." Id.
255. The opinion is reproduced at the end of the majority opinion in the appeal. See In
re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324, 327 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
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"'his needs looking into!", 257 Judge Morgan explained that he told the parties:
we do not view our role in this matter .. as "a passive instrument of
the parties"; that the public interest in the controversy and this Court's
inherent plenary powers of supervision over trusts may lead us to add to
our consideration of the issues such facts not offered by the parties as
might aid our determination; and we particularly referenced... judicial
notice of adjudicative facts disclosed in ... prior proceedings involving
the Milton Hershey School Trust wherein the respondents here were the
moving parties.
25 8
Judge Morgan concluded the factual recitation by commenting that a competitive
merger or acquisition process usually results in a bid price with a premium. "This
leads the acquiring company to introduce management efficiencies ... [that likely]
will result in reduced work forces with a potential for plant location changes. 259
The Orphans' Court began its discussion by ruling that "[p]roperty given to a
charity is in a measure public property," and held that "the Attorney General has
the authority to inquire whether an exercise of a trustee's power, even if authorized
under the trust instrument, is inimical to the public interest."26 The court invoked
its "broad visitorial and supervisory powers over charitable trusts": 'The Court
'within its appointed orbit is exclusive, and therefore necessarily as extensive as the
demands of justice.' 26 1
While the immediate issue was the preliminary injunction, the court also
addressed the merits, declaring: "'The business was not, during Mr. Hershey's life,
is not now, nor foreseeably in financial difficulty, and the School, according to
statements by officers of the Directors/Managers has ample funds in its
,262accumulated income to carry out its purposes." The court found lacking an
"explanation why, if any need for funds exists for which a sale is necessary, it
could not be met while still keeping control," raising the question "whether an
immediate premium share price obtained in losing control is a reasonable trade-off
for permanently retaining it."'263 The court concluded that a further investigation
was warranted into whether a sale comports with Milton Hershey's intent, and
whether "the act of... the Directors/Managers[] is so unreasonable as it relates to
their duty to the School Trust that it amounts to a capriciousness that is an abuse of
their discretion.,, 264 Dismissing the argument that a trustee is always to administer
256. Id. at 331.
257. Id. at 332 n.3.
258. Id. at 328 (footnote omitted).
259. Id. at 329. Later in his opinion, Judge Morgan stated: "We would add that this
Court is not required to be blind and deaf to that which has been commonplace information
to the public during the recent past period of numerous mergers and acquisitions of public
companies." Id. at 331.
260. Id. at 330.
261. Id. (citation omitted).
262. Id. at 332.
263. Id. The court noted the 1999 cy pres proceeding "based on an allegation that there
was a pro tanto failure of the School Trust because it had more accumulated income
($750,000,000) than it was ever going to need," and the court's denial of the petition "on the
ground that the proposed Institute was not within the Settlors' intent." Id. at 333 n.4.
264. Id. at 332. The court had earlier stated: "The symbiotic relationship among the
School, the community, and the Company is common knowledge." Id. However, a
2004]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
the trust solely for the benefit of its beneficiaries, the court wrote:
The duties of a trustee and the Attorney General are concomitant in so
far as assuring that the benefits of a charitable trust are delivered in
accordance with the Settlor's intent; but because the socio-economic
benefits of a charitable trust extend beyond the designated beneficiaries
to the public itself, although ordinarily compatible with each other, the
Attorney General has an added responsibility of assuring that
compatibility.
265
The Hershey Trust appealed to the Commonwealth Court,26 which on
September 18, 2002, affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction. At the oral
argument, President Judge James Gardner Colins commented: "If we create this
doctrine that the attorney general becomes sort of a super trustee, we're putting all
the public at risk to the next person who might benefit from that position."
267
However, Judge Colins, in writing for the court, did not reach the merits of the
Trust's arguments, but rather concluded: "A review of the record and Judge
Morgan's opinion does not immediately convince us no apparently reasonable
grounds exist to support the order as one that restores the status quo... before the
issues raised by the parties are resolved [in court] .... ,,268 The court "direct[ed]
that the Orphan's Court rule on the merits of the controversy expeditiously. ' 269 The
vote was five to one (with one judge recusing himself).
In dissent, Judge Pellegrini "disagree[d] that the Attorney General has
authority to become fully involved under a parens patriae theory to protect the
'public' regarding the proposed sale" prior to a decision by the trustees to sell. 270
"If that were the case, then the Attorney General could become fully involved in
the decisionmaking process of every charitable trust or, for that matter, in every
subsequent filing by the Trust asserted that control of Hershey Foods could not have been an
overriding interest to Milton Hershey because only the stock market crash of 1929 prevented
him from merging Hershey Chocolate with the Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation and
Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Corporation. Jack Sherzer, Hershey Planned Merger in 1929;
Trustees Tell Court Stock Market Crash Prevented Deal, PATRIOT-NEws, Sept. 10, 2002, at
B 1. As the news story quotes the trustees' filing:
[The deal] would have required the exchange of the shares of the
Hershey Chocolate Company in the school trust for shares in the new
company and would not have resulted in the school trust having voting
control in the new company, clearly evidences that [Milton Hershey]
did not intend to limit his fiduciaries in the exercise of their discretion
in making trust investment decisions.
Id.
265. In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d at 334.
266. The Commonwealth Court is "an intermediate appellate court in Pennsylvania that
hears appeals in all cases that have been commenced by the Commonwealth government or
officers thereof acting in their official capacity. In Pennsylvania, most appeals involving
trust and estate matters are referred instead to a different intermediate appellate court, the
Superior Court." Christopher H. Gadsden, The Hershey Power Play, EST. & TR., Nov. 2002,
at 8, 12, available at http://trustsandestates.comlar/estate._hershey-power_-play/index.htm.
267. Brett Marcy, Stating Their Cases; Judges Ponder Moves to Block Sale of Hershey,
PATRIOT-NEWS, Sept. 12, 2002, at Dl.
268. In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d at 327.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 335 (Pellegrini, J., dissenting).
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charity in Pennsylvania." 27 The preliminary injunction was not in accordance with
law, he wrote, because nowhere in the Probate, Estate and Fiduciaries Code "is
there any authority for the Attorney General to essentially act as co-trustee or co-
manager of the Trust and be part of the process leading up to a decision by the
Trustees to take a certain action., 272 Moreover, "for the Attorney General to
properly exercise parens patriae powers, his concern must be on behalf of the
public and tied to the express desires of the Trust settlor." 273 In sum, "[a]bsent a
showing that the Trustee's actions are against the terms of the Trust or that the
Trust provisions themselves are against public interest, the parens patriae powers
of the Attorney General do not apply.,
274
By coincidence, literally on the eve of this decision, two decisive events
occurred. First, Hershey Foods received two offers for its stock, one of which, from
gum manufacturer Win. R. Wrigley, Jr. Co., totaled $12.5 billion in stock and cash,
as well as a promise to maintain jobs in and support the Hershey community.275
Second, the board of the Hershey Trust held a ten-hour meeting, at the end of
which it voted 10-7 to abandon its exploration for a sale. The Trust asserted that the
Wrigley offer failed to provide sufficient diversification, since the Trust would still
have 36 percent of its assets in the new combined company.276 One skeptic sensed
rationalization: "If God had walked in and offered $110 a share, they still wouldn't
have taken it."
277
"Our cash cow is safe; we're feeling really great," was the reaction of one local
leader, adding: "But there's still a lot of interest in getting rid of the Hershey
trustees for ever trying this in the first place." 278 The attorney general was quoted as
saying: "We did what we could to try to make sure people knew how hard it was
going to be to buy Hershey Foods." 279 By contrast, Hershey Foods executives were
furious. The company is viewed as weakened by the perception that it can never be
sold,280 and fears lawsuits over whether the Wrigley offer, which reflected a 42-
percent premium on share price, should have been presented to shareholders.
28 1
Hoping to put an end to the dispute, the Hershey Trust sent a letter to the
attorney general declaring that the board "will not agree to any sale of the School
Trust's controlling interest in Hershey Foods without the approval of the Dauphin
271. Id.
272. Id. at 337.
273. Id. at 338.
274. Id.
275. "In a moving presentation to the Hershey trust .. [William] Wrigley promised to
uphold the company's commitment to the community. 'If you think it's hard for you to do
what you're doing tonight, consider how hard it's been for me and my family to put
someone else's name on the door of our company,' he said, a reference to the proposed new
company's name, Wrigley-Hershey .... " Robert Frank & Sarah Ellison, Meltdown in
Chocolatetown; Controlling Trust Calls Off Sale of Hershey to Wrigley, WALL ST. J., Sept.
19, 2002, at B1.
276. See, e.g., Sherri Day & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Candy Giants Both Show New Faces
in Failed Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at Cl.
277. Id.
278. Francis X. Clines, Whiff of Chocolate, and the Sweet Smell of Success, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at C6.
279. See Craig R. McCoy & Wendy Tanaka, Bid for Hershey Not Sweet Enough,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 19, 2002, at Al.
280. Frank & Ellison, supra note 275, at B 1.
281. Pearlstein, Bittersweet, supra note 3, at El.
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County Ohans' Court, following advance notice to the Office of the Attorney
General.'  The letter further says to Mr. Fisher: "We look forward to your ideas
and support for our diversification efforts. 283 A Wall Street Journal story
commented, though, that "the trust's options for diversifying are limited as the
company's management, which is now at loggerheads with the trust, is unlikely to
be willing to offer a significant premium to buy back the trust's shares." 28
The attorney general, however, still sought confirmation that the Hershey
Trust, should it change its mind, must inform the office about a future sale, and
whether the court must give its approval. On October 16, 2002, Judge Morgan
issued a decree dismissing the case as moot.285 However, the court noted, a future
board could
ignore the resolutions and not disclose to the Attorney General, thereby
evading judicial review of their action. Such deception would be an act
of bad faith that would lead to removal of the Board members but in
order to further resolve the Attorney General's concern we shall include
in our Decree the provision for notice he requests.286
The judge added the following "observations":
The memorials of a good and generous man have not been well served
by events surrounding this litigation. In this midstate area, Hershey is
everybody's town; there is a shared pride in identifying with that
community, its industry and the School, all founded by Milton S.
Hershey. ... It appears to many that the Directors/Managers, whatever
their skills and however well-intentioned their efforts, have become
detached from [Milton Hershey's] philanthropic scheme, not the least
significant reasons for this being that the membership of each Board is
unusually large and the residences and daily lives of too many members
are distant and disconnected from the charitable interests they serve.
287
Meanwhile, on October 9, 2002, the Pennsylvania Senate passed--by a 48-1
vote-the attorney general's bill to require a charity to, among other things,
consider "as asset's special relationship or special value, if any, to the purposes of
the trust .... including... the special relationship of the asset and its economic
,,288impact as a principal business enterprise on the community .... Declared the
senate majority leader, whose district includes 1700 Hershey Foods employees:
"We've all learned an important lesson here.... We have to be active and protect
our economic assets. 289 On October 28, the house overwhelmingly approved the
282. Sarah Ellison, Hershey Foods' Controlling Trust Says It Has "No Intentions to
Sell", WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2002, at B5 (quoting Hershey Trust chairman John Gabig).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Decree and Adjudication, In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324 (Pa.
Commw. 2002), available at http:llwww.mhsaa.org/docmanager/applications/Document
LibraryManager/upload/OrphansCourt2002lOl6.pdf.
286. Id. at 3.
287. Id. at 4.
288. See Charles Thompson, Future Hershey Sale Obstacles OK'd, PATRIOT-NEws,
Oct. 10, 2002, at B1.
289. Id.
[Voi.79:937
CHARITY LAW ENFORCEMENT
bill. 290 The governor, despite concerns raised by the business community, signed it
on November 6, 2002.29I
Attorney Christopher Gadsden contrasts the mandatory duty in this new statute
with the permissive language that Pennsylvania applies in its nonprofit corporation
statute.29 In general, nonprofit corporate directors may consider "the effects of any
action upon any or all groups affected by such action, including members,
employees, suppliers, customers and creditors of the corporation, and upon
communities in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are
located.",293 Indeed, this nonprofit corporation statute echoes "corporate
constituency" provisions in some states' business corporation statutes that permit
(or, in some states, require) the board to take these other interests into account-
although "[s]keptics see corporate constituency laws as thinly disguised anti-
takeover statutes, enacted at the behest of incumbent managers of threatened
corporations." 294 Moreover, Gadsden observes that the Pennsylvania Prudent
Investor Act (which the new act amends) may be overridden by specific terms in
the governing instrument, and so "a savvy donor may try to stipulate in the trust
instrument that the trustee is excused from compliance with this new
requirement.
' 295
The day the governor signed the new legislation, Mike Fisher resoundingly
lost his bid for governor to former Philadelphia mayor Ed Rendell.296 Nine days
290. The vote was 154 to 43. Professor Sidel quotes the reservations raised by one
dissenting legislator, Representative Steven Nickol, including the following:
I really agreed with the Attorney General's original proposal for a court
review and approval of an agreement when it is reached to protect
community interest. This proposal seems to go far afield to what his
original proposal was. I am not sure whom it applies to and whom it
does not, and I am not sure many of you do. I think there are numerous
drafting ambiguities.... And it also challenges provisions in Federal
law and the U.S. Constitution.
Sidel, supra note 163, at 42 & n.169 (quoting 2002 Legislative Journal-Pennsylvania
House, at 1935-38 (Oct. 22, 2002)). Of the bill's provision for Attorney General review of a
covered transaction "before a decision is even made," Nickol said: "I am not sure at that
point in time how you can have a judicial review over something like this... in which the
fiduciary must prove the economics of a deal before it has even been negotiated .... Id. at
n.168. See also Bill Sulon, Bill on Charitable Trusts Signed, PATRIoT-NEws, Nov. 7, 2002,
at D1 (writing that the original sponsor of the bill voted against it, calling the final version
"drastically and hastily altered from the version he first proposed last fall. 'My concern is
that at some point, it will have an impact on Hershey Foods shareholders, and in my mind I
wasn't prepared to have the Pennsylvania attorney general serving as chief investment
officer for one of the largest corporations in Pennsylvania."').
291. See Sidel, supra note 163, at 39-43 & nn.157-70. H.B. 2060 amends section 7203
(Prudent Investor Rule) of Title 20 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes. H.B. 2060,
185th Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2002).
292. Gadsden, supra note 266, at 14.
293. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5715(a)(1) (West 1995).
294. See Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 457, 477 (1996).
295. Gadsden, supra note 266, at 14.
296. With 99 percent of the vote counted on November 6, 2002, the New York Times
reported 53 percent for Ed Rendell and 44 percent for Mike Fisher. The 2002 Elections:
Results in Pennsylvania, N.Y. TiMEs (Nov. 7, 2002), available at http://www.nytimes.com
/ref/elections2002/2002PA.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
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later, on November 14, 2002, ten of the Trustees (including all seven who voted in
favor of the Wrigley bid) resigned, and four new members (including a former
Pennsylvania attorney general) were appointed, leaving the board with a majority
of local members. 297 In mid-December, Hershey Foods announced a plan to buy
back up to $500 million of its stock, but "[elven if the trust company sold the
maximum number of shares authorized in the stock repurchase, it would be left
with more than 60 percent of the Hershey stock outstanding.'
298
Mike Fisher, who did not have to resign his position to run for governor, still
had two more years to serve as attorney general. In April 2003, Pennsylvania
Senator Arlen Specter proposed Fisher for consideration for nomination to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. On June 27, 2003, Fisher announced that
his office had reached agreement with the Hershey Trust's new board to prevent
conflicts of interest and to tighten the qualification standards for students.
According to the attorney general's press release, 299 the agreement requires, among
other things, the written consent of the attorney general's for any purchase of
"goods and services from companies that employ or are owned by a board
member," and requires at least ninety-days' notice to the attorney general's office
of "selling land or constructing buildings on land that could be used by the Milton
Hershey School for program purposes.,, 300 The agreement also requires an annual
report to the attorney general containing data on the "economic and academic
characteristics" of admitted students. 30 1 Mike Fisher was sworn in as a Third
Circuit judge on December 15, 2003.
The Hershey case shows each of the three branches of Pennsylvania
government acting illegitimately. The attorney general practically treated the
Hershey assets as his election campaign funds. 3°2 The Orphans' Court's long
experience with the Hershey Trust only served to continue a history of usurping the
board's discretion-and this time it was even less justifiable, relating as it did to
making prudent investments rather than to programs. Moreover, the particular local
nature of the supervising court can compound the risk of parochialism, as one
journalist observed: "That the directors should live anyplace beside Hershey
seemed an affront to Morgan, a 71-year-old judge on retired status who has spent
30 years on Common Pleas Court of Dauphin County, of which the Orphans' Court
is a division, and who attended college and law school at Dickinson, just a few
297. Press Release, Attorney General Mike Fisher, AG Fisher Announces Reconstituted
Hershey Trust Board; Says New Board Will Further Milton Hershey's Vision (Nov. 14,
2002), at http://www.attomeygeneral.gov/press/release.cfm?p=lAD88F95-1248-4B6A-8D4
C312599643ACl (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
298. Bill Sulon, Hershey Foods to Buy Back Some Stock, PATRIOT-NEws, Dec. 13,
2002, at D1.
299. See Press Release, AG Fisher Announces New Agreement with Milton Hershey
School and Hershey Trust; Prohibiting Conflicts of Interest and Ensuring That Poor Children
Are Served (June 27, 2003), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.gov/press/releases/text/
27Jun2003-ag-fisher-announces new-agreement-with miltonhershey-school.htnl.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Not that the Democratic candidate for governor took the high road; he ran an ad
declaring: "Can you believe Mike Fisher's bragging about saving Hershey? The truth? It was
Fisher's office who told the Hershey board they should sell in the first place." See A Look at
Rendell's Hershey Foods Ad, PATRIOT-NEws, Oct. 10, 2002, at Dl.
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miles from Hershey in Carlisle., 30 3 Finally, the legislature singled out the Trust and
effectively appropriated to the local community locked-in control of a publicly
traded corporation-without, of course, rising to the level of a "taking" requiring
payment of compensation.
And what of the attorney general's goal to protect the town's jobs?
Protectionism has its dangers. One business columnist observed that Wrigley,
which is not "a big player in the chocolate business," would have needed to keep
the existing factories going. "And if at the same time the Hershey Trust had been
able to free billions of dollars of capital, think what it could have done with the
money."
3°4
Of course, this assumes that the Hershey Trust could get attorney general and
court approval to spend the extra money. Judge Morgan applied an inappropriately
crabbed application of the cy pres doctrine in 1999, and then bootstrapped that
decision to deny Hershey the right to maximize its investments by declaring that
Hershey has more resources than it can use for its legitimate charitable purposes.
The Hershey case illustrates the lesson that the value of narrowly-confined
charitable assets does not disappear-it just gets appropriated by those with power
over their disposal.30 5
B. The Terra Foundation for the Arts
Hershey involved investment assets. Another case illustrates similar issues
involving assets used in the direct conduct of charitable operations. 3°6 In September
303. David Marcus, Welcome to the Real World, Jimmy Stewart, CORP. CONTROL
ALERT, Nov. 23, 2002.
304. Avrum D. Lank, Hershey Should Have Mimicked Milwaukee, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Sept. 22, 2002, at ID (describing the takeover of the Allen-Bradley Company,
with the result that the "Bradley Foundation saw its endowment, and national influence,
soar").
305. The Trust's answer to the attorney general's petition stated, in part, that in
asserting a fiduciary obligation to further community benefit, "the Attorney General ...
effectively [is] undertaking his own form of 'cy pres' ... to redesignate the beneficiary of
the School Trust by taking away value from the School Trust (the sole designated
beneficiary) and transferring that value to the community... directly contrary to prevailing
charitable trust law." Trust Answer to Attorney General's Petition for Citation for Rule to
Show Cause at 60 & 61, In re Milton Hershey School Trust, No. 712, slip. op. (Orphans'
Ct. Div., Ct. C.P., Dauphin County, Aug. 12, 2002).
306. See also Missouri Attorney General Jay Nixon, Review and Recommendations
Regarding the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation (Mar. 2004), available at
http://www.ago.state.mo.us/newsreleases/2004/030404.htm. The report on the $1.6 billion
foundation contains good discussions of the role of the board vis-a-vis officers, conflicts of
interest, and the desirability of increased public disclosure. However, the attorney general
makes far reaching demands regarding the geographic reach of the foundation:
Founders of charitable corporations often include geographical
limitations or areas of emphasis in their articles of incorporation, as well
as statements establishing the foundation's purposes. Despite Mr.
Kauffman's great love for and devotion to Kansas City, no such
limitations are found in the Articles of Incorporation of the Kauffman
Foundation ....
Many sources have relayed to us his vision that progams could be
designed and founded on a "test basis" in Kansas City, and the best and
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2000, a rift arose within the board of the foundation that operates the Terra
Museum, which houses a modest collection of American impressionist art. 3 7 The
widow of the founder and her allies (including former senator Alan Simpson)
wanted to discuss with other board members the possibility of moving the assets of
the struggling Chicago museum to Washington, D.C., perhaps to combine with the
Corcoran Museum. Before any vote could occur, two directors-prominent
Chicago businessmen-brought suit to block a move, charging that its proponents
were breaching their fiduciary duties.
Filing a complaint on the side of the plaintiffs, and asserting jurisdiction under
308the Illinois Charitable Trust Act, the attorney general sought to read into the
purposes of the corporation the desire to benefit primarily "the people of
Illinois. ' 3 9 (The articles of incorporation contained no geographic restriction;
most workable of these could then be "exported" around the country.
Accordingly, we have found no basis for concluding that Mr. Kauffman
intended that the Foundation would limit its work to the Kansas City
area to the exclusion of every other community in this country.
This is not to say, however, that Mr. Kauffman intended to permit
the Foundation to become so national in scope as to leave behind its
Kansas City roots. Mr. Kauffman, when he was alive, insisted that the
Board have some members with strong ties to Kansas City, and that the
Foundation have a significant and lasting impact on the city he loved.
The Kauffman headquarters he invisioned for Kansas City opened in
1999, and both he and his wife are interred in the gardens on the
headquarters grounds. Accordingly, based on the totality of the
evidence, we conclude that Mr. Kauffman intended that, although the
Foundation would not be limited in its actions to Kansas City, its work
and presence in Kansas City would be substantial and, barring an
extraordinary convergence of circumstances, permanent.
Id. at 5-6. The attorney general "recommends" (1) that the board amend the Articles "to
reflect that a substantial portion of the annual programmatic expenditures of the Foundation
would be dedicated to initiatives intended to have a positive impact on the Kansas City
area"; (2) that the board amend the Articles or Bylaws to provide that a specific substantial
number of the members of the Board of Directors shall have, and maintain throughout their
services, significant ties ... to the Kansas City community"; and (3) that the Board amend
the "Articles or Bylaws provide that the headquarters of the Foundation shall not be moved
from the Kansas City area without the unanimous vote of its Board of Directors at a meeting
called for this purpose not less than 30 days following a public meeting by the Foundation
held for the purpose of receiving public comment regarding such a move." Id. at 7-8.
According to a news report, "Nixon did not say what he will do if the foundation doesn't
comply .... 'I have a number of tools in my arsenal,' he said." Stephen Roth, Kauffman
Tussles with Spirit, Letter of Nixon 's Report, Bus. J. KANsAs CITY, Mar. 15, 2004, available
at http://kansascity.bizjournals.com/kansascity/stories/2004/03/15/story2.html.
307. I served as an advisor to the Terra Foundation defendants with respect to a filing
made in July 2001.
308. 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/1-19 (1992 & Supp. 2003).
309. As the Chicago Tribune reported on the settlement reached with the Regenstein
Foundation:
The fact that the new directors lived elsewhere had concerned the
state attorney general's office, which intervened in the case and insisted
the settlement say that most of the money would be disbursed here.
"We're happy to get it locked in for the Chicagoland area," said
Assistant Atty. Gen. Floyd Perkins. He noted that his office has
intervened in another case to prevent the Terra Museum of American
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moreover, the Terra Foundation operates a sister museum in Giverny, France.)
During the course of the litigation, the defendant directors charged, the attorney
general brought pressure to bear on two individual directors to switch their votes
and support keeping the assets in Chicago.31 ° Indeed, a settlement ensued when a
majority of directors voted to obligate all current board members to step down; to
require, for at least twenty-five years, that a majority of the board be residents of
Illinois; and to prohibit the assets from leaving the state for fifty years.31 1
The new board members took office in September 2002, headed by Marshall
Field V.312 The foundation's primary concern was whether to attempt to build its
Art on Michigan Avenue from moving out of town.
J. Linn Allen, Foundation Truce a Boon for Charities, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 28, 2001, at 14
(emphasis added).
310. The defendants unsuccessfully sought recourse in federal court. In Terra
Foundation for the Arts v. Perkins, the district court rejected their claim that the attorney
general violated their constitutional rights:
[T]he conduct being induced (a changed vote) is not itself unlawful ....
Essentially the plaintiffs argue that Mr. Perkins used his undoubtedly
legitimate authority to name Dr. Stebbins in a complaint and to
investigate Dr. Marshall's school in order to get them to do something
lawful, which the plaintiffs argue will have unfortunate effects. If the
directors had just changed their minds, the plaintiffs would just have to
live with it. What difference, as far as their status as potential § 1983
defendants goes, does it make if they changed their votes because of the
inducements by Mr. Perkins?
151 F. Supp. 2d 931, 937 (N.D. Ill. 2001). As a threshold matter, the court also rejected
plaintiffs' assertion that federal court protection is needed against (elected) state judges:
"Moreover, there is no reason to think that the plaintiffs require the special protections of
federal court even though the state is a party to the state court action. The only basis that the
plaintiffs give for thinking there may be a problem with the state court is that the very able
state court judge is elected. That is not a reason to think that she cannot fairly resolve charges
of misconduct made against the state and its officers, such as Mr. Perkins." Id. at 935.
311. Press Release, Terra Foundation, Joint Press Release re Buntrock et al. v. Terra
Foundation et. al. (July 26, 2001) (on file with author):
The plaintiffs and the Foundation are pleased to announce that a
settlement has been reached and adopted by the Court.
The settlement will preserve the public's access, here in Chicago,
to The Terra Foundation's collection for no less than 50 years. The
Foundation will continue to manage its affairs, to operate its museum
and programs in Giverny, France, and to promote understanding of and
appreciation for American art. The Attorney General is satisfied that the
settlement upholds the interests of the people of the State of Illinois.
The plaintiffs and the Foundation are pleased that a settlement could be
reached.
The plaintiffs and the Foundation have agreed to let this statement
stand alone. No further statements are to be made.
Id.; see also Alan G. Artner, Terra Founder's Deeds May Not Reflect Desires, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 25, 2001, at 1: 1; Jon Yates, Judge to OK Museum Accord: Appeal Likely, CHI. TRi3.,
July 25, 2001, at 2:1.
312. See Jerry Mullman, Terra Explores Art of Mag Mile Move; Relocating Is Cheaper
than Revamp, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., Sept. 16, 2002, at 1 ("Mr. Field, along with four other
board members, was appointed last year by Attorney General Jim Ryan's office, which
monitors the running of charities and non-profits, after it weighed in on the Terra
controversy. Subsequently, Mr. Field selected the other 10 directors.").
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endowment and stay independent, or, alternatively to merge its $100 million
Illinois collection with the Art Institute of Chicago or the University of Chicago's
Alfred Smart Museum of Art. (The foundation would retain control over its $200
million endowment and the Giverny museum.) The new board also worried about a
decision by Chicago's Commission on Landmarks to give preliminary landmark
protection to the Michigan Avenue building housing the museum; this could limit
the foundation's options if it wants to sell the building. 31 3
Meanwhile, the original defendants-Judith Terra, Paul Hayes Tucker, and
Alan Simpson-have filed an appeal of the court's acceptance of the settlement.1 4
Their appeal charges that the lower court's acceptance "proclaims Illinois a cultural
backwater, so unsure of its patrimony and its place in the world that it cannot allow
great works of art, once housed in Illinois, to be removed from the state.... It
declares that Illinois is too provincial a place to permit the free flow of artistic
effort and creation., 31 5 The appeal also charges the attorney general with pressuring
two board members to change their votes, an action that the attorney general
denies.31 6 The appellants asked the appellant body to rule that "the Terra
Foundation may not lawfully be confined within Illinois"; that "it may not be
stripped of its collections"; and that "its board may not be handpicked by the
attorney general. 31 7 The Terra Foundation itself, acting through its new board, is
expected to file a brief in support of the settlement.318
On June 21, 2003, the Terra Foundation issued a press release announcing that
by the end of 2004 it would close its Michigan Avenue facility and place its most
important paintings and its entire collection of works on paper on long-term loan to
the Art Institute of Chicago. Rather than being displayed together in a distinct
gallery, the paintings will be integrated into the Art Institute's galleries of
American art.319 According to a news story, the director "said the remainder of the
300 paintings now in the collection either will be placed in storage, shown in a
sister museum in Giverny, France, or be lent for exhibitions at other
institutions."
320
Terra's press release sets forth the following statement by Terra's director:
313. Jon Yates, Terra Fight Set for New Chapter; 11 to Leave Board, but Art Museum's
Fate Still Unclear, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 6, 2002, Metro section at 1.
314. Lawsuit Challenges Museum Settlement, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 1, 2001, Metro section
at 4.
315. Jon Yates, Appeal Disputes Deal on Terra; State Pressured Board, Widow Says,
CHI. TRIB. (West Edition), Feb. 19, 2003, at Wl (internal quotes omitted).
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Nancy Moffett, Terra Widow Disputes Order to Keep Art Here, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2003, at 26.
319. Specifically, Terra "will place approximately 50 paintings on a renewable 15-year
loan and allow for a rotation of the paintings on view to accommodate the various needs for
installation, exhibitions and loans to the Giverny museum. Works on paper will be housed in
the Art Institute's Department of Prints and Drawings to be shown in changing exhibitions
and made accessible through the Department's Study Center." Press Release, Terra Museum
of American Art, Terra Foundation to Place Major Paintings and Works on Paper on Long-
Term Loan to the Art Institute of Chicago, at http://biz.yahoo.com/pmews/030621/cgsa
001_l.html.
320. Charles Storch & Jon Yates, Terra Giving Up, Closing Doors in '04: Treasures to
Go to Art Institute, CHI. TRIB., June 21, 2003, at 1.
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Our collaboration with The Art Institute of Chicago enables both
organizations to increase the understanding of American art and culture
among the people of Chicago and visitors to the city. It will also allow
the Terra Foundation to foster increased research in American art. This
innovative relationship catapults the realization of Daniel J. Terra's
vision to a level of service that the Foundation could never achieve on
its own. On behalf of the people of this region and across the country-
the ultimate beneficiaries-we thank the Art Institute for helping us to
achieve this goal.
321
A source contacted by the Chicago Tribune reported that the Terra board's
decision was not unanimous. This news story also quoted Judith Terra's lawyer: "It
would be a bitter irony if the actual result of that coup was to take a great art
collection, lovingly assembled and put on public display by the Terras, and stick
most of it in a warehouse."
322
Interestingly, the Art Institute of Chicago provides a startling illustration of the
dangers of weak judicial oversight, although in that earlier case, involving the B.F.
Ferguson Monument Fund, the charity was the party needing skeptical supervision.
The trustee of the Ferguson Fund was the Northern Trust Company, but the funds
were to be expended on those statuary and monuments chosen by the Art Institute.
In 1933, the Art Institute obtained a decree construing the word "monument" to
include a memorial building and authorizing the Art Institute to spend Fund
moneys on its own building expansion program.323 By 1955, the Art Institute was
ready to build and returned to court to confirm its plan to construct an
administrative wing.3 24 A colorful history by the attorney for the plaintiff in the
subsequent 1958 case recounts the 1933 proceeding:
On May 22, 1933, at 10:02 A.M. the Art Institute filed a Complaint in
the Circuit Court of Cook County .... At 10:04 A.M. on the same day
the Attorney General's Answer was filed, making only a nominal
defense and conceding all the points raised by the Art Institute. Minutes
later, at 10:17, a seventeen-page decree was entered declaring that the
word "monument" in the Benjamin Ferguson will could indeed include
a building, and that the Art Institute could use the accumulated and
future income ... [for] an addition to the Institute. . . . [I]t was
subsequently discovered that the Art Institute's Complaint, the Attorney
General's Answer, and the court's Decree were all typed on the same
typewriter, all bore the same watermark, and the Attorney General's
Answer was enclosed in the reversed blue backing of the Art Institute's
counsel.. . , who was himself a member of the Art Institute's Board.325
In an addendum to this Article, the author noted that the then-new attorney general
re-examined the case, and that the Art Institute of Chicago agreed that the
321. Press Release, supra note 319.
322. Storch & Yates, supra note 320, at 1.
323. See Art Inst. of Chicago v. Castle, 133 N.E.2d 748, 750 (111. App. 1956).
324. Id. (holding also that the National Sculpture Society lost its bid to intervene); see
also Greene v. Art Inst. of Chicago, 147 N.E.2d 415 (Ill. App. 1958) (dismissing taxpayer's
complaint for lack of standing).
325. Luis Kutner, The Desecration of the Ferguson Monument Trust: The Need for
Watchdog Legislation, 12 DEPAUL L. REv. 217, 219-20 (1962-63) (emphasis in original).
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"accumulated income" from the $1 million principal of the Ferguson Monument
Fund would be used to erect statuary in Chicago.
C. HealthPartners
Recent years have brought numerous examples of state officials seeking
appointment power over the makeup of a nonprofit board. Usually this
phenomenon takes the form of attorney general demands to approve appointments
to the board: the shakeup of boards of the Hershey Trust and the Terra Foundation
in favor of local interests; 326 the sale of the Boston Red Sox for the benefit of the
Yawkey Trust, with the appointment of an expanded board of trustees;327 and the
settlement of charges over excessive and improper expenses by Allina Hospitals
and Clinics, which resulted in the nonprofit's agreeing to allow the attorney general
to name the board of a newly spun-off subsidiary.328 The New York Times observed
326. See supra Parts II.A & B.
327. On the grounds that the Yawkey Trust, a charity, was the remainder interest of the
majority owner of the Boston Red Sox, the attorney general of Massachusetts actively
participated in the 2002 sale of the club. See Press Release, Office of the Massachusetts
Attorney General, AG Reilly Announces Agreement to Bring $30 Million More to Charities
from Sale of Red Sox (Jan. 16, 2002), available at http://www.ago.state.ma.us/txtlbo
soxdeal.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2004). Specifically, the estate of Jean Yawkey owned a 53
percent general partner interest in the Red Sox. John Harrington was both the Red Sox chief
executive and the executive director of the Yawkey Foundation-as well as one of the
limited partners. While conceding that "[t]he trust set up by the Yawkeys to operate the
ballclub and Fenway Park is private and its actions were not subject to our regulatory
approval," the attorney general asserted "it is prudent to get the facts so we can determine
whether the Yawkey Trust has appropriately discharged its fiduciary responsibility to the
charities that stand to benefit from the sale of the team." Press Release, Office of the
Massachusetts Attorney General, AG Reilly Seeks Facts on Proposed Sale of Red Sox (Dec.
21, 2001), available at http://www.ago.state.ma.us/txt/bosox2.htm (last visited Mar. 4,
2004).
More of a potential deal breaker was the attorney general's insistence that the Yawkey
Foundation expand its board and make new policies and procedures subject to his office's
review. Under the agreement, though, the attorney general cannot reject new board
members, "even if he feels they are not qualified, and his advisory role will be limited to the
selection of the five trustees to be named in the next six months .. " See Greg Gatlin, AG
"Blinked" on Sox Deal, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 18, 2002, at 25. The Globe noted that "the
attorney general's office has called for special governance agreements with foundations only
where there has been evidence of mismanagement of the organizations or their money," and
there "are no such allegations in the case of the Yawkey Foundation." Beth Healy,
Foundation Faces Greater Oversight AG Sets Bar Higher for Yawkey Trust than for Other
Charities, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 18, 2002, at Cl. With the appointment of six new trustees,
including one recommended by the attorney general, the dispute has come to an end. "'All is
well that ends well,' Reilly said, adding that he believes his 'goals have been
accomplished."' Scott Van Voorhis, Yawkey Charity Has New Trustees, BOSTON HERALD,
May 31, 2002, at 29.
328. See Stephanie Strom, Strong-Arm Shaking of Charities Raises Ethics Qualms,
N.Y. TiMES, May 11, 2003, at 22 ("In 2001, Mr. Hatch reached a settlement with one, Allina
Health System, that resulted in it spinning off operations to a new subsidiary company,
Medica Health Plans. He then selected eight 'special administrators' as Medica's board of
directors, and the court signed off on them the next day."); see also notes 343-53 and
accompanying text.
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that many attorneys general "are becoming headhunters as well, shaking up
scandal-tainted charities with new board members and administrators they pick
themselves-often friends, colleagues and even political contributors and allies.
' 329
In these cases, the attorney general obtained his desired results from jaw-
boning-but in the case of another Minnesota HMO, the nonprofit challenged the
attorney general's motion to appoint two members to its board. Attorney General
Mike Hatch's investigation of HealthPartners uncovered questionable expenses for
travel, consulting, and compensation. 330 An attorney general filing charged that the
current board "did little to exercise independent judgment concerning the lavish
activities of management." 33' Hatch's desired appointees-who would serve for 12
to 18 months-were Glen Taylor, owner of the Minnesota Timberwolves
professional basketball team, and real-estate businessman Ed Flaherty; Hatch
petitioned for Taylor to be named chairman of the board.332 HealthPartners
objected, contending that its governing documents require directors to come from
the plan membership, and that "[a]nyone who comes on the board deputized by the
attorney general has the first duty of loyalty to the attorney general and not to our
members." 333 An editorial in the Minneapolis Star-Tribune was critical:
There are any number of remedies that seem appropriate to these
lapses: quarterly public audits; an observer from the attorney general's
office at board meetings; or Gov. Tim Pawlenty's proposal to
consolidate health-plan regulation under skilled auditors at the
Commerce Department. But using the courts to turn HealthPartners
management over to one elected official is a thoroughly bad idea.
334
329. Strom, supra note 328. This story reported that, in the Hershey case, two of the
four board members replacing the ten departing members had served on the Pennsylvania
attorney general's transition team; that one new member recommended and elected to the
Terra board by the Illinois attorney general had contributed $750,000 to the attorney
general's campaigns from 1994 through 2000, about $250,000 after he joined the board; and
four of the eight appointees to the Medica board had contributed to the Minnesota attorney
general's campaign.
330. The attorney general's 100-plus page findings charging a "culture of luxury" can
be found at http:llwww.ag.state.mn.usconsumer/PDF/HealthPartnersExecComp_.pdf (last
visited Mar. 4, 2004), http://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/PDF/HealthPartnersConsulting
_Expenses.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2004), and http://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/PDF
/HealthPartnersTravelEntertainment.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2004).
331. Glenn Howatt, HealthPartners Vows to Be Trustworthy to Deflect Hatch Move,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), May 1, 2003, at D3.
332. Glenn Howatt, Flaherty Is Hatch's Next Selection for HealthPartners Board, STAR
TRm. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Feb. 4, 2003, at D3.
333. Glenn Howatt, HealthPartners Uses Web Site to Rebut Hatch's Plan; HMO Raises
Issue of Loyalty of Appointed Board Members, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Jan. 30,
2003, at B3 (quoting chief executive officer Mary Brainerd). The contest attracted the
attention of an association of cooperatives, which are also member-controlled. The National
Cooperative Business Association wrote to attorney general Hatch: "While your interest in
ensuring that Minnesota consumers are well-served by HealthPartners is laudable, your
effort to subvert the control consumers have over the healthcare business they own is an
unprecedented challenge to the first and most important principle of cooperative
ownership--democratic member control." NCBA Warns CUs to Watch Case of Minnesota
HMO, CREDIT UNION J., Feb. 10, 2003, at 2.
334. Editorial, HealthPartners; Hatch, Board Need to Compromise, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis, Minn.), Jan. 31, 2003, at A18.
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Writing about the attorney general's position, attorneys Michael Peregrine,
Ralph DeJong, and James Schwartz write that:
what is most noteworthy ... is that he appears to lack any statutory
authority for the proposition that an attorney general may appoint (as
opposed to remove) directors of a non-profit corporation. Furthermore,
the entire concept raises substantial conflict of interest issues (e.g., does
the 'appointed director' owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation or to the
attorney general?). 335
These authors also believe that Minnesota law authorizes appointment of a "special
administrator" "only in unique circumstances (e.g., to assist in winding up
corporate affairs) and not to act in a role tantamount to a director."336
In early June 2003, the Hennepin County District Court ruled that Taylor is to
be appointed as a special administrator rather than a board member, and-while he
can attend board meetings and have access to information-he may not share any
proprietary or confidential information with Hatch, and may only make
recommendations to the board on issues relating to travel and entertainment,
consultants, executive compensation, corporate governance, and "other matters he
believes may be of benefit to HealthPartners." 337 (The court did not address the
attorney general's other nominee.) Taylor's tenure is to last twelve months, as is
the court's jurisdiction over the matter; "[t]he parties further agree that no
extensions of this Stipulation and Order shall be sought. 3 38 If during that period
Taylor "reasonably believes" that HealthPartners has withheld access to
information or, without acting in the good faith exercise of its business judgment,
rejected one of his recommendations, Taylor may, through the attorney general,
seek court relief.339 This settlement is consistent with the belief of some current and
former charity officials that judicial rather than attorney general oversight is the
proper route. Marion Fremont-Smith, former top charity official in Massachusetts,
commented on settlements that result in attorney general authority over board
appointments: "The attorney general has the clout to force people to let him do it,
but he has no legal right to do it."34 Similarly, the Texas attorney general
commented: "We really don't have the authority to say to a board, you must hire or
appoint someone .... That's a decision that belongs to the courts."'
335. Michael W. Peregrine et al., "Hot" Developments in Non-Profit Corporation Law:
Health Midwest, HealthParmers and Attorney General Spitzer, HEALTH LAW. NEws, June
2003, at 50, 55.
336. Id.
337. Stipulation and Order for Appointment of Special Administrator, In re
HealthPartners, Inc., No. MC 03-001587 (Hennepin County, Minn., June 10, 2003) (on file
with author). See also HealthPartners Reaches Agreement with Attorney General, Attorney
General Audit Updates, at http://www.healthpartners.com/Menu/0,1598,5574,00.htm (last
visited Mar. 4, 2004).
338. Stipulation and Order for Appointment of Special Administrator, In re
HealthPartner, No. MC 03-001587, at 18.
339. Id. at 5. See also Patrick Reilly, Health Plan Scrutiny: Ruling May Restrict
Oversight by Attorneys General, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 23, 2003, at 44; Mark Wolski &
Peyton Sturges, HealthPartners Agrees to Accept AG's Choice as Special Administrator, 12
HEALTH L. REP. 959 (2003).
340. Strom, supra note 328.
341. Quoted in id.
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The bond-rating agency Standard & Poors, which had placed HealthPartners
on credit watch "with negative implications," reacted to the settlement by restoring
HealthPartners' rating.
342
In a different HMO enforcement matter, Medica Health Plan had agreed that
Attorney General Hatch could name eight special administrators to Medica's board.
In 2003 Medica petitioned to terminate its 2001 settlement with Hatch.343 Medica
charged the attorney general with micromanaging and pursuing his own interests;
the Attorney General countered by characterizing Medica's petition as a "hostile
takeover."' " Four of the special administrators named by the attorney general
subsequently won election to the board, and the remainder were appointed by the
board. 345 As described in a May Star Tribune editorial: "Mike Hatch's long and
vigorous campaign to tame Twin Cities HMOs took a bizarre twist this week, when
the very people he installed to run Medica Health Plans accused the attorney
general of meddling in their business and asked a Hennepin County judge to
release them from his supervision." 346 The editorial noted the unease of some
observers when the attorney general proposed to install his own board: "Some said
it would give one elected official too much power over the health care of 1 million
Minnesota consumers; others said it would be a conflict of interest for the state's
top consumer watchdog to supervise a company run by his own appointees. 34 7 The
editorial described the "paradox": "If Hatch appointed competent and honorable
people, then a judge should ask why the attorney general continues to second-guess
their judgment. If Hatch appointed directors who are bungling the job, then a judge
should ask why the attorney general should be allowed to repeat the experiment.
' 348
Attorney General Hatch, however, called the fours' election a sham: The seats were
uncontested (an almost universal practice in Minnesota HMOs), and three of the
incumbents, not being members of the health plan, were issued free policies in
order to qualify under State law. 349 In August 2003, the court ruled: "This is a
company cited in a compliance report for gross mismanagement and corporate
waste .... Under the circumstances, the AG . . . would be remiss if he did not
critically review Medica's ongoing management practices and current
342. Compare Glenn Howatt, HMO's Bond Rating Put on Credit Watch, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis, Minn.), Feb. 8, 2003, at 10D ("The New York-based ratings agency this week
cited the investigation of the company by Minnesota Attorney General Mike Hatch and his
subsequent moves to place two new members on the company board as the reasons to review
the BBB+ credit and financial strength ratings."), with Yvette Shields, Minnesota: Regions
in Recovery, BoND BUYER, June 18, 2003, at 31 ("Standard & Poor's last week affirmed
Regions Hospital's BBB credit and took it off its negative CreditWatch list, following its
parent entity's announcement of a settlement with the state attorney general's office
regarding a critical audit.").
343. See Glenn Howatt, Medica Is Still Subject to Hatch, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis,
Minn.), Aug. 16,2003, at Al.
344. Glenn Howatt, Medica Seeks to Cut Ties to Hatch; Attorney General Call Move
"Hostile Takeover", STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), May 8, 2003, at Al. "'If they don't
like it, get off' the board, Hatch said." Id.
345. See Glenn Howatt, Hatch, Medica Fight Centers On What Vote Did or Didn't Do,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), May 14, 2003, at D1.
346. Editorial, Hatch vs. Medica; Attorney General Should Let It Be, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis, Minn.), May 10, 2003, at A22.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Howatt, supra note 345, at Dl.
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administration. ' 350 The court also ruled that Medica had voluntarily entered into a
contract with the Attorney General, and that the agreement would remain in effect
until the parties jointly sought for the court to terminate it.35' Finally, the court
invalidated the 2002 election of three of Hatch's appointees and the remainder who
were appointed to the board; all retain their status as special administrators, and
Hatch is free to replace them.352 Medica intends to appeal 3
D. Health Midwest
In the fall of 2002, the for-profit, Tennessee-based chain HCA, Inc.-formerly
known as Columbia/HCA-submitted a winning bid of $1.125 billion to acquire
Health Midwest. HCA also agreed to invest an additional $450 million in capital
improvements, to maintain at least Health Midwest's recent level of indigent care,
and to keep its existing hospitals open. Explained a spokesman for Health Midwest:
"Nonprofits are at a decided disadvantage at acquiring necessary capital to expand
and strengthen themselves .... Our board of directors decided the only responsible
way to proceed would be to listen to offers from for-profit companies. ' 35 Owning
seven hospitals, leasing two, and managing four, Health Midwest is Kansas City's
largest hospital system, treating one in three area patients. 355 The acquisition is
HCA's largest.
356
As has happened with many nonprofit hospital conversions, the fight then
shifted to the question of what to do with the sale proceeds, which must remain in
the charitable sector.357 In this case, an expected $700-800 million would fund one
or more "conversion foundations," "sparking a philanthropic tug of war between
advocates of indigent health care and proponents of life sciences research.,
358
To complicate matters, Health Midwest had to contend not just with one
attorney general but two, given that the multi-community system operates within a
150-mile radius of Kansas City, and so straddles Missouri and Kansas. Health
Midwest brought suit to clarify the jurisdiction of both attorneys general. The
attorneys general's responses were severe.
Missouri Attorney General Jay Nixon counterclaimed by moving to dissolve
Health Midwest as a nonprofit corporation and to remove its board for abandoning
the entity's charitable purpose in agreeing to a sale to a proprietary buyer.359 He
350. Howatt, supra note 343, at Al.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Richard Williamson, HCA, Midwest Come Together for $1.6 Billion Deal, BOND
BUYER, Oct. 17, 2002, at 3.
355. Vince Galloro, Some Loose Ends; HCA Deal Worries Missouri Attorney General,
MOD. HEALTHCARE, Nov. 25, 2002, at 12.
356. Id.
357. See also the case involving Banner Health. See supra notes 133-46 and
accompanying text.
358. Paul Wenske & Julius A. Karash, Health Midwest Sale Prompts Gold Rush Rival
Interests Seek Foundation's Funds, KANSAS Crry STAR, Nov. 9, 2002, at Al.
359. "By disposing of the very facilities it exists to 'establish, operate and maintain,'
Health Midwest has put itself in a position in which it can no longer carry out or fulfill its
purposes." [Missouri] Attorney General's Answer, Counterclaims, and Cross-Claims to
Plaintiff's Petition for Declaratory Judgment at 1 98, Health Midwest v. Nixon, No.
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declared:
The Attorney General of Missouri may bring an action for removal of
directors of a public benefit corporation ... when the directors have
engaged in a gross abuse of authority or discretion with respect to the
corporation, including a breach of their fiduciary duties owed to the
corporation and the people it exists to serve, and removal is in the best
interests of the corporation.
36 0
As an affirmative defense, Nixon stated:
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Petition should be dismissed under the
doctrine of laches and estoppel because, having enjoyed the benefits of
non-profit, charitable status since its inception, and having conceded the
Attorney General's authority and sought his review and approval,
Health Midwest may not now challenge that authority or seek to prevent
a determination on their proposal which the Attorney General has not
yet made .... 361
Carla Stovall, attorney general of Kansas-where Health Midwest operated
two subsidiaries and managed a county hospital-similarly reacted angrily to
Health Midwest's declaratory judgment suit. She issued a press release stating:
It is unconscionable for Health Midwest to waste money belonging to
the citizens of the two states in filing this lawsuit, and to deny those
same people the ability to benefit from or have any say in this proposed
sale. The Health Midwest board members have the arrogance to believe
that this money is theirs, when in reality it belongs to the people of
Kansas and Missouri .... 362
In her answer, Attorney General Stovall raised several counterclaims,
including (1) a petition for the conduct of a judicial cy pres proceeding; and (2) the
removal of the directors, and the appointment of a receiver to take over the
charitable assets in a quo warrento proceeding due to ultra vires acts by a nonprofit363 64
corporation. She also asked for a jury trial. Her counterclaim declared:
The Kansas assets of Health Midwest, which are vested in Kansas tax
02CV326118 (Cir. Ct. Mo. filed Dec. 5, 2002), available at http://ago.niissouri.gov/health/
HMW-ANS.pdf [hereinafter Missouri Answer]; see also Press Release, Office of Missouri
Attorney General Press Release, Nixon Asks Court to Dissolve Health Midwest (Dec. 5,
2002), available at http://www.ago.state.mo.us/newsreleases/2002/120502b.htm (last visited
Feb. 27, 2004). The attorney general's answer characterizes Health Midwest's suit as "an
unconscionable waste of corporate assets." Missouri Answer, supra, I 73 & 75.
360. Missouri Answer, supra note 359, at 102.
361. Id. at 176.
362. Press Release, Office of the Kansas Attorney General, Stovall Responds to Health
Midwest Lawsuit (Nov. 27, 2002), at http://www.accesskansas.orglksag/contents/news-
releases/2002news/hca_lawsuit_react.htm.
363. Answer, Counterclaim, and Cross Claim of Defendant Carla J. Stovall in Her
Official Capacity as the Attorney General of the State of Kansas at Counts Im, IV, and V,
Health Midwest v. Stovall (Kan. Dist. Ct. filed Dec. 10, 2002) [hereinafter Kansas Answer].
364. Id. at' 53.
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exempt not-for-profit corporations are the property of the people of the
state of Kansas. Any proceeds from the sale of any Kansas assets are
property of the people of the State of Kansas and no person or entity can
divest, alienate or exercise dominion over these assets without specific
Judicial approval.
365
Stovall asserted that Health Midwest "waived the right to contest the authority of
the Kansas Attorney General to review the transaction" by, for example, providing
such a right in their bylaws; through statements to that effect made by its general
counsel at board meetings; and through a term in the asset purchase agreement
giving the Kansas attorney general the right to request a delay in the closing date of
the transaction.
366
Finally, Stovall's counterclaim also included her own proposal for a post-
closing foundation, with a fifteen-person board appointed by her.367 Yielding to
criticism, Health Midwest subsequently proposed two conversion foundations, one
for each State, and to prorate the sale proceeds 80 percent to the Missouri
foundation and 20 percent to the Kansas foundation in accordance with current
operations. Under Health Midwest's modified proposal, a common twenty-five-
person board would govern both foundations. According to Health Midwest's
memorandum describing the structure and governance of the foundations:
"Because a separate entity will be chartered in each state, each Attorney General
will be able to assert such jurisdiction as permitted by laws of their respective states
,,368
over the entity chartered in his or her respective state. However, the Missouri
and Kansas attorneys general continued to contest the authority of the Health
Midwest board to structure the foundation boards and to determine how the funds
will be used.369
Out of fear that the attorneys general's wrangling over the foundations would
delay the financially-needed sale, a third of Health Midwest's physicians took out
an ad in the Kansas City Star in December 2002 supporting the transaction.
370
Kansas's Carla Stovall, however, told the press that she wanted Health Midwest
executives to pay half of their closing bonuses to the charitable foundations, and
has asked for experts to determine what percentage of the sale's proceeds should go
to each State's foundation.37' When Stovall's term was ending, incoming attorney
365. Id. at 17.
366. Id. at 10.
367. Id. at I 74-79.
368. Health Midwest, Structure and Governance for Foundations 2 (Dec. 19, 2002), at
http://ago.rnissouri.gov/health/HMW-proposal-19decO2.pdf. As a separate matter, ten
existing foundations that support the Health Midwest system could continue to operate
independently if they choose. Id. at 6; see also M. Steele Brown, Some Health Midwest
Foundations Consider Independence After Sale, Bus. J. OF KANsAs Crry, Jan. 3, 2002,
available at http://kansascity.bizjoumals.com/kansascity/stories/2003/01l/06/story7.html.
369. Nor would separate statewide foundations address concerns of how and where
within Health Midwest's current operating area the funds should be expended: "Kansas City
officials want [the sales proceeds] spent only in the central city. The mayor of adjacent
Independence, Mo., has his own detailed plan for spending some of it in the suburbs." Bill
Lewis, HCA Finds "Tough Crowd" in K.C., THE TENNESSEEAN, Nov. 22, 2002, at El.
370. Mike Norbut, Physicians Back HCA Purchase of Nonprofit Hospital Chain, AM
NEWS, Jan. 20, 2003, available at http://www.ama-assn.orglsci-pubs/amnews/avantgo/con
tent/bb0120.htm.
371. Attorney General Negotiating with Health Midwest, DODGE CITY GLOBE, Jan. 11,
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general Phill Kline reaffirmed her position that the Health Midwest board should be
replaced.372 Nor did Missouri attorney general Jay Nixon seem moved by concerns
over delay, telling the editorial board of the Kansas City Star he did not feel bound
to settle by the called-for March 31, 2003 closing date. 373 He charged Health
Midwest with having filed suit in order to keep sale documents secret,
commenting: "It's a stunning thought that Health Midwest would think that public
documents in the hands of the attorney general are not public."374
In January 2003, Health Midwest and Missouri Attorney General Nixon agreed
to create a foundation whose board would be chosen by Nixon, Health Midwest
and the community. 375 The proposal established a minimum of 10 percent of the
conversion proceeds for the benefit of Kansas. Declared the Missouri attorney
general: 'This new foundation will exist for the purposes of improving community
health in the metropolitan Kansas City area without regard to state lines or political
subdivisions."
376
This did not sit well across the border. The Kansas legislature swiftly passed a
bill requiring a nonprofit hospital corporation to forfeit its Kansas hospital assets to
a new foundation-with the board of the foundation to be appointed by the
governor, attorney general, and legislative leaders, 377 The new Kansas attorney
general urged the legislature not to let Missouri keep control over all the sale
proceeds. One news story reported: "'The attorney general of Missouri has said
through his actions that he has the right to spend your money,' Kline told
legislators. . . . 'This money is in trust with the people of the state of Kansas.'
378
One legislator later commented: "The way it was explained to us, since they are
non-profit and do not pay taxes, the state is entitled to a substantial amount of the
proceeds from the sale."379 In an interview, Missouri Attorney General Nixon
denied the metaphor of a "border war," asserting that the Missouri foundation
would benefit those living in the entire Kansas City area, and noting that under the
2003, available at http://www.dodgeglobe.com/stories/011 103/sta.healthniidwest.shtml (last
visited Feb. 26, 2004).
372. M. Steele Brown, New AG Kline: He'll Stay Course on Sale to HCA, Bus. J. OF
KANSAS CrrY, Jan. 13, 2003, available at http://kansascity.bizjournals.com/kansascity/stories
/2003/01/13/story.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
373. Paul Wenske, Nixon: Time Isn't of the Essence; Health Midwest Case Ignores
Clock, KANSAS CITY STAR, Jan. 15, 2003, at Cl.
374. Id.
375. See Press Release, Office of the Missouri Attorney General, Nixon Announces
Agreement with Health Midwest to Establish $700 Million Foundation for Health Care
Needs (Jan. 22, 2003), available at http://www.ago.missouri.us/newsreleases/2003/0122
03.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
376. Patrick Reilly, One Down, One to Go; Mo. Settles Health Midwest Case; Kansas
Still in Court, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Jan. 27, 2003, at 10.
377. The bill was introduced on January 22, 2003, and signed by the governor on
January 24. See S.B. 44, 2003 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2003). As reported in The Newton
Kansan, "the House passed the measure... on a 114-5 vote about an hour after the Senate
approved, 37-1." Chad Frey, Legislators After Funds from Sale of Hospitals, NEWTON
KANSAN, Jan. 25, 2003, available at http://thekansan.com/stories/0l12503/fro_01250300
10.shtml (last visited Feb. 24, 2004). The lone dissenting vote in the Senate was cast by
David Adkins, "who lost last year's GOP primary for attorney general to Kline." Id.
378. Frey, supra note 377.
379. Id. (quoting Representative Carl Krehbiel, R-Moundridge).
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settlement, six of its twenty-five directors are to come from Kansas.38 °
Separately, the new Kansas Attorney General Kline persisted in court. On
February 3, 2003, Judge Thomas Foster issued a lengthy opinion.381' He held that
38
nonprofit corporate law applied. 82 The court rejected the application of cy pres
doctrine to the decision of the board of a nonprofit corporation to change its
purposes:
The Kansas cy pres statute .. .governs changes to the purposes of
charitable trusts, devises, and bequests. The cy pres statute does not
apply to changes to the purposes of nonprofit corporations. The cy pres
statute applies only to any restricted gifts and not the entity as a whole.
Bethany Medical Center, 266 Kan. at 372-73. No restricted gifts have
been identified herein and therefore the cy pres statute does not
apply.
383
Citing "the comprehensive process undertaken by the Health Midwest Board,"
Judge Foster found that "each board unanimously approved the sale in good faith
and in the best interests of those Kansas not-for-profit corporations"-and that
"[tihe Attorney General has failed to identify a missed detail or conflict of interest
in the process that would prohibit or place conditions on the sale of assets.
' 384
Judge Foster addressed the Kansas attorney general's challenge to the executive
compensation packages by finding: "Health Midwest's decision to approve the
compensation is an internal matter of the Missouri company and is subject to
review by a Missouri court. 385 The court additionally concluded that the "funds
here are either generated by the corporation's business or are proceeds from the
sale of the corporate assets and are not 'solicited' funds as defined by [the Kansas
Charitable Organizations and Solicitations Act]", or "managed funds or donations
as defined by [the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act]." 386
However, Judge Foster overruled the board's decision to allow the sale
proceeds to be paid into a single Missouri foundation, applying the Health Midwest
board's own determination that 20 percent of the sale proceeds were attributable to
its Kansas corporations: "The Missouri Attorney General will control the Missouri
Foundation," and his consent will be required to adjust the provision in the
Memorandum of Understanding calling for a minimum of 10 percent of the
380. Id.
381. Health Midwest v. Kline, No. 02-CV-08043, 2003 WL 328845, at *1 (Kan. Dist.
Ct. Feb 6, 2003).
382. Id. at *2. Citing Kansas E. Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc. v.
Bethany Medical Center, Inc., 969 P.2d 859 (1998), the court declared: "Kansas corporate
law, which applies to Health Midwest... by virtue of Bethany, includes the presumption
that boards of directors act on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief their
decisions are in the best interests of the corporations." Id.
As to the Kansas corporate members of the Health Midwest system--which are to be
merged into Health Midwest, a Missouri corporation-Judge Foster found that Kansas
nonprofit corporate law permits their merger into a foreign nonstock corporation, is so
provided for, and that such mergers "necessarily permit the 'transfer' of assets out of state if
the foreign corporation absorbs the Kansas corporation." Id. at *25.
383. Id.
384. Id. at *17.
385. Id. at *19.
386. Id.
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spending to benefit Kansas residents.38 7 Judge Foster concluded: "Health
Midwest's approval of the Missouri foundation, in light of its position that a[n]
80/20 split of the net proceeds is the appropriate division, is a breach of its duty and
a violation of trust as it relates to its obligations to the residents of its Kansas
service area."
388
At the same time, Judge Foster ruled the new Kansas legislation amounted to
an unconstitutional taking, declaring "no authority remotely suggests that assets of
a nonprofit charitable or public benefit corporation may be confiscated without
compensation." Finding that "confiscation without compensation is the whole
purpose of the Bill," Judge Foster rejected the attorney general's assertion that this
statute instead constitutes permissible regulation: "The key distinction lies in
whether the law leaves the property owner impaired but with some degree of
dominion in each of the three rights associated with ownership of property; the
right to possess, use and to dispose."0
89
Health Midwest appealed the ruling on the merits; the attorney general
appealed the ruling on the constitutionality of the legislation.390 The continued
dispute threatened to kill the golden goose by extending beyond HCA's March 31 st
deadline. The Kansas Supreme Court turned down Health Midwest's motion for an
expedited hearing. 391 With only weeks to go, though, the Kansas attorney general
and Health Midwest reached a settlement that provides for 20 percent of the
expected $700 million net sale proceeds to fund a separate Kansas foundation.
392
According to the Kansas attorney general, this would create the largest foundation
in Kansas. 393 "When I took office as attorney general in Kansas," Kline asserted,
"Kansas had zero assets. Now, 60 days later, Kansas' interests are protected.
' 394
The post-closing action shifted back to Missouri. In early April, the attorney
general solicited public nominations for the members of the new Missouri
foundation's board, which he would be naming.395 A press release quoted his
387. Id. at *17.
388. Id.
389. Id. at *24.
390. See Julius A. Karash & Paul Wenske, Kansas Attorney General Files Appeal in
Health Midwest Case, KANSAS CITY STAR, Feb. 26, 2003, at Al.
391. Late News, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Mar. 10, 2003, at 4.
392. Press Release, Whitney E. Watson, Kansas Office of the Attorney General,
Attorney General Kline Announces Settlement with Health Midwest (March 13, 2003),
available at http://www.ksag.org/contents/news-release/2003news/marl3hca.htm (last
visited Feb. 27, 2004); Patrick Reilly, Healthy Settlement; Kansas Reaps 20% of Proceeds in
Health Midwest Sale, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Mar. 17, 2003, at 22; HCA 's CEO Says March 31
Deadline Firm on Health Midwest Deal, MANAGED CARE WEEKLY DIG., Mar. 17, 2003, at
42.
393. Kansas, Health Midwest Strike Deal on HCA Purchase, NASHVILLE Bus. J., Mar.
13, 2003, at http://nashville.bizjournals.com/nashville/stories/2003/l/daily30.html.
394. Quoted in id.
395. Press Release, Attorney General of Missouri, Nixon Asks Public for Nominations
to Board of Directors of New KC Foundation Created from Sale of Health Midwest (April 7,
2003), available at http:/www.ago.missouri.us/newsreleases/2003/040703b.htm (last visited
Feb. 27, 2004):
The Missouri Attorney General will appoint the initial board of
directors from among nominations received from local governments,
Health Midwest and the community at large. Once the initial board is
chosen, the foundation board will choose all future directors based on
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declaration that "[t]his new foundation will exist for the purposes of improving
community health in the metropolitan Kansas City area without regard to state lines
or political subdivisions." 396 The Business Journal of Kansas City reported that the
Kansas foundation will have twenty-seven members, with Health Midwest having
"one-time authority to appoint five members[;] Kansas elected officials will make
the rest of the appointments according to guidelines of a bill passed earlier this year
"397
Finally, on July 23, 2003, the Missouri attorney general announced the final
settlement with Health Midwest and the creation of the new foundation, dubbed "A
Rising Tide-the Greater Kansas City Health Care Foundation. '398 The final
settlement provides that until the seating of the Missouri foundation's initial board,
its board of directors "shall be comprised of two representatives of the Attorney
General and one representative of Health Midwest... ... 399 The foundation's initial
articles of incorporation set forth a variety of health purposes, and state that the
purposes are to be carried out in the Kansas City area, specifying three counties
each in Missouri and Kansas. 4° The bylaws specify the number of board members
who must be from Missouri and from Kansas; public officials are not eligible to
serve as directors.
401
The articles also contain provisions that blur the line between private and
public, and give extraordinary oversight authority to the attorney general. First,
article 8.7 declares that, with certain modifications, "[i]t is the policy of the
Corporation to subject itself to the provisions of [Missouri's Sunshine Laws] as
though the Corporation were a public governmental body," and that the "Attorney
General of the State of Missouri will have the exclusive authority to enforce this
provision." Second, article 10 provides that "[u]ntil March 31, 2006, the Articles of
nominations from a community advisory committee appointed by local
areas that are currently served by the Health Midwest hospitals.
Id.
396. Id.
397. M. Steele Brown, Health Foundations Should Be Set up in Matter of Days, Bus. J.
OF KANSAS CITY, Apr. 4, 2003, available at http://kansascity.bizjournals.com/kansascity
fstories/2003/04/07/story6.html; see also M. Steele Brown, Names Emerge for Spots on
Health Foundations' Boards, Bus. J. OF KANSAS CITY, July 11, 2003, available at
http://kansascity.biz.joumals.com/kansascity/stories/2003/07/14/story5.html (reporting on
flood of nominations and progress on appointments).
398. Press Release, Missouri Attorney General's Office, Nixon and Health Midwest
Sign Settlement to Form "A Rising Tide" Health Care Foundation from Sale to HCA (July
23, 2003), available at http://www.ago.missouri.gov/newsreleases/2003/072303.htm. The
release states, in part: "The purposes of the foundation are to increase access to, and the
quality of, health care services in Kansas City; Jackson, Lafayette and Cass counties; and
three counties in Kansas. Nixon said the foundation will strictly adhere to Missouri's
Sunshine Law." Id. The release contains a link to the final Settlement Agreement, and to the
Articles and Bylaws of the Missouri foundation.
399. Settlement Agreement, A Rising Tide-The Greater Kansas City Health Care
Foundation, at 4, available at http://www.ago.missouri.gov/newsreleases/2003/healthmid
westpdf/hmw4.pdf [hereinafter Agreement] (last visited Apr. 26, 2004).
400. Articles of Incorporation, A Rising Tide-The Greater Kansas City Health Care
Foundation, art. 7.2, available at http://www.ago.missour.gov/newsreleases/2003/healthmid
westpdf/hmw5.pdf. [hereinafter Articles] (last visited Apr. 26, 2004).
401. Bylaws, A Rising Tide-The Greater Kansas City Health Care Foundation, art. 4,
available at http://www.ago.missouri.gov/newsreleases/2003/healthmidwestpdf/hmw6.pdf.
[hereinafter bylaws] (last visited Apr. 26, 2004).
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Incorporation and Bylaws of the corporation may only be amended with the written
consent of the Attorney General of the State of Missouri." The bylaws elaborate on
the attorney general's authority to oversee appointments.402
The bylaws set forth detailed requirements for diverse and knowledgeable
community representation on the Missouri foundation's board and for a
"Community Advisory Committee" (which will nominate candidates to the
board).4"3
402. Section 7.9 of the bylaws provides the following with regard to attorney general
enforcement:
If any Appointing Authority fails to make a timely appointment to the
Community Advisory Committee, the Attorney General shall make an
appointment from the community represented by such Appointing
Authority.... If, at any time following the appointment of the initial
Community Advisory Committee, the Attorney General determines that
the Committee lacks appropriate diversity or otherwise has become
unable to fulfill its function, the Attorney General may petition the
Circuit Court of Jackson County for an order dissolving the sitting
Committee and compelling the CAC Appointing Authorities to make
appointments to reconstitute the Committee.
Id. § 7.9. Section 4.5 of the bylaws sets forth with regard to the nomination and appointment
of the initial board:
Health Midwest will nominate 14 persons to serve on the initial board,
and the Community Advisory Committee Appointing Authorities
(defined below) will nominate 22 persons to serve on the initial board.
The Attorney General shall select 8 persons from the Health Midwest
nominees and 8 persons from the Appointing Authority nominees to
serve as members of the Initial Board. The remaining 9 directors will be
appointed by the Attorney General following an outreach program of
his design. The Attorney General can reject a nominee only for
duplication (i.e., when a nominee has been nominated by two sources,
the Attorney General can reject one nomination but not both) or for
cause, in which case the party that nominated the rejected nominee will
nominate a replacement nominee .... Before making appointments, the
Attorney General will interview all nominees and other persons under
consideration for appointment and Health Midwest will be permitted to
participate in those interviews and offer to the Attorney General its
recommendations with respect to the qualifications of the candidates.
Id. § 4.5. Under Sections 7.1 and 7.2 of the bylaws, the Community Advisory Committee
will be appointed, in specified numbers, by over a dozen mayors, local government
executives, and the attorney general. Id. §§ 7.1-7.2.
403. Article 8 of the bylaws, entitled, Diversity of Nominees and Appointments,
provides:
All nominees for appointments to the initial board, all
appointments to the initial board, all appointments to the Community
Advisory Committee, and all nominations made by the Community
Advisory Committee shall be made in consideration of ensuring that the
board and Community Advisory Committee collectively represent the
gender, racial, cultural, geographic, socio-economic, age, professional
and ethnic diversity of the Foundation service area.... The Community
Advisory Committee, in making nominations for future vacancies on
the board, bears the responsibility not only for perpetuating the diversity
of the board in all respects set forth above, but also for ensuring that
each nominee has demonstrated expertise, education, or experience in
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As for the border issue, the articles of incorporation provide:
The corporation is encouraged to cooperate with the Kansas Foundation
created pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between Health
Midwest and the Attorney General of the State of Kansas dated March
13, 2003, for example, (a) by forming a joint committee of directors to
review and make recommendations relative to metropolitan-wide grant
making... and to indigent care needs throughout the greater Kansas
City Metropolitan area; (b) by participating in a joint metropolitan-wide
community needs assessment process; and (c) by sharing of staff and
resources.4°
Interestingly, Kansas appears to wind up double-dipping, given the outright transfer
of 20 percent of the sales proceeds to the Kansas foundation and the coverage of
the Kansas portion of the Kansas City area in the charitable purposes of the
Missouri foundation. After payment of expenses and debts (as well as amounts
retained by existing independent foundations of the Health Midwest system), the
net amount for both foundations comes to about $520 million. °5
Neither Missouri nor Kansas has adopted hospital conversion legislation,
forcing both attorneys general in the Health Midwest matter to assert their
common-law and general corporate jurisdiction over the nonprofit corporations. °6
Attorneys Michael Peregrine, Ralph DeJong, and James Schwartz applaud the
Kansas trial court for:
(a) Upholding the applicability of non-profit corporation law (as
distinguished from charitable trust law) to the board's decision-making
process; ...
(c) Rejecting the "predominant purpose" test and affirming the
right of charitable corporations to use the proceeds from the sale of their
assets for any authorized corporate purpose;
(d) Rejecting the claimed rights of a state Attorney General to
regulate the internal functions or decision-making of a foreign non-
profit corporation (including payment for executive compensation,
whether or not excessive); ... and
(f) Affirming the "private" nature of non-profit corporate assets
and determining that a state law mandating the transfer of the sale
proceeds of a non-profit health system to a governmentally established
and controlled foundation constitutes an unconstitutional "taking" under
the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.
°7
the provision of health care, asset management and investment
strategies, philanthropic administration, or community health care, and
that the board as a whole possesses the necessary skills in asset
management, philanthropic administration, and in assessing and
improving health care in the Foundation's service area to enable the
board to fulfill its responsibilities....
Id. art. 8.
404. Articles, supra note 400, at art. XI.
405. Paul Wenske, Missouri, HCA Finalize Structure of Kansas City-Area Health
Foundation, KANSAS CITY STAR, July 24, 2003, at Cl.
406. Peregrine et al., supra note 335, at 51.
407. Id.
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These authors worry, however, about Health Midwest's agreeing to so much
public-and political-input into the makeup of the new foundation's board:
[Wihile the purposes of the proposed new foundation, its broadly based
twenty-five person membership (eight members appointed from
nominations by Health Midwest; eight members appointed from
nominations by a Community Advisory Committee; and nine members
appointed by the Attorney General), its requirements of gender, racial,
ethnic, cultural, and socioeconomic diversity on Board appointments, its
prohibition on "public officials" serving as Board members, and other
provisions may well constitute enlightened public policy and benefit the
communities served-a substantial concern must have existed that there
was no legal basis for either the Attornez 8General's demands in this
respect or Health Midwest's acquiescence.
They urge:
while it is always advisable for non-profit health systems to attempt to
work cooperatively with state Attorneys General to resolve regulatory
issues surrounding major transactions of this kind, health systems and
their counsel should recognize their obligations to abide by non-profit
corporation law. On occasion, this may require resisting extra-legal
demands by activist state Attorneys General.
E. The Increasing Difficulty of Converting Blue Cross Plans
In contrast to nonprofit hospitals, the various Blue Cross and Blue Shield
entities typically are insurance plans for given pools of subscribers.410 Indeed,
based on the belief that federal tax exemption is no longer appropriate for
commercial-type insurance plans, Congress repealed the Blues' exemption in
1986.411 Loss of favored tax status spurred action across the country to transform
the nonprofit plans to for-profit status. However, the Blue Cross conversion
transactions fit awkwardly within the traditional framework for analyzing nonprofit
conversions. Who should control the decision to convert the organization, and who
408. Id. at 53.
409. Id.
410. For example, CareFirst's articles of incorporation describe its corporate mission as
one to:
establish, operate and maintain a nonprofit health service plan as
authorized by Title 14, Subtitle 1 of the Insurance Article of the
Annotated Code of Maryland and any and all amendments thereto,
whereby hospital, medical, dental and other health care is provided by
hospitals, physicians, dentists, and other providers to persons who
become subscribers to such plan, so that such health care and service
may be obtained at a minimum cost and expense.
Md. Ins. Admin., Legislative Report of the Maryland Insurance Administration on MIA
Order No. 2003-02-032, at 31 (2003) [hereinafter MIA Report], available at http://www.md
insurance.state.md.us/documents/LegislativeCareFirstReport07-03.pdf (last visited Apr. 26,
2004).
411. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1012, 100 Stat. 2085, 2390-94
(codified at I.R.C. § 501(m) (2000)).
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should benefit from the conversion proceeds?41 2 An argument could be made that
these types of mutual nonprofits are more like cooperatives and less like
charities.413
Indeed, the status of the local nonprofit Blue Cross plans varies: Where the
issue has been adjudicated, in some states the Blue Cross plan is held to be a
charity, while in some states it is a non-charitable nonprofit organization. What
difference does it make? In Texas, for example, the court of appeals rejected the
attorney general's claim that "Blue Cross/Texas is a common-law charity that must
preserve its assets for charitable purposes and the merger is prohibited by the Texas
Non-Profit Corporation Act"; the parties had agreed that if the entity were held to
be a charity, "the merged entity would ultimately pay to one or more charitable
trusts or foundations designated by the attorney general the sum of $350,000,000
plus interest. '414 Similarly, the Wisconsin appeals court upheld the insurance
commissioner's determination that neither the common law nor statutory
codification of the cy pres doctrine applied to the conversion of Blue Cross/Blue
Shield United of Wisconsin.4 15 In this case, the plan of conversion called for the
sale proceeds to be donated to two Wisconsin medical schools.
412. One might wonder where such large values arise, given that over time a nonprofit
insurer would seek to set rates to cover expenses. The Maryland insurance commissioner's
report discusses the role of State oversight of the rating practices of insurers and HMOs in
Maryland:
Maryland law does not dictate a particular profit margin that insurers
may build into their rates. This is something that is often disputed and
negotiated in the course of the submission of a rate filing .... So long
as a health insurer has proposed rates that exceed the minimum 60%
loss ratio and at the same time are not based on an unsupported or
excessive medical trend, the carrier has some discretion in terms of
setting the profit margin included in its rates. . . .Given that even
CareFirst's own expert acknowledged that a for-profit company has a
paramount duty to its shareholders to maximize profits, one cannot
ignore the possibility that a for-profit CareFirst would seek even higher
profit margins in its rate filings.
MIA Report, supra note 410, at 170.
413. See generally HANSMANN, supra note 96.
414. Abbott v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex., Inc., 113 S.W.3d 753, 756 (Tex. App.
2003). In affirming the trial court's fact-finding as to the organization's purpose, the court
observed: "Blue Cross/Texas's articles of incorporation propose no general charitable
purpose directed toward the public as a whole or toward any indefinite or undefined segment
of the public." Id. at 765. The parties had stipulated that the entity's surplus and reserves
come exclusively from premiums, fees, and investments; has not provided any charitable
insurance; and charges competitive market rates. Id. at 765-66. The court cited similar
holdings in Georgia, Illinois, and Wisconsin. Id. at 766 n.13.
The Texas Attorney General for the Charitable Trust Section recently commented on
this case: "The Attorney General is seeking review in the Texas Supreme Court. If the
Attorney General prevails, more than $590 million, paid over twenty years, will become
available for charitable health-related purposes in Texas." John W. Vinson, The Charity
Oversight Authority of the Texas Attorney General, 35 ST. MARY's L.J. 243, 273 n.156
(2004).
415. See ABC for Health, Inc. v. Comm'r of Ins., 640 N.W.2d 510, 512-13 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2001). The court found that the plaintiff failed to show that "BC/BSUW is an entity
operated exclusively for charitable purposes... and that the assets of BCIBSUW were gifts
to an entity which operated exclusively for charitable purposes." Id. at 515.
1018 [Vol.79:937
CHARITY LAW ENFORCEMENT
Conversion of a Blue Cross plan also highlights intrastate tensions: within the
executive branch between the insurance commissioner and the attorney general,
and between the legislature and the executive branch. The insurance commissioner
understandably conceives of the "public interest" as the interests of the subscribers
and policyholders. The attorney general, by contrast, has the broader, common law
role of focusing on the governance and purpose of the resulting conversion
foundation. It can thus be a conflict of interest-although not the ordinary personal
financial one-for the attorney general to act as legal counsel to the insurance
commissioner. Moreover, the legislature's concept of public interest can differ
from that of either the subscribers or the beneficiaries as determined by the board
of the conversion foundation, as illustrated to the extreme in New York state.
In the 2003 cases that follow, Maryland imposed nonprofit status on its Blue
Cross entity for five years; New York conditioned approval to convert on payment
of ninety-five percent of the proceeds to the state; and plans to convert were
abandoned in North Carolina and New Jersey, with Washington state's in jeopardy.
1. CareFirst: Conversion Prohibited
CareFirst is the sole member of the Blue Cross Blue Shield plans of Maryland,
Washington, D.C., and Delaware.4 1 6 CareFirst's desire to convert to a for-profit
company and to be acquired by WellPoint Health Networks set off an explosion of
opposition from the public, the Maryland Assembly, and the Maryland Insurance
Administration-as well as the threat to CareFirst of expulsion from the Blue Cross
system; still-ongoing counteractions from regulators in Delaware and the District of
Columbia; civil charges under Maryland insurance law against CareFirst and its top
officers; and an as-yet unspecified federal criminal investigation.
At the time CareFirst proposed the transaction, Maryland had two applicable
statutes: a Conversion/Acquisition Statute, which applies to nonprofit health
service plans, and an Insurance Acquisitions Act.41 7 Both required CareFirst to
obtain approval by the Maryland insurance commissioner, although the standards
differ somewhat.4 8 On March 5, 2003, the commissioner, Steven Larsen, rejected
416. In re Consol. Application for the Conversion of CareFirst, Inc. & CareFirst of Md.,
Inc. to For-Profit Status & the Acquisition of CareFirst, Inc. by WellPoint Health Networks,
Inc.; Order, MIA No. 2003-02-032, at 1 (Md. Ins. Admin. Mar. 5, 2003), available at
http://www.mdinsurance.state.md.us/documents/MIA-2003-02-032CareFirstConversion.pdf
[hereinafter Order] (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
417. For a detailed discussion of the application of Maryland's Conversion/Acquisition
Statute and Insurance Acquisitions Statute to the CareFirst case, see the MIA Report, supra
note 410, at 62-197.
418. See 87 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. No. 02-019 (Md. 2002), available at
http://www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions/2002/02-019.pdf (Nov. 12, 2002). The Maryland
attorney general had confirmed the commissioner's approval power, particularly authority
over the transaction involving the affiliate licensed in Maryland but domiciled in the District
of Columbia. Id. at 17. Among other things, the Opinion concludes:
If the Commissioner determines that public or charitable assets that
serve health care needs in Maryland "will be adequately protected" by
review of the GHMSI [the D.C. affiliate] portion of the transaction in
the District of Columbia, the Commissioner may dispense with a
detailed review of that part of the transaction. SG § 6.5-307. On the
other hand, if the Commissioner determines that the District of
Columbia review will not focus on the preservation of Maryland assets
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the conversion and the acquisition as not in the public interest.419 The
commissioner made specific findings that the transaction could result in private
inurement to CareFirst officers; that the sale price does not reflect fair market
value; that "[t]he procedures that CareFirst used in making the decision to convert
and to be acquired were flawed"; and that, based on WellPoint's refusal to produce
critical documents, he was "unable to conclusively determine on this record
whether the Proposed Transaction has the likelihood of creating a significant
adverse effect on the availability or accessibility of health care services in the
affected communities, but there is evidence that the proposed transaction could
have such an impact .... 420 As more colorfully reported in a later news story:
"Larsen blasted the board of directors for agreeing to a deal that he said
undervalued the company, was rife with conflicts of interest, and would have
enriched executives with bonus and severance packages worth up to $119
million."
4 2
'
The commissioner attached a 342-page report to his order. As to process, the
report concludes:
While it is true . . . that the Board followed an elaborate strategic
planning process . . . on a superficial level, it appears that the Board
was deliberative in its decision, and sought the advice of experts,
including lawyers, consultants, and investment bankers. However, the
process used by the Board was based on faulty assumptions which in
or health care needs to the same degree as would the Commissioner's
own review, then it would not be appropriate to defer. In any event, the
decision whether to defer to the foreign regulator's determination is left
to the discretion of the Commissioner. In deciding whether to review-
and whether to approve-the transaction, the Commissioner must
consider not only the price offered for charitable assets, but the effect of
the transaction on the availability of and accessibility to health care in
Maryland.
Id. at 16; see also 88 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 03-002, at 12 (Md. 2003), available at
http://www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions/2003/03-002.pdf (Jan. 27, 2003) (upholding 2002 anti-
bonus provision legislation, and noting "the Commissioner should consider the anti-bonus
provision in assessing whether the proposed CareFirst transaction is in the public interest").
419. Press Release, Md. Ins. Admin., Maryland Insurance Commissioner Denies
CareFirst Conversion and Sale (Mar. 5, 2003), available at http://www.mdinsurance
.state.md.us/documents/CFannouncementl-3-5-03.pdf (last visited Feb. 26 2004); Order,
supra note 416, at 2, and MIA Report, supra note 410, at 3. The commissioner also relied on
advice from experts that his office retained at the expense of the would-be acquirer, as
provided by law. See Order, supra note 416, at 2; MIA Report, supra note 410, at 11. The
commissioner's press release explains:
The decision concludes a 14-month process undertaken by the
Maryland Insurance Administration. That process, outlined in the
Maryland State Government Statute, Title 6.5-101, included 15 days of
hearings, eight Opportunities for Public Comment held across
Maryland, seven expert reports, and more than 87,000 pages of
documents reviewed. Commissioner Larsen heard from more than 250
people during the Public Comment sessions and received more than 300
written comments via email and letters from citizens.
Press Release, supra, at 30.
420. Order, supra note 416, at 3.
421. Jo Becker, CareFirst's BlueCross Affiliation at Risk, WASH. PosT, April 12, 2003,
atEl.
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turn meant that however "diligent" the board was in following that
process the result would not satisfy the applicable legal standards....
The record shows that the Board has misapprehended, or simply
ignored, its overriding responsibility to the mission of the company and
its insureds.
422
Despite the commissioner's finding of a flawed process, his report also rejects
CareFirst's argument that the business judgment rule protects the board's decision
to convert and sell to WellPoint:
The business judgment rule was designed to limit judicial interference
in corporate affairs and to insulate corporate directors from personal
liability that might arise from suits filed by disgruntled shareholders.
The "rule", as such, has no place in this regulatory proceeding.
This case does not involve personal liability. It is not a civil
lawsuit in which disgruntled shareholders are seeking to overturn the
decisions of corporate management. More importantly, oversight of the
Insurance Administration over insurance regulatory matters without
exception involve [sic] evaluation of substantive outcomes rather than
the process through which those outcomes were derived.
423
The report analogizes the insurance commissioner's power to that of an attorney
general's regarding enforcement of the fiduciary duties of nonprofit corporations,
although the cited authority itself concerns a case where the fiduciaries were
engaging in self-dealing.424
422. MIA Report, supra note 410, at 111.
423. Id. at 71-72 (footnote omitted).
424. Id. The report quotes the following paragraph from a decision by the Tennessee
Court of Appeals addressing the application of the business judgment rule in enforcement
matters:
While the business judgment rule reflects a judicial policy of declining
to substitute a court's judgment for that of a corporation's directors
when they have acted in good faith and in the exercise of honest
judgment in furtherance of corporate purposes, that policy has no
application to allegations that a public benefit corporation has
abandoned any charitable purpose and has pursued private, rather than
public, interests. Similarly, while Tennessee courts have adopted a non-
interventionist policy with regard to internal corporate matters, that
policy is inapplicable here because the legislature has specifically given
the Attorney General and the courts authority and responsibility to
ensure that nonprofit public benefit corporations operate in the public
interest and not for private gain. The public policy of this state, as
expressed by the legislature, is that the Attorney General and the courts
intervene in such situations because the public interest is involved and
the activities involved are not merely "internal corporate matters."
Id. (quoting Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486, 529-30
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted)). In the cited case, however, the court upheld the
authority of the attorney general of Tennessee to dissolve two nonprofit corporations whose
fiduciaries were essentially looting its assets. The founder and top officer was eventually
indicted. See Marc Perrusquia, Feds Charge Madisons with Fraud-26 Counts Cite
Cherokee Day Care Corruption, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Nov. 21, 2002, at Al. The
Tennessee court held:
[T]he Attorney General, acting in the public interest, has authority to
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Moreover, in explaining his role, the insurance commissioner cited to an
opinion by the highest court in Maryland that rejected an asserted right by the
members and subscribers of CareFirst to bring a derivative suit:
The thrust of the opinion is that it is the Insurance Administration,
rather than shareholders that serves the "watchdog function" over the
actions of the Board. While the Insurance Commissioner's authority is
generally circumscribed by specific statutes, the Court of Appeals has
noted that "we have strongly inferred the visitorial power at least
embraces preventing conduct that is violative of public law or the
charter and bylaws of the corporation."
425
This discussion ends by declaring, 'The MIA's responsibility is to determine
whether the statutory criteria have been satisfied, not simply to assess whether the
Board engaged in a process which it reasonably hoped would result in the
satisfaction of the criteria.-
426
In short order, the Maryland General Assembly ratified the commissioner's
report by unanimously enacting legislation427 to require CareFirst to maintain its
nonprofit status for five years, declaring "that it is in the interest of all Marylanders
to protect and preserve CareFirst in its nonprofit form., 4 28 In addition, the statute
provided a schedule for removing the ten Maryland members of the twenty-one-
member board, with replacements chosen by a nominating committee appointed by
the governor, the House speaker, and the president of the Senate; 429 further, one
seek dissolution of a nonprofit public benefit corporation which fails to
devote its assets to a public, rather than a private, interest. Where such a
corporation is operated for the private benefit of an individual in
contravention of the principles governing nonprofit status and its
accompanying benefits, or where, as the trial court phrased it, the
corporation has abandoned its public benefit, charitable purpose, action
by the Attorney General and the courts is warranted.
Summers, 112 S.W.3d at 507. In the paragraph prior to the one quoted by the Maryland
report, the court declared:
The business judgment rule has application as a potential defense in two
situations: (1) where officers or directors face personal liability; and (2)
where the corporation (generally through shareholders in a derivative
action) seeks to void a decision of or transaction approved by the board.
Neither situation is present herein. The Attorney General does not seek
monetary damages from any member of the board for breach of
fiduciary duties. Neither does he seek to set aside or invalidate any
particular transaction. Instead, this action is maintained under Tenn.
Code Ann. § 48-64-301 under which the Attorney General is authorized
to act in the public interest to ensure that a nonprofit public benefit
corporation is not operated for private gain.
Id. at 529.
425. MIA Report, supra note 410, at 73 (footnote omitted) (discussing O'Donnell v.
Sardegna, 646 A.2d 398 (Md. 1994); quoting Ins. Comm'r v. BlueShield of Md., Inc., 456
A.2d 914 (Md. 1983)).
426. Id. at 72.
427. Act of May 22, 2003, ch. 356-57, 2003 Md. Laws 2474; see also M. William
Salganik, Assembly Welds "Nonprofit" to CareFirst, BALT. SuN, April 8, 2003 at IC ("The
Senate vote was 46-0. The House of Delegates vote was 139-0.").
428. Act of May 22, 2003, ch. 356, § 3, 2003 Md. Laws 2474, 2523.
429. Becker, supra note 421, at El.
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member is to be appointed by the president of the senate and another by the speaker
of the house. The governor signed the bill on May 22, 2003.
A tangle of lawsuits ensued.43 ° Viewing the legislation as a threat to the
independence of a Blue Cross affiliate, the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association
terminated CareFirst's right to use the Blue Cross trademark. CareFirst declared
itself "caught in a huge tug of war between the new CareFirst reform law in the
state of Maryland, the trademark license removal by the Blue Cross and Blue
Shield Association (BCBSA) and obligations of local regulators relative to the
affiliation agreements in Washington, D.C, [sic] and Delaware.,, 431 The state sued
the association, and CareFirst sued the State, contesting the constitutionality of the
statute, in part because of the extraterritorial provisions. On June 6, a federal
district judge accepted a settlement signed by the Blue Cross and Blue Shield
Association and by the entire top echelon of Maryland executives and legislators:
the attorney general, the governor, the insurance commissioner, the speaker of the
House, and the president of the Senate. The settlement grants the legislatively-
created nominating committee to replace five of the twelve Maryland board
members when their terms end, and those new members will select seven new
directors to replace the remaining members at the expiration of their terms.432 "To
the extent practicable, the directors selected to replace the Outgoing Directors shall
represent the racial and gender diversity of the State and the geographic regions of
the State and shall have experience in accounting, information technology, finance,
law, large and small businesses, and organized labor.' 433 "[Tihe Maryland Attorney
General's Office said it will likely recommend that the General Assembly confirm
the changes in the law agreed to in the settlement.
' 434
And what of the conversion foundation? The Maryland insurance
commissioner's report discusses state legislation that in 1997 had created the
Maryland Health Care Foundation "to receive monies resulting from the conversion
of non-profit health care entities in the State. ... to 'expand access to health care
services for uninsured and underinsured Marylanders. - The report added:
However, since the enactment of that law, the Maryland General
Assembly has modified the role of the Maryland Health Care
430. See the litigation summary in: Order and Consent Judgment at pmbl., CareFirst v.
Ehrlich, No. JFM 03-1521, State v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass'n, No. JFM 03-1510 (D.
Md. June 6, 2003) [hereinafter Order and Consent Judgment].
431. Press Release, Statement of CareFirst Regarding New "Reform" Law and Blue
License Removal (May 22, 2003), at http://carefirst.onlinepresskits.con/news-archive_052
203.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
432. Order and Consent Judgment, supra note 430, 1, at 5; see also Bill Brubaker,
CareFirst Weathers Storm; Deal to Retain Insurer's Blue Cross License Could Pose Control
Issues, WASH. POST, June 9, 2003, at El; Dan Thanh Dang, CareFirst's Chief Alters Views,
Seeks to Remain at Helm, BALT. SUN, June 29, 2003, at IA.
433. Order and Consent Judgment, supra note 430, 1, at 5. This paragraph also
provides: "The directors shall include two consumer members, one of whom shall be a
subscriber and one of whom shall be a certificate holder of CareFirst." Note that these terms
echo requirements in the May legislation, whose provision for two nonvoting members
named by the speaker of the House and the president of the Senate continues in effect. Id. at
8.
434. Dan Thanh Dang, Maryland Legislators Castigate CareFirst: Implement Reform
or Face Tougher Deal, Insurer Told, BALT. SUN, June 12, 2003, at Al.
435. MIA Report, supra note 410, at 203.
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Foundation and given itself a role in the process.... [A]lthough the
Maryland Health Care Foundation serves as trustee of the Trust, money
will be spent from the Trust only as determined by the General
Assembly.
436
But these efforts were all in vain. As reported in the press, "[n]ow that the
CareFirst deal has been derailed by controversy over executive bonuses, and the
sale of hospitals has cooled, the foundation is out of money... [and] plans to close
Oct. 1."43 Echoing the insurance commissioner's report, the news story continued:
Even the General Assembly began having second thoughts as early
as 2001 about whether it wanted to turn over to the foundation all of the
$1 billion in public proceeds from a CareFirst sale. It considered
whether it might use some of the money for another public purpose,
such as covering families that can't afford health insurance.
The Assembly created an entity called the Maryland Health Care
Trust to hold money from any conversion and that would be under its
control more than would the foundation.
438
With the conversion blocked, governmental interest shifted to the CareFirst
fiduciaries. On July 8, 2003, the Maryland Insurance Administration issued a report
calling for civil fines against CareFirst and its top officers, and charging that the
board engaged in "corporate mismanagement." As reported in one news story,
"[t]he board members will be spared civil fines for violating their fiduciary duties
in approving incentive bonuses for CareFirst executives, according to the report,
because they already face a more appropriate punishment-removal. 4 3 9 The
insurance commissioner's new report lists seven allegations, including CareFirst's
abandonment of its nonprofit mission for withdrawing from Medicare and
Medicaid; corporate waste for making a multimillion dollar subsidy of an affiliate
without permission of the commissioner; and breach of fiduciary duty for failure to
consider the financial risks of a merger. The commissioner would have to prove the
allegations at a hearing. 440 A Baltimore Sun columnist suggested that the CareFirst
bill and the ensuing controversy "could have been avoided, of course, if Maryland
had allowed CareFirst's planned merger with WellPoint Health Networks, minus
the bonuses."441
436. Id. at 204. The report then alludes to events in New York, discussed in the final
case study, infra at Part lI.E.2.
437. M. William Salganik, Health Foundation Closing in October, BALT. SUN, Aug. 12,
2003, at Dl. "[T]he foundation's board, appointed by the governor and heavy with public
officials, wasn't structured to have the connections and skills for the fund-raising that would
be needed to keep the foundation going on its own, said [Marilyn] Maultsby, the director."
Id.
438. Id.
439. Nancy Kercheval, Civil Actions, Fines Possible for CareFirst, DAILY REC.
(Baltimore), July 9, 2003, at B3.
440. See Dan Thanh Dang, Insurance Chief Targets FirstCare Executives, BALT. SUN,
July 9, 2003, at Al.
441. Jay Hancock, Editorial, CareFirst Ready for a Change at the Top, BALT. SUN,
June 8, 2003, at D1. He added:
CareFirst's big problem is its legal structure. As a nonprofit corporation,
CareFirst has no shareholders. Because it has no shareholders, there are
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Worse, in August 2003, CareFirst and others confirmed that they received
subpoenas as part of a federal investigation of the aborted conversion. "Other
government and private sources said . . . that the U.S. attorney for Maryland, a
federal grand jury and the FBI are involved in the probe, which was initiated after a
sharply critical report on CareFirst was released by the Maryland Insurance
Administration." 44 2 The Baltimore Sun reported, "The broad scope of the initial
phase of the investigation made it difficult to determine what, if any, federal
statutes authorities suspect were violated, experts said, but the investigation is in
keeping with U.S. Attorney Thomas M. DiBiagio's stated mission of pursuing
allegations of white-collar fraud and public corruption." 443 CareFirst and the
Maryland insurance commissioner's office had been meeting to attempt to work
out a consent decree on the potential state charges, but that effort will be shelved,
the commissioner announced, "until the federal investigation is complete or I
determine it is time to move forward with the charges." 4 " Separately, still due is a
legislatively-mandated report by the Maryland attorney general into whether
CareFirst violated any criminal or civil laws in the course of planned conversion.
Meanwhile, authorities in the two other jurisdictions that CareFirst serves have
not acceded to the extraordinary level of Maryland oversight. The Delaware
insurance commissioner complained about the "extraterritorial effect" of the
Maryland legislation, including the possibility that the statute's requirement that
CareFirst provide insurance at the lowest cost to Maryland residents would in effect
siphon assets from the financially healthy Delaware Blue.445 The District of
Columbia insurance commissioner, Lawrence H. Mirel was quoted in the
Washington Post: "Who the hell are they? . . . CareFirst is not a Maryland
government property.... Either the Maryland legislature changes the law or we go
to court and contest it." 4 " The D.C. insurance commissioner worries that the newly
appointed Maryland members would pressure the board to offer discounted
insurance to Maryland residents at the expense of the D.C. residents. Mirel also
worries about the five-year bar on CareFirst's converting to for-profit status: "If the
choice is that CareFirst gets sold or it goes out of the business, I don't want to be
stuck with a Maryland law that says they can't be sold." 447 The Maryland federal
court's June 6 order provides: "if conflicting orders by the District of Columbia and
no property rights associated with the company's equity. And with no
property rights-as any good libertarian should know--there is often
chaos.
At CareFirst, a big, disembodied chunk of capital, the buck stops-
nowhere. Hence the disengaged board and extramural meddling.
Id.
442. M. William Salganik, U.S. Subpoenas CareFirst, BALT. SUN, Aug. 14, 2003, at
Al.
443. M. William Salganik, Insurer Says Subpoenas Are Received, BALT. SUN, Aug. 15,
2003, at D1. One critic of the proposed conversion called the federal probe "a puzzlement"
and lamented: "This is everybody's worst nightmare. . . . I was hoping for an orderly
transition from a for-profit orientation to a nonprofit orientation.... I can understand the
anxiety if you're an executive out there and you're being investigated by the FBI." Id.
444. Id.
445. Maureen Milford, CareFirst Law Prompt Talks, NEWS J. (Wilmington, Del.), June
17, 2003, at B1O.
446. Bill Brubaker, CareFirst Oversight Questioned: District Wary of Maryland
Control Over Nonprofit Health Insurer, WASH. POST, July 7, 2003, at El.
447. Id.
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Delaware Insurance Commissioners are issued, this Court retains jurisdiction on
the motion of any party (including CareFirst) or the District of Columbia or
Delaware Insurance Commissioner to resolve such conflict."
448
2. Empire Blue Cross: Proceeds Paid to State
Beginning in 1996, the large New York health-insurance nonprofit Empire
Blue Cross Blue Shield sought to convert to for-profit status. That year the Empire
board negotiated with the attorney general and the department of insurance over the
form of such a transaction. Consistent with one typical form of conversion in other
states, Empire proposed creating a new for-profit insurance company whose stock
would be held 100 percent by a new nonprofit "conversion foundation," which
would then sell off shares of stock over time in order to diversify its assets and
raise funds for making grants. From 1997 through 1999, the attorney general and
the insurance department held public hearings on Empire's proposal.
Over 130 community organizations endorsed a set of principles calling
for an independent, community-responsive foundation to be established
with Empire's nonprofit assets in the event the conversion were
permitted. Empire drafted a conversion petition largely consistent with
these principles and outlined its plan to use the assets generated by the
conversion to expand access to health insurance and health care for the
medically underserved.
44 9
In May 2000, Attorney General Eliot Spitzer described his role as
"determining whether a particular conversion proposal properly protects the public
interest," and outlined changes that he obtained to the Empire plan.450 In April
2001, Empire issued a press release describing that the new "independent charitable
foundation that would be created as part of its proposed plan to restructure as a for-
profit company is estimated to be at least $1 billion., '4 5 ' The foundation "would be
dedicated to providing funds to expand access to more affordable health insurance
coverage for those New Yorkers who need it the most: children, the elderly and
individuals who purchase their own coverage." 452 Michael Stocker, MD, President
and CEO of Empire stated in the release: "Historically, Empire has provided
coverage to these New Yorkers when they could not afford coverage elsewhere.
Dedicating the charitable value of Empire to this population is consistent with the
448. Order and Consent Judgment, supra note 430, 1 13, at 9.
449. Press Release, Consumers Union, Advocates Blast Amended Empire Blue Cross
Conversion Plan, Urge NY Department of Insurance to Reject For-Profit Bid (Aug. 5, 2002)
(on file with author).
450. Press Release, Statement by Attorney General Eliot Spitzer Regarding the
Proposed Conversion of Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield (May 24, 2000), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2000/may/may24bOO.html; Press Release, Statement by
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer Regarding Legislation to Protect the Public Interest in Health
Insurer Conversions (May 31, 2000), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2000/
may/may3 1 a.00.html.
451. Press Release, Empire Blue Cross, $1 Billion to Care for the Uninsured Provided
by New Charitable Foundation (April 2, 2001), available at http://www.empireblue.com
/pdf/empire.pdf (last visited March 2, 2004).
452. Id.
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historical mission of the company. 453
However, because of opposition from health care unions and hospitals,
legislation to authorize the conversion remained stalled for years. Finally, in early
2002, the state legislature authorized the conversion as part of a multi-billion dollar
health care package4 54 in which 95 percent of the proceeds from Empire's initial
public offering would be paid to the state budget,455 and only 5 percent deposited in
a conversion foundation for the health care needs of the poor. "The deal was
protested as a shallow attempt by [Governor] Pataki to curry favor with a 200,000-
member union headed by Dennis Rivera, one of the most powerful labor leaders in
the state and one of its most influential Hispanic figures. Pataki, indeed, later
received the union's endorsement for his re-election bid. 456
None of the traditional parties complained about this removal of an expected
$1 billion in value from the nonprofit to the public sector. Apparently, the Empire
board had its eyes on its future operations as a for-profit business (they would no
longer have controlled the conversion proceeds in any case). The Attorney
General's motives for not opposing the result are unknown, although Eliot Spitzer
has a reputation for being politically ambitious.457 Consumer groups were furious,
but faced the threshold issue of whether they had standing to complain in court-
indeed, under the legislation, the courts are deprived of jurisdiction to enjoin the
transaction, as explained below.458
453. Id.
454. On January 25, 2002, the Governor signed Chapter 1 of the Laws of 2002, codified
as N.Y. INS. LAW § 4301(j) (McKinney Supp. 2004) (permitting certain not-for-profit health
care corporations to convert to for-profit corporations) and N.Y. INs. LAW § 7317
(McKinney Supp. 2004) (establishing the process and standards for the superintendent of
insurance's review and approval of a proposed conversion plan).
455. The legislation designates 95 percent of the stock to fund "work-force recruitment
and retention." According to the subsequent Consumers Union complaint:
82. The remaining 95 percent of the conversion proceeds is treated as a
Public Asset and required to be deposited in a "Public Asset Fund"
managed by a five member board appointed by the Governor, Senate
Majority Leader and Speaker of the Assembly, and paid over to the
Director of the Budget for deposit in a Tobacco Control and Insurance
Initiatives Pool, from which in excess of $700 million dollars, more
than two thirds of the anticipated value of Empire, is required to be paid
to hospitals, nursing homes and certain personal care agencies to fund
pay raises for their nonmanagerial health care workers over a three year
term.
Complaint, Consumers Union, Inc. v. State of New York at 1 82, No. 118699/02
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
456. Editorial, The Empire "Heist", J. NEWS, Aug. 31, 2002, at 8B; see also Elizabeth
Greene & Meg Sommerfeld, $1-Billion Conversion Plan Draws Criticism in N.Y., CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 24, 2002, at 25; James C. McKinley, Before Bills Move in Albany, 3
Leaders Cut Deals in Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2002, at Al.
457. The governor's insurance commissioner commented: "What you would have had
is 12 to 15 board members appointed by the Attorney General doling out money as they see
fit .... Now what you have is the duly elected members of the Legislature, who represent
districts all across the state, determining what the health care purposes should be." A
spokesman for the attorney general claimed "unusual circumstances," and denied that this
action "sets rock-solid precedent." Andrew Metz, Conversion's Missed Chance, NEWSDAY,
Jan. 19, 2002, at A8.
458. The New York Times reported that a private lawsuit has few legal precedents: "In
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On June 18, 2002, Empire filed an amended plan of conversion with the New
York State Department of Insurance for approval to convert from a not-for-profit
health service corporation to a for-profit accident and health insurance company.
Consumers Union charged, among other things, that this "plan would spend 95% of
Empire BCBS's resources over three years, instead of establishing a permanent
endowment to continue Empire's charitable mission. If instead all the funds were
put in a health care foundation, the foundation could award $50 million in grants to
expand health access and coverage per year in perpetuity., 459
In comments filed with the superintendent of the department of insurance, the
attorney general focused on issues of maximizing the value of Empire's stock.4 °
Referring back to the earlier conversion contemplated under the Not-for-Profit
Corporations Law,461 the attorney general asserted that "the Empire Conversion
Legislation is apparently silent, as is Empire's Amended Plan, with respect to
shareholder rights and other protections of the kind we pursued under Empire's
former proposal. ' 62 Accordingly, the attorney general concluded, the department
of insurance "should approve a conversion plan only if it is accompanied by
sufficient shareholder rights and other protections which will ensure that the fair
market value is not substantially diminished, and the statutory mandate to
'maximize the value of the public asset' is achieved.''463 The attorney general did
not comment on the percentages allocated to the State and to the foundation.
Unsatisfied with this course of events, Consumers Union and other parties
filed a lawsuit in August 2002 seeking a permanent injunction prohibiting the
conversion or, in the alternative, requiring all conversion proceeds to be paid to a
foundation that will carry on Empire's charitable nussion. The plaintiffs charged
the legislature with engaging in an unconstitutional taking of private property
without just compensation and other constitutional violations. As to the actions of
the board, the complaint charged: "In their eagerness to secure for-profit status,
however, Empire's directors have now chosen to acquiesce in the State's taking of
one case, consumer organizations sued Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Georgia and the state
insurance commissioner after the health plan converted to a for-profit. In a settlement in
1998, the conversion went ahead but the health plan agreed to give some assets to a public
health foundation." Milt Freudenheim, Suit Attacks Plan to Change Blue Cross Status, N.Y.
TiMES, Aug. 21, 2002, at B2. See also FREMONT-SMITH & HORWITZ, supra note 104, at 7("In 1996, the Virginia legislature passed a bill requiring the de-mutualization proceeds to be
paid to the state treasury rather than to a new charity. As a result, $176 million from the
conversion of Trigon (Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Virginia) was transferred to the
Virginia treasury with the approval of the Attorney General.") (footnotes omitted).
459. Press Release, supra note 449.
460. Letter from Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, New York, to George V. Serio,
Superintendent, New York State Department of Insurance, Aug. 2, 2002 [hereinafter Spitzer
Letter] (on file with author).
461. See supra notes 454-55 and accompanying text.
462. Spitzer Letter, supra note 460, at 3.
463. Id. at 4.
464. Complaint, Consumers Union, Inc. v. State of New York, No. 118699/02 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2002). As to standing, the complaint asserts: "Upon information and belief, no
member of the Board of Directors, no appointed member of the corporation, and no public
official with authority to require that Empire's Directors act in accord with their fiduciary
duty to the corporation, including the office of the Attorney General, has challenged or will
challenge the Amended Plan of Conversion as inconsistent with their fiduciary duties." Id. at
1141.
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Empire's charitable assets. They have thus violated the duties of loyalty, obedience
and care which they owe to Empire and its charitable mission.,,465 As to the actions
of the attorney general, the complaint charged that "the Attorney General has
declined to challenge the Legislation, the actions of Empire's Board, or the taking
of Empire's assets by the State.
'466
On September 20, 2002, the attorney general (on behalf of the state
defendants) and Empire filed a motion to dismiss, on the grounds that the plaintiffs
lacked standing and failed to state a cause of action. On the merits, the attorney
general's memorandum in support of its motion quoted the legislation to show that
the provisions of the act preempt the ordinary process for adopting and approving
the disposition of nonprofit assets:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the superintendent's
approval of the conversion transaction shall constitute final approval of
the transaction and no further authorizations or approvals shall be
required. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, sole jurisdiction
for any challenge of the superintendent's final determination regarding
the conversion transaction shall rest with the New York supreme court
and shall be commenced within thirty days of the superintendent's final
determination. Judicial review shall be limited to a determination as to
whether the superintendent acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner
with respect to reaching a determination.
467
As to the plaintiffs' charge of an unconstitutional taking, the attorney general
replied that "the conversion by Empire from a non-profit to a for-profit entity does
not result in a state taking of anything: it is a voluntary, discretionary decision by
those responsible for Empire-the board of directors.' '468 Moreover, Empire's
memorandum asserts that the board is insulated from a charge of breach of duty by
the statute: "if the Superintendent approves the amended plan of conversion, New
York Insurance Law § 7317(f)(ii) effectively declares that the board's decision to
authorize the conversion cannot constitute a breach of fiduciary duty as a matter of
law."
4 6 9
465. Id. at 1 3. The complaint also charged: "Empire's Directors abdicated and
breached their fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and obedience by, inter alia: (i) abandoning
the Restructuring Plan which the Board originated in 1997 as best meeting its fiduciary
obligations and then pursued through 5 years of regulatory hearings and approvals; (ii)
asking the Legislature to substitute its judgment in determining the disposition of Empire's
assets; and (iii) ignoring requests to exercise its fiduciary duty and instead simply
acquiescing in the Legislature's taking of Empire's value for purposes other than carrying
out Empire's mission." Id. at 1143.
466. Id. at 197.
467. N.Y. INs. LAW § 7317(f)(i) (McKinney 2002) (emphasis added).
468. State Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint at 26, Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State of New York, No. 118699/02 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2002).
469. Empire's Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 25,
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State of New York, No. 118699/02 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002)
(emphasis in original). Specifically, the statute provides that compliance with the new act
shall be deemed to constitute compliance with and shall supercede [sic]
all such other legal requirements, including, but not limited to, statutory,
common law and any other requirements relating to not-for-profit
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In their reply brief, the plaintiffs declared:
It is ironic that the AG cites its own role as "parens patriae" and
protector of charitable assets as a basis for denying plaintiffs' standing
in this case.... Indeed, the unusual circumstances of this case-where
the AG has been legislatively defrocked of its parens patriae robe and
has been saddled with an irreconcilable conflict of interest by virtue of
its statutory obligation to defend legislative enactments-provide an
additional basis for plaintiffs' standing. With the AG removed from its
customary office as protector of the public's (as opposed to the
government's) interest in charitable property, and the Directors walking
away from their fiduciary role, no one but plaintiffs remain to stand up
for Empire and the charitable mission of its assets.
470
The plaintiffs refined their "takings" argument by characterizing the legislation as
an "unconstitutional condition," in which New York State granted the Empire
board's desire to convert to for-profit status on condition that it surrender nearly all
of its assets.471 "When the Directors have been left with no option but to sell
Empire's charitable soul in order to save its commercial enterprise skin, this hardly
makes their forfeiture 'voluntary.'
472
The November 2002 initial public offering raised twice as much as expected
for about 25 percent of the stock of the new publicly traded company, WellChoice,
thus doubling the total value of the Empire conversion to $2 billion.473 And there
might be more on the way for the financially-strapped state. The New York Times
reports:
Now at least two other nonprofit insurers in the state are weighing
whether to become publicly traded corporations, handing Albany
lawmakers the possibility of two more big windfalls at a time when the
state is trying to close a cumulative budget deficit estimated at $12
billion next year out of a $90 billion budget. To that end, Mr. Pataki
submitted legislation along with his proposed budget on Wednesday
that would give blanket authorization to other nonprofit insurance
companies to convert to profit-making entities if they wish.
474
corporations and fiduciary requirements applicable to the board of
directors of any company filing a plan pursuant to this section. In
addition, and not in limitation of the foregoing, a transaction approved
by the superintendent shall be deemed for all purposes to be a
transaction that is fair and reasonable to an applicant.., and the use of
proceeds as described herein shall be deemed for all purposes to be a
use for a purpose that is consistent with and as near as may be to the
purposes for which the applicant was originally organized and
subsequently operated.
N.Y. INs. LAW § 7317(f)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 2004).
470. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 35,
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State of New York, No. 118699/02 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
471. Id. at 36 n.32 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigart, 512 U.S. 374, 316-17 (1994)).
472. Id. at 36.
473. Alison Leigh Cowan & James C. McKinley, Jr., Critics Say Albany Is Wasting
Insurance Windfall, N.Y. TIMEtS, Feb. 1, 2003, at B1.
474. Id.
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On March 6, 2003, Judge Gammerman issued a ruling that granted standing to
the plaintiffs (including Consumers Union) who faced 1 remium increases, but
dismissed all of their enumerated claims on the merits. 4 7? The court commented
that while the attorney general generally has exclusive standing to enforce
charitable assets, anyone with a "special interest" also has standing. Moreover, the
court noted that the attorney general is, as required, defending the statute, and so
"the beneficiaries ... are here cast upon their own devises." 47 However, the court
ruled that constitutional claims cannot be raised against the Empire defendants,
who are private parties, and refused to find that they violated their fiduciary
duties.477 The court also dismissed the claims against the state defendants. As to the
takings charge, the court elaborated: "Even if it is assumed, without deciding, that
plaintiffs have a property interest in Empire's assets [a highly dubious assumption],
the claims alleging a taking must fail because the Statute does not require Empire
to convert. The Statute presented Empire with a choice, albeit a Hobson's choice,
of whether to convert, given the terms that the Statute imposed. 4 78 Surprisingly,
though, the court identified a new cause of action, allowing the plaintiffs thirty-
days to amend their complaint to invoke a provision of the New York Constitution
barring private laws that grant any single corporation an exclusive privilege or
franchise. The judge also extended the stay on the expenditure of proceeds from the
sale of stock held by the conversion foundation. On April 1, 2003, the plaintiffs
475. Consumers Union v. State of New York, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 12, 2003, at 18 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Mar. 6, 2003).
476. Id. The court concluded:
In any event, the rules limiting standing to enforce the terms of
charitable trusts, and the exceptions to those rules, apply to lawsuits
brought against the directors or managers of such trusts. Defendants
have adduced no case, and I know of none, that holds, or even suggests,
that those rules limit the general rules that govern standing to challenge
the constitutionality of a state statute. The individual plaintiffs and CU
have shown that they, or the members whom they represent here, are
likely to suffer injury-in-fact, as a result of the conversion of Empire,
which injury will not be shared by the general public. Accordingly,
these plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Statute.
Id.
477. Id. Specifically, the court ruled:
Inasmuch as plaintiffs' constitutional claims are not, and cannot, be
alleged against the Empire defendants, the fifth cause of action, alleging
a violation of 42 USC §1983, must be dismissed as against those
defendants. As seen above, the Statute supersedes all inconsistent
common-law and statutory duties. Consequently, the sixth and seventh
causes of action, which allege that the Empire defendants failed to
comply with provisions of the NFPCL, and that they violated their
fiduciary duties, must also be dismissed. Accordingly, the motion of the
Empire defendants to dismiss the complaint, as to them, should be
granted.
Id.; see also FREMONT-SMITH & HORWIrz, supra note 104, at 5 ("Although the court
accepted the characterization of Empire as a charity and the application of trust principles to
this case without discussion, it rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants violated their
fiduciary duties; it stated, without further explanation, that the State supersedes all
inconsistent common-law and statutory duties.").
478. Consumers Union v. State of New York, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 12, 2003, at 18 (brackets
in original).
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filed both an amended complaint and an appeal of Judge Gammerman's ruling.479
In October, Consumers Union survived WellChoice's motion to dismiss; while
WellChoice promptly appealed, $418 million from stock sales remain escrowed.48 °
However, the court dismissed the claims against the individual members of
Empire's board, a move Consumers Union did not oppose. 48 1 New York State still
owns 70 percent of the stock, an investment that appreciated more than 40 percent
as of October 2003.482 The state appears on the verge of finding a happy
constitutional way out of the court challenge: Another nonprofit health plan, worth
as much as $1 billion, is seeking legislative approval to convert, and the revenue-
starved state is salivating over the potential conversion proceeds.483
3. Fallout and Analysis
Planners of other contemplated Blue Cross conversions have reacted to this
regulatory climate by abandoning their intentions. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
North Carolina abruptly withdrew its application to convert, purportedly because of
delay by the insurance department and the likelihood of unacceptable conditions,
including the desire for state influence over appointments to the conversion
foundation board. 484 The attorney general of North Carolina had rendered an
opinion that the insurance commissioner generally "has the authority to enter an
approval order imposing continuing conditions on the conversion, provided each
479. See James M. Odato, Lawsuit Deals Another Blow to State in Crisis, ALBANY
TIMES UNION, Apr. 3, 2003, at Al.
480. See Tom Perrotta, Suit to Challenge Conversion of Empire Allowed to Proceed,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 2, 2003, at 1.
481. Id.
482. See Mary Sisson, WellChoice Earns Clean Bill of Health; Insurer Is Thriving a
Year After IPO, CRArN's N.Y. Bus., Nov. 24, 2003, at 3.
483. See Richard Perez-Pena, Many Sides Await Deal on Insurer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22,
2003, at Al. The Times reports: "This time, the political forces are far less unified about
what to do with the money, and since every member of the Legislature is up for re-election
in 2004, the issue is highly charged. No one involved expects the dispute to be resolved
easily." Id. The story suggests that state interests will likely override the interests of those in
New York City, despite claims that the conversion of this entity, HIP Health Plan, might be
different from Empire:
[New York City Mayor] Bloomberg administration officials and
municipal unions argue that HIP is unique and that the money should
not automatically revert to the state. The insurer was created in the
1940's to cover city employees, and while it has long covered other
clients, city workers remain a big part of its enrollment. The city and its
workers have contributed much of HIP revenues over the years, and
four municipal unions are represented on its board. As a result, city and
union officials say, they have a particular claim on any conversion
money.
Id.
484. See, e.g., Kristi E. Schwartz & Danielle Deaver, Blue Cross of North Carolina
Drops For-Profit Plan: CEO Refers to Length of Process, Possibility of More Restrictions,
WINSTON-SALEM J., July 9, 2003, at Al ("[CEO Bob] Greczyn said that the trustees were
worried that the insurance department would want to directly appoint many of Blue Cross'
board members, interfere with the board's management responsibilities, impose rate caps
and limitations and push for the release of such confidential business information as
membership and financial projections.").
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condition is reasonably related to the accomplishment of one or more of the
legislative goals found in the conversion law."4 ss According to press coverage, the
public was pleased with this outcome, although some lamented that failure to sell
would mean no new conversion foundation. 8 6 Of course, the same dollar cannot be
counted twice, and one conversion opponent commented: "No foundation is worth
making 2.8 million people in North Carolina pay substantially more for their health
,A487coverage. Other opponents are not done: They're seeking reform legislation to
make Blue Cross "act like a nonprofit," even though the North Carolina Blue Cross
is not chartered as a charity.48 s
Regulators nationwide are sharing information on these events-the June 2003
meeting of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners hosted a Blue
Cross Blue Shield Conversion Working Group. 489 Maryland's success in imposing
nonprofit status on CareFirst:
also has heartened officials at the Washington State Hospital
Association, which filed a lawsuit in January to block the proposed
conversion of Premera Blue Cross .... .. Now there's mounting
evidence from other states that these conversions have negative
consequences and should be denied," said [one advocate]. "This may be
the beginning of a trend."'49
485. Power of Commissioner to Approve Conversion Plans with Conditions; Limits on
Conditions, Office of the Attorney General of the State of N.C. (Feb. 18, 2003), available at
2003 N.C. AG LEXIS 2.
486. For example, an editorial in the Durham Herald-Sun identified the "down side to
stay not-for-profit. Conversion would have spun off an independent health care foundation
valued at more than $710 million in Blue Cross stock. Now that won't happen, and it's a big
loss for the state." Editorial, Blue Cross Should Get More Scrutiny, HERALD-SUN (Durham),
July 10, 2003, at A8.
487. Anne Krishnan, Limits Kill Blue Cross Change, HERALD-SUN (Durham), July 9,
2003, at B 1. In the meantime, the state, anticipating the conversion, had enacted legislation
requiring Blue Cross to pay the same state tax rates as other insurance companies-for an
estimated total of $18.6 million more this year. "They're going to be stuck with that one,"
commented one state senator. Id.; see also David Rice, Reaction in Raleigh Mixed to BCBS
Decision, WINSTON-SALEM J., July 9, 2003, at Al.
488. Jean P. Fisher, It's Not Over for Blue Cross, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), July
10, 2003, at D1. "'The question becomes one for the Legislature and whether the Legislature
wants to have a company cloaked as a nonprofit that is in effect acting as a for-profit,' said
Peter Kolbe, general counsel for the N.C. Department of Insurance. 'That's not something
we have the authority to deal with now that the conversion has been pulled."' Anne
Krishnan, Scrutiny of N.C. Insurer Not Over, HERALD-SUN (Durham), July 9, 2003, at Al.
This story concludes: "The DOI currently doesn't have the authority to make Blue Cross
lower its premiums or its profit margins, Kolbe said. Regulators achieved the rate
stabilization program in 1986 as the result of 'arm twisting,' he said." Id.
489. See As Consumers Wield Influence, Blues Conversions Don't Go As Smoothly,
BESTWtRE, June 23, 2003.
490. Laura B. Benko, Curtain Falls: CareFirst Settlement Dims Hope for Blues
Conversion, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 16, 2003, at 14; see also Alan Greenblatt, Regulators
Say No to the Blues, GOVERNING MAGAZINE, June 2003, at 44. The Washington State
conversion might also be vulnerable to an as yet unspecified charge by a whistleblower. See
Laura B. Benko, Out In the Open: Long-Secret Whistleblower Suit Could Harm Premera's
Attempt to Go For-Profit, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Aug. 18, 2003, at 18.
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Even where a Blue Cross plan had previously switched from nonprofit to for-
profit, the state might find that a sale is not in the public interest (i.e., in the interest
of its policyholders). Notably, the Kansas Supreme Court unanimously upheld the
decision of the insurance commissioner (and now governor) to reject the
conversion of the state's (now for-profit) Blue Cross plan to a stock corporation
and subsequent sale to Anthem, Indianapolis. 49 1 Most recently, New Jersey's
largest health insurer called a halt to its two-year project of conversion.492
As mentioned above, the Blue Cross conversions can be difficult to fit into the
general charity-state relationship. Moreover, as the court's opinion in the Empire
case reveals, applying normal doctrine leads to the unsatisfying legal result that
neither the state nor the governing board acted illegitimately, and that there is no
avenue for obtaining judicial relief. Technically, the conversion legislation was not
a "taking" because the Empire board voted to accept its terms. Nor, in the abstract,
could the board's decision to transfer the conversion proceeds to the state be
attacked-after all, charitable purposes have always included relieving the burdens
of government. One is left with the abiding reservation, however, that this transfer
was not made voluntarily by those with an interest in any other outcome-that is,
the board was not going to be in control of the conversion proceeds, and was
simply looking forward to when it could operate more efficiently in proprietary
form. The question remains, then, of the appropriate beneficiary class: the
subscribers, the uninsured and underinsured, the needy, or some other group-and
who decides?
CONCLUSION
The state-at the first instance through its attorney general-has the obligation
to provide oversight of the charitable sector. Where discretion is conferred on a
charity's board, proper state enforcement action over fiduciary decisionmaking
reduces to a single rule: The role of the attorney general and courts is to guard
against charity fiduciaries' wrongdoing, and not to interfere in decisionmaking
carried out in good faith. To this end, an attorney general is vested with the
authority to seek to correct breaches of fiduciary duty that have not otherwise been
remedied by the board. However, the attorney general is not a "super" member of
the board.
Complicating the issue, the talisman of donor intent seems to permeate
decisions over all of a charity's activities, regardless of the other sources of charity
assets, and how small a percentage of those assets might consist of donations. (It is
491. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kan., Inc. v. Praeger, 75 P.3d 226 (Kan. 2003). "In
1992, BCBSKS terminated its nonprofit status and became a mutual insurance company. In
order to extinguish its charitable obligations, BCBSKS made a one-time special payment of
approximately $75 million for charitable purposes which was judicially approved." Id. at
231. Immediately following the high court's decision, the entity announced that it was
abandoning plans to seek to affiliate with a larger plan, prompting the director of the Kansas
Medical Society to declare: "It keeps a pretty precious asset-a homegrown Kansas
insurer-here." Associated Press, Kansas Blue Cross-Blue Shield Won't Seek New Anthem
Offer, Dow JONES NEwswIREs, Aug. 7, 2003.
492. Horizon Blues: Staying Nonprofit Is Better for the Company, BESTWIRE, Aug. 25,
2003. The State of New Jersey might be unhappy with this outcome. The New York Times
has suggested that "New Jersey... is said to be intrigued by the New York-Empire deal."
Cowan & McKinley, supra note 473, at B I.
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sometimes also asserted that the public is entitled to a say over the use of the assets
because of the indirect public contribution through tax exemption.) The law needs
to clarify the extent to which donor intent can bind the charity beyond the
immediate terms of the gift, and who gets to decide. That is, is a determination to
alter the purposes of a charitable corporation a matter for the board, to be reviewed
only for abuse of discretion?
Is there any way to take politics out of the mix? To what extent is it desirable
to do so? Proposals have emerged from time to time to create a variously-
conceived "charities board," either at the state level 493 or at the federal level.494 Joel
Fleishman recently revisited this debate by urging:
For the long-run good of the sector, we cannot continue to rely on an
inadequately staffed and insufficiently powerful IRS, the vagaries of
inadequately staffed and usually not-very-interested offices of state
attorneys general which, in any event, have difficulty in policing a
sector which routinely crosses state and national boundaries many times
a day, the limited scope and vision of voluntary watchdog agencies, the
new information-providing organizations, and the investigatory,
inflammatory press.495
More recently, James Fishman set forth a detailed proposal for improving charity
accountability through the creation of local charity commissions of "unpaid
citizens, eight appointed by the governor and seven by the attorney general":
The commissions would serve under the control and guidance of the
state attorney general .... The charity commissions would be public-
private partnerships which would be imbued with a legal and moral
authority that a wholly private body or state agency could not engender.
They also could serve an educational or remedial, norms inculcation
function more easily than a governmental enforcement agency alone.
4 96
However, creating a new body has risks of its own: each regulator's particular
493. See Avner Ben-Ner, Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector? Reforming Law and
Public Policy Towards Nonprofit Organizations, 104 YALE L.J. 731 (1994) (book review);
Karst, supra note 41, at 476-83.
494. See Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs (Filer Commission),
Commentary on Commission Recommendations, in 1 FILER COMM'N RESEARCH PAPERS 38
(U.S. Treas. Dep't ed., 1977); see also David Ginsburg et al., Federal Oversight of Private
Philanthropy, in 5 FILER COMM'N RESEARCH PAPERS 2640-44 (U.S. Treas. Dep't ed., 1977);
Adam Yarmolinsky & Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Preserving the Private Voluntary Sector:
A Proposal for a Public Advisory Commission on Philanthropy, in 5 FILER COMM'N
RESEARCH PAPERS 2857 (U.S. Treas. Dep't ed., 1977); Regina E. Herzlinger, Can Public
Trust in Nonprofits and Governments Be Restored?, 74 HARv. Bus. REv. 97 (1996).
495. Joel L. Fleishman, Public Trust in Not-for-Profit Organizations and the Need for
Regulatory Reform, in PHILANTHROPY AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN A CHANGING AMERICA
172, 185 (Charles T. Clotfelter & Thomas Ehrlich eds., 1999). The closest we come to a
national charity regulator is the Internal Revenue Service, although I note that the IRS
focuses its resources on issues relating to the rules of tax-exemption; is generally indifferent
to geographic location; and operates more as a bureaucracy than do those attorneys general
who are more influenced by immediate political considerations.
496. James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REv. 218, 272-
73 (2003).
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priorities can lead to over-regulation in some cases and under-regulation in
others.497
So, whose public does a charity serve? This Article does not reach the
substance of that question, but rather focuses on the process. I argue that this
decision is legitimately made by private parties-donors, charity boards, and
members-and so a charity's public is not necessarily the local community, the
state, or any other public that constitutes the constituents of an attorney general, a
legislature, or a judge. Still remaining is an examination of how such private parties
wrestle with the difficult issues of setting the mission for and governing the
charity-within the scope of a properly constituted and administered legal regime.
497. See Brody, Accountability and Public Trust, supra note 47. Professor Sidel has a
more benign view of the political process:
[T]he representational choices of the attorney general in the Hershey
struggle, and the fact that the Attorney General had to make such
choices, were not necessarily inappropriate given the limited
institutional actors available for oversight and supervision of the
nonprofit sector, the importance of public perception and views in the
actions of the sector, and the indisputable fact that we have chosen to
retain oversight and enforcement of the charitable system within the
political realm rather than handing it over to purportedly "non-political"
charity commissions or boards.
Sidel, supra note 163, at 34 (footnote omitted).
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